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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters at the intersection of macroeconomics and public
finance.
The first chapter demonstrates that deep recessions can stimulate investment in state fiscal
capacity. Large negative income shocks endanger the revenue-raising capability of existing
narrow tax bases, particularly when the ability to borrow is limited, making an increase in
fiscal capacity desirable relative to its implementation cost. An increase in fiscal capacity
enables a given amount of revenue to be raised by taxing a wider range of economic activity
at lower tax rates, which reduces the e!ciency cost of taxation. Evidence from U.S. state
governments during the Great Depression supports the model’s predictions: governments in
states experiencing larger than average negative income shocks were significantly more likely
to adopt a retail sales tax (and income taxes) than were governments in states experiencing
smaller than average income shocks, and state governments entering the Great Depression
with a high level of debt were more likely to adopt new tax bases than those with low levels
of debt.
The second chapter proposes a model of consumption commitments—costly adjustment of
spending for some goods—that can be easily incorporated into an otherwise standard rep-
resentative agent DSGE model. The model explains several features of aggregate consump-
tion data: (i) excess smoothness and excess sensitivity; (ii) hump-shaped dynamics; (iii)
attenuated response to transitory real interest rate changes; and (iv) some aspects of the
equity-premium puzzle. The model provides a microfoundation for reference dependent con-
sumption.
ix
The third chapter, co-authored with Peer Skov, uses a reform in Denmark a"ecting reporting
of charitable tax deductions to shed light on taxpayer behavior. We find that the introduction
of information reporting and pre-population of charitable tax deductions in 2008 coincided
with a doubling in the number of deductions claimed, and attribute this change to incomplete
claiming of eligible deductions under the prior self-reporting regime. We estimate the per-year
average amount of forgone tax benefits to be small, but find that many taxpayers repeatedly
failed to claim eligible charitable tax deductions under the self-reporting regime.
x
Chapter 1
What Determines Investment in Fiscal
Capacity? The Role of Macroeconomic
Income Shocks, Indebtedness and
Sovereign Risk
1.1 Introduction
Much of the modern public finance literature takes the set of tax bases as exogenously fixed,
and studies the optimal tax rate to levy on those bases. But a defining feature of economic
development is growth and compositional change in the set of tax bases used to raise revenue.
In developed economies, modern consumption and income tax bases have largely replaced
comparatively ine!cient trade, seignorage, licensing, and property taxes (except at the local
level for property taxes). These tax base changes—improvements in state fiscal capacity—
have reduced the e!ciency cost of raising revenue and facilitated the growth of government
in developed economies; limited ability to raise revenue at tolerable e!ciency cost is widely
seen as a barrier to economic growth in the developing world today (Besley and Persson,
2009).
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Understanding the determinants of improvement in state fiscal capacity is an active area of
research. Historians and economists have noted the coincidence of external wars and the
upgrading of fiscal capacity, captured in Tilly’s (1975, p. 42) famous words “War made
the state, and the state made war.” A glance at U.S. history is revealing: the first U.S.
income tax was proposed during the War of 1812 (although the war ended before the tax was
instituted); income taxes were imposed on a small number of taxpayers during the U.S. Civil
War; the modern income tax was introduced during World War I, following the ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and during World War II withholding
for wage and salary income was introduced, strengthening the ability of tax administrators
to enforce the income tax code.
In a seminal body of research, Besley and Persson (2009; 2010; 2013) and Besley, Ilzetzki
and Persson (2013) present a framework in which political frictions limit the willingness of
governments to invest in fiscal capacity: politicians undervalue the future benefits of higher
fiscal capacity because of political turnover, and a lack of social cohesion makes incumbent
politicians unwilling to invest in fiscal institutions that can be used by future governments
to redistribute money to disfavored groups. External wars act as a stimulant to investment
in fiscal capacity in their framework because, in the language of Besley and Persson (2009,
p. 1218), military spending is “an archetypal public good representing broadly common
interests for citizens.” Their framework assumes non-distortionary lump-sum taxes, with
fiscal upgrading corresponding to investment in compliance infrastructure that limits evasion
and avoidance behavior. In reality, however, upgrading of fiscal institutions includes both
improvement in compliance infrastructure and the adoption of new tax bases, both of which
lower the e!ciency cost of raising revenue.
This paper pursues a complementary explanation for upgrading in fiscal capacity, studying
the role of macroeconomic income shocks. A decline in income, particularly in the presence of
a high level of indebtedness, endangers the existing tax infrastructure and makes the benefit
of an increase in fiscal capacity high relative to its fixed implementation cost. Macroeconomic
fluctuations are transitory but, when the fixed cost incurred to upgrade fiscal capacity is large,
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improvements in fiscal capacity can be enduring.
This intuition is formalized in a model in which a benevolent government provides a public
good by taxing either a narrow share of private consumption goods at a high tax rate or
a broad set of goods at a low tax rate. The broader is the tax base—corresponding to a
higher level of fiscal capacity—the lower is the marginal e!ciency cost of raising tax revenue,
because a broader tax base permits the same amount of revenue to be raised at a lower tax
rate. In the model, revenue collections vary one-for-one with income (given an unchanged
tax rate and tax base) but, matching an empirical regularity, government spending does
not; in bad times, a government unable to accumulate debt must immediately cover its
revenue shortfall by either raising the tax rate on its existing tax base or undertaking a
base broadening reform: su!ciently large income shocks make an increase in fiscal capacity
optimal. A government with the ability to borrow can accumulate debt when income is low
and postpone the decision on how to meet a revenue shortfall, until net debt repayment is
required. Net debt repayment ordinarily occurs when income is high but, with high levels
of indebtedness, may occur in bad times, because sovereign risk makes lenders unwilling
to permit net lending. Net debt repayment adds to the revenue requirement, raises the
required tax rate, increases the distortionary cost of taxation, and thus increases the benefit
of improving fiscal capacity. An increase in fiscal capacity may also reduce the cost of
borrowing for a heavily indebted government: an increase in fiscal capacity is typically more
beneficial in the repayment than default state of the world (because debt repayment makes
the revenue requirement larger in the repayment state) which reduces default incentives.
The model’s implications are tested by examining the behavior of U.S. state governments
during the Great Depression. The size of income shocks during the 1930s was historically
unprecedented, creating strong incentives for governments to broaden their tax bases: real
per capita GDP for the U.S. as a whole fell by 29 percent between 1929 and 1933. The
empirical analysis makes use of the substantial cross-state variation in the magnitude of
income shocks experienced: South Dakota experienced a fall in real per capita personal
income of 56 percent between 1929 and 1933, while at the other extreme Virginia experienced
3
a decline of “only” 12 percent over the same period. Across state governments there was also
significant heterogeneity in debt levels on the eve of the Great Depression: several states had
almost no debt, while Arkansas had a debt-to-revenue ratio of 4.4 in 1929 and defaulted on
some of its debt obligations during the Great Depression.
The Great Depression had a profound impact on U.S. state government tax structure. Before
the Great Depression no state had a retail sales tax, and few states had individual income
or corporate income taxes. But by 1938 22 states had a retail sales tax, and many had also
adopted income taxes. States adopting a retail sales tax in the 1930s raised on average about
one-fifth of total tax revenue from the retail sales tax by 1942, and the importance of the
sales tax as a source of revenue has grown since then. Income taxes introduced during the
1930s were a non-trivial, but less significant, source of revenue.
The cross-sectional pattern of tax base adoption is consistent with the model: states su"ering
larger than average declines in income were significantly more likely to introduce a retail sales
tax than those experiencing smaller than average falls in income. The estimated e"ect of
income shocks is both economically significant and precisely estimated: each 10 percentage
point fall in per capita real income is estimated to have increased the probability that a
state government adopted a retail sales tax during the 1930s by about 0.18 (the average state
experienced a fall in real per capita income of about 30 percent). There was also a tendency
for states entering the Great Depression with high debt-to-income ratios to adopt a retail
sales tax.
Strikingly, however, state governments entering the Great Depression with little debt tended
to not increase deficit spending when incomes fell sharply in the early 1930s. Further, the
most indebted states at the onset of the Great Depression had begun reducing the real value
of debts before incomes recovered their pre-Depression level. Some of the unwillingness of
state governments to engage in deficit spending appears to be due to binding institutional
constraints: 20 states had constitutional balanced budget requirements in 1929, while others
had constitutional or procedural restrictions placing long-term debt issue in the hands of
voters, rather than legislatures (Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis, 2010; Ratchford, 1938). But
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even for states in which the e"ective power to issue debt resided in the state government
legislature, the magnitude of deficit spending was small compared to the size of income
shocks experienced. Some of this behavior appears to be due to a deterioration in borrowing
conditions: only a minority of states maintained their pre-Depression Aaa credit rating.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 lays out and discusses a for-
mal model endogenizing the upgrading of fiscal capacity; Section 1.3 contains the empirical
analysis, which uses the behavior of U.S. state governments during the Great Depression to
investigate the relationship between macroeconomic income shocks, indebtedness and fiscal
capacity; and some concluding thoughts are o"ered in Section 1.4.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Overview of the Model
The model assumes a government that raises revenue via a distortionary tax to provide a
public good. It is inspired by Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989), but di"ers in a number
of important ways. Households receive a time-varying income endowment and consume a
continuum of private goods, for which the government chooses both the tax rate and the
breadth of the tax base (the set of taxed commodities).1 A broader tax base corresponds to
a higher level of fiscal capacity, and these two terms are used interchangeably. Cobb-Douglas
utility is assumed because with these preferences a uniform rate on all taxed goods is optimal,
permitting the analysis to use a single tax rate and thus sidestep the issue of di"erentiated
tax rates among goods, which is not a central issue in this context.
An increase in tax base breadth lowers the excess burden of taxation, because there are
fewer untaxed goods for taxpayers to substitute toward, but raises marginal administrative
cost, which is assumed to be smoothly increasing in tax base breadth. As an example of
the relationship between tax base breadth and marginal administrative cost, expanding the
1Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) analyze the optimal setting of tax base breadth in an extended version of this
model with taxpayers of di!ering ability levels and a social preference for redistribution.
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sales tax base to include services is widely believed to raise administrative cost because
service transactions are generally more costly to observe, and therefore to tax, than are
goods transactions.2 At an optimum, the reduction in the excess burden of taxation from
a marginal increase in tax base breadth is equal to the marginal increase in administrative
costs. Because excess burden is convex in the tax rate levied on a given tax base, the optimal
breadth of the tax base is increasing in the government’s revenue requirement.
The model is written in terms of a commodity tax base but, by letting the set of untaxed
goods be income tax deductible items, the model can be interpreted as a description of
the income tax base as well. Much of the discussion that follows emphasizes the sales tax
interpretation of the model because income tax changes were a less important development
for U.S. state government finances during the 1930s than was adoption of the sales tax.
Two variants of the model are solved: a special case in which the government must run a per-
period balanced budget (20 U.S. states had such restrictions in 1929), and a general version in
which tax revenue shortfalls can be smoothed via sovereign borrowing (U.S. state governments
are sovereign with respect to their debts). To model the interdependence between income
shocks, fiscal capacity, and sovereign risk, the model of optimal tax base breadth sketched
out above is incorporated into an Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) type model of sovereign debt
accumulation. Modeling the interaction between fiscal capacity and sovereign risk is a key
contribution of this paper: few models of sovereign borrowing explicitly include a government
sector, and, to the best of my knowledge, none have endogenized tax base breadth.
In the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model, borrowers are willing to lend to sovereign gov-
ernments because default imposes reputation costs on borrowers that preclude access to
international financial markets; governments are willing to maintain their repayment obliga-
tions for as long as the expected present value costs of financial autarky exceed the cost of
repayment. While the threat of financial autarky is su!cient at a theoretical level to sup-
port sovereign borrowing, plausible calibrations indicate that the increase in consumption
2Note that there may be cases where administrative cost is not smoothly increasing in tax base breadth;
excluding a small number of commodities from the tax base is likely to raise collection costs because extra
resources are required to police avoidance and evasion opportunities provided by exemptions.
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volatility under financial autarky imposes small costs and can support only small amounts
of debt in equilibrium (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, and Lucas, 1987).3 The reputation
cost model is now widely used in the modern quantitative sovereign debt literature but, in
order to yield a plausible quantitative description of debt dynamics, these models generally
assume there is also an output cost experienced upon default (see Arellano, 2008, and Aguiar
and Amador, forthcoming).
The following subsection begins the formal description of the model.
1.2.2 Model Setup
1.2.2.1 Privately Consumed Goods
There is a representative consumer who has Cobb-Douglas period utility for privately con-




!ilog (ci,t) di, (1.2.1)
where the sum of the parameters !i has been normalized to unity:
´ 1
0 !idi = 1. At an
optimum for the consumer, the parameter !i is equal to the consumer’s expenditure share
on good i " [0, 1]. The representative consumer receives an exogenous income endowment At,
and spends all their income each period. The assumption of an endowment economy means
that there is no labor/leisure trade-o", and that leisure is not included in the set of goods
i " [0, 1]. The income endowment At is assumed to evolve according to the autoregressive
process At = #At!1 + (1! #) Ā+ $t, where # is the autocorrelation parameter, Ā = 1 is the
steady-state income level, and $t " iid (0, %2!). As a consequence of the representative agent
assumption, there are no di"erences in income or time preference across households that
would give rise to borrowing or lending. However, the government may be able to borrow
3The Eaton-Gersovitz equilibrium relies on governments being unable to save at the world interest rate, and
thereby accumulate surpluses. Bulow and Rogo! (1989b) show that if a government can save at the world
interest rate, then the reputation cost model can sustain no debt in equilibrium: rather than repay debt, a
sovereign government would be better of by defaulting at its point of maximum indebtedness and using the
funds that would have gone to debt repayment to self-insure against fluctuations in national income.
7
outside the jurisdiction on behalf of households. The set of goods i " [0, It] are subject to a
uniform tax rate, and the remaining set of goods i " (It, 1] are not taxed. The larger is the
index of taxed goods, It, the broader is the tax base because a wider set of commodities is
subject to tax. The expenditure share of taxed goods is b (It) #
´ It
0 !idi and, because b (It)
is a monotonic transformation of It, the planner can equivalently set the breadth of the tax
base by choosing b (It) or It. Normalizing the exogenous pre-tax price of all goods to unity,
households face the price pi,t = 11!"t for goods i " [0, It], and pi,t = 1 for goods i " (It, 1]. The





(1! &)!iAt for i $ It
!iAt for i > It,
(1.2.2)
implying period indirect utility for privately-consumed goods equal to
%v (At, &t, bt) = ' + logAt + btlog (1! &t) , (1.2.3)
where ' #
´ 1
0 !ilog (!i) di is a constant. Ceteris paribus, utility from privately consumed
goods is increasing in the income endowment At, decreasing in the tax rate &t, and decreasing
in the share of goods subject to tax bt.
The excess burden of taxation is the cost to the representative consumer of paying taxes on a
narrow tax base relative to a world in which they remit the same tax liability via a lump-sum
tax.4 Measured in units of utility, the excess burden of taxation for a tax policy that collects
tax revenue R = &tbtAt is equal to:
EB (At, &t, bt) # %v (At !R, 0, bt)! %v (At, &t, bt)
= log (At !R)! [log (At) + btlog (1! &t)] .
(1.2.4)
In what follows, this excess burden of taxation will sometimes be equivalently referred as
4In this model, a comprehensive tax base is equivalent to a lump-sum tax, but is assumed to be prohibitively
expensive to administer.
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e!ciency cost, or deadweight loss. Next, consider the reduction in the excess burden of
taxation due to a revenue-neutral marginal increase in tax base breadth. This can be found
by di"erentiation of Equation (1.2.4) with respect to bt, subject to the requirement that
tax-revenue collected is unchanged: R = &tbtAt. The decline in excess burden is:
(EB
(bt









where the approximate equality in Equation (1.2.5) follows from taking a second-order Taylor
series approximation around & = 0. The decline in excess burden due to a marginal increase
in tax base breadth is approximately proportional to the tax rate squared; as discussed
in detail later, this convexity plays a crucial role in explaining the occurrence of tax base
changes.5
Reflecting the fact that the marginal excess burden of a tax rate increase is decreasing in
tax base breadth, Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002, p. 108) show that the compensated tax base
elasticity (TBE) with respect to the net-of-tax price of goods in this setting is equal to the







= (1! bt) . (1.2.6)
Because the parameter bt controls both the share of goods subject to tax and the tax base
elasticity, the model cannot, in general, match both these statistics for a real-world com-
modity tax base. The direct dependence of the TBE on tax base breadth can be relaxed
by assuming more general constant elasticity of substitution preferences (see Slemrod and
Kopczuk 2002, fn. 11), but the loss in tractability exceeds any gain in realism for the appli-
cation here. In Section 1.2.5, where the model is calibrated and solved quantitatively, bt is
chosen to match the aggregate TBE, not the empirically observed tax base breadth.
5Note that the increase in excess burden due to a marginal increase in the tax rate is approximately 12!tbt,
near ! = 0.
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1.2.2.2 Public Good Provision and Administrative Costs
Revenue raised by taxation of the privately consumed goods is used to fund provision of
a public good, and net repayment of debt obligations incurred. The government’s period
budget constraint is given by:
Gt = &tbtAt ! ) (bt, bt+1) + qtDt+1 !Dt, (1.2.7)
where Gt is spending on the public good, &tbtAt is revenue raised from proportional com-
modity taxes at rate &t on a tax base with breadth bt at an income level At, Dt+1 is the face
value of a one-period discount bond repayable at time t+ 1, and qt is the price of that bond
today. The administrative cost function ) (bt, bt+1) depends on both the current level of fiscal
capacity, and next period’s level of fiscal capacity:
) (bt, bt+1) = )f (bt) + )F (bt, bt+1) , (1.2.8)
where )f (bt) is the per-period fixed cost to administer a tax base with breadth bt, and
)F (bt, bt+1) is the fixed setup cost incurred in undertaking a tax base broadening reform that
expands the expenditure share of commodities subject to tax from bt to bt+1. There is no
fixed setup cost associated with a tax base narrowing reform. The per-period administrative
cost )f (bt) is assumed to be convex in tax base breadth, reflecting the fact that purchases of
some commodities are more di!cult to observe, and therefore more costly to include in the
tax base. Although in practice it may sometimes be less costly to administer a tax base with
few exceptions than a tax base with many exceptions, the assumption that )f (bt) is convex
in tax base breadth captures the underlying tradeo" faced by tax administrators: an increase
in tax base breadth reduces the excess burden of taxation, but raises collection costs.
The fixed setup cost incurred when fiscal capacity is upgraded includes all the expenses
incurred by the tax administration, such as training employees and purchasing equipment,
in readying operations to collect revenue on a new tax base. The infrequency with which
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we observe fundamental changes in tax base breadth—such as the introduction, or repeal,
of an income or sales tax base—suggests that the one-time fixed cost incurred in changing
tax base breadth is large; were this cost small, we would expect tax bases introduced when
revenue needs are unusually high to be repealed when revenue needs return to normal levels,
and the flow cost of administering a broad tax base exceeds the benefit a"orded via reduced
e!ciency cost of raising revenue. An increase in tax base breadth chosen this period becomes
operational in the next period, but the fixed setup cost is incurred today; in contrast, the
per-period fixed administrative cost )f (bt) is incurred only in periods in which the tax base
is operational.
Utility is additively separable between private and public good consumption, with period
semi-indirect utility for the representative household from consumption of private and public
goods given by:





where * parameterizes the importance of the public good relative to privately consumed
goods. Note that utility depends on next period’s level of fiscal capacity via the resource
cost of any fixed setup cost incurred, which is reflected, holding the tax rate constant, in the
level of public good provision (see Equation 1.2.8). Utility for the public good depends on its
provision relative to the reference point Ḡ, with the parameter + > 0 controlling the weight
placed on the reference point.
This specification of public good utility is introduced to model the empirical regularity of
counter-cyclical business-cycle variation in government spending as a share of income. When
+ is large there is a high degree of curvature in the public good utility function around the
reference point, and the representative household prefers greater business-cycle variation in
spending on privately-consumed goods than the public good. Hence, the larger is +, the
smaller is the optimal degree of variation in public spending over the business cycle.
The reference level Ḡ is assumed to be equal to the steady-state (when income At is at its
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mean) level of public good provision Gss, in which case the marginal utility of government
spending, and thus the optimal size of government, in the steady-state is una"ected by the





*log (1! +) + *log (Gss), and the weight on the reference level + does not a"ect marginal
utility of the public good. For simplicity, the reference point Ḡ is assumed to not vary with
tax base breadth, even though, in principle, the optimal level of public good provision does
depend on the e!ciency cost of raising tax revenue, via tax base breadth.6
1.2.3 Optimal Commodity Tax Rate
The government enters each period with tax base breadth bt (determined in the previous
period), a level of debt Dt that must be repaid today, and knowing the current period’s
income endowment At. The level of borrowing Dt+1, the tax rate &t, and next period’s tax
base breadth bt+1 are chosen each period to maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility.
The model assumes no frictions a"ecting the choice of the tax rate &t each period, making
its choice a static problem conditional on choices for Dt+1 and bt+1. Taking tax base breadth
and net borrowing as given, the planner maximizes welfare for the representative taxpayer
(given by Equation 1.2.9), subject to the budget constraint (given by Equation 1.2.7). The
resulting first-order condition provides an implicit expression (i.e., conditional on tax base
breadth and the amount of debt issued in the current period) for the optimal tax rate:
& (At, Dt, Dt+1, bt, bt+1) =
*At + ) (bt, bt+1) + +Ḡ+Dt ! qtDt+1
At (bt + *)
. (1.2.10)
The optimal tax rate is higher the greater is net debt repayment Dt ! qtDt+1, and admin-
istrative costs ) (bt, bt+1). Holding net debt repayment and tax base breadth constant, an
increase in the income endowment At reduces the optimal tax rate, and an increase in the
public good preference parameter * increases the steady-state optimal tax rate. The larger
6Assuming utility for public consumption is globally more concave than utility for private consumption would
also lead households to desire less variation in private than public consumption over the business cycle.
However, an assumption of globally more concave utility for public than private consumption is di"cult to
defend in light of the growth in government spending as a share of income over the 20th century.
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is +, the greater is the required increase in the tax rate when income declines to fund the
desired level of public good provision. Holding administrative costs constant, a broader tax
base requires a lower tax rate to raise a given amount of revenue than a narrow tax base,
and thus the optimal tax rate is decreasing in tax base breadth.
Making use of the implicit expression for the optimum tax rate (Equation 1.2.10), let
v̂ (At, Dt, Dt+1, bt, bt+1) # v (At, & "t , bt, G"t ) (1.2.11)
represent utility for the representative taxpayer evaluated at the optimum tax rate (condi-
tional on Dt+1 and bt+1), where & "t = & (At, Dt, Dt+1, bt, bt+1) and G"t = & "t btAt ! ) (bt, bt+1) +
qtDt+1!Dt. This substitution re-expresses welfare for the representative household in terms
of only two choice variables for the planner at time t, Dt+1 and bt+1, simplifying the analysis
that follows.
1.2.4 Optimal Tax Base Breadth: Balanced Budget Requirement
Before considering government behavior when borrowing can be used to intertemporally
smooth revenue shocks, this subsection describes the determination of optimal tax base
breadth when there is a binding per-period balanced budget requirement. Faced with a tax
revenue shortfall, a government with a balanced budget requirement, unwilling to accommo-
date a fall in public spending equal to the fall in tax revenue, faces an immediate choice of
raising revenue by either levying a higher tax rate on its existing tax base or undertaking
a tax base broadening reform. In 1929, 20 U.S. states had a balanced budget requirement,
making this special case particularly relevant for the empirical analysis that follows.
With a balanced budget requirement, debt is equal to zero each period (Dt = Dt+1 = 0) and
the optimal tax rate (given by Equation 1.2.10) simplifies to & bbt # & (At, 0, 0, bt, bt+1). Noting
that tax base breadth at time t is predetermined (chosen in the previous period), Equation
(1.2.10) reveals that the optimal tax rate varies inversely with income: as income falls, the
value of the tax base (btAt) declines and, holding tax base breadth constant, the tax rate must
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rise to collect enough revenue to fund administrative costs, which do not vary with income,
and to fund provision of the public good, for which demand varies less than one-for-one with
income.
A revenue-neutral increase in tax base breadth permits a reduction in the tax rate, which
reduces the excess burden of taxation, but a tax base broadening reform incurs higher per-
period administrative cost, and a fixed setup cost to implement the increase in tax base
breadth. Defining v̂bbt # v̂ (At, 0, 0, bt, bt+1), the increase in per-period welfare at time t from
























The term !0,t measures the reduction in the excess burden of taxation from having a
marginally broader tax base (see Equation 1.2.5), and !1,t is the utility cost of paying for
the associated marginal increase in per-period administrative costs. If there were no fixed
setup cost incurred to increase tax base breadth the planner would optimally set !0,t = !1,t
in each period.
The sign of the cross-partial derivative (2v̂bbt /(bt(At is critical: if it is negative then the
benefit of having a marginally broader tax base rises as income falls, and we should expect
governments with a balanced budget requirement to be more likely to undertake a tax base
broadening reform when income is low than when it is high (and vice versa). In the neigh-
borhood of an optimum for tax base breadth (i.e., assuming !0,t = !1,t), a marginal increase






























Evidence from the U.S. states during the 1930s, discussed in detail in Section 1.3, indicates
that state governments experiencing large negative income shocks were significantly more
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likely to undertake tax base broadening reforms than states experiencing relatively modest
declines in income. This suggests it is important to understand the conditions under which
(in the neighborhood of an optimum for tax base breadth) (2v̂bbt /(bt(At is negative. With
some manipulation of Equation (1.2.13), it can be shown that a su!cient condition for a
negative cross-partial derivative (for a government with a balanced budget requirement) is









The elasticity of the optimal tax rate with respect to the income endowment ($",A) depends,
among other factors, on the optimal degree of variation in public good provision over the
business cycle. The smaller is the variation in public good provision that the representative
household desires in response to fluctuations in income the larger, in absolute value, is the
elasticity of the tax rate with respect to income. Intuitively, when demand for the public
good is insensitive to variation in income, the tax rate must rise sharply when income falls
to prevent a revenue shortfall; the sharp rise in the tax rate raises the excess burden of
taxation—and so the benefit a"orded by a marginal increase in tax base breadth. For a
government with a per-period balanced budget requirement, it can be shown that, making
use of Equation (1.2.10), for all values of the endowment $",A < !12 provided revenue needs





Figure 1.1 graphs !0,t and !1,t as a function of income, assuming that tax base breadth bt is
at an optimum (ignoring the fixed setup component of administrative costs) when income is




> *Amax, the curve !0,t cuts the
curve !1,t from above as a function of income. For values of the income endowment below
Ā, the vertical distance between !0,t and !1,t shown in Figure 1.1 indicates the increase in
utility from having a marginally broader tax base in period t. Recall though that tax base
breadth in the current period is determined in the previous period, and an increase in tax base
breadth requires payment of a fixed setup cost. If income in subsequent periods is expected
to be only briefly below Ā, a tax base broadening reform is undesirable because the social
7The tax revenue income elasticity is equal to one plus the tax rate income elasticity: "Rbb,A = 1 + "!bb,A.
15
cost of funding the fixed setup cost exceeds the benefit of having a marginally broader tax
base. In contrast, an expected prolonged decline in the income endowment makes it optimal
to incur the fixed cost to expand tax base breadth.
The next section relaxes the balanced budget restriction, outlining a model of optimal tax
base breadth determination in the presence of sovereign borrowing.
1.2.5 Model of Optimal Tax Base Breadth with Debt
A government that does not face a binding balanced budget requirement chooses {Dt+1, bt+1}
each period to maximize the discounted sum of expected lifetime social welfare. Formally,
the maximization problem at time t is:
V o (At, Dt, bt) = max
/




where V 0 (At, Dt, bt) is expected discounted lifetime utility for the representative household at
time t conditional on the government having access to foreign lenders. It is the maximum of
the expected utility provided by two choices available at time t: either maintain contractual
obligations and receive expected discounted lifetime utility V c (At, Dt, bt), or default on debt
obligations and receive expected discounted lifetime utility V d (At, bt). Default is assumed to
result in full repudiation of debt obligations. The value function conditional on maintaining
debt obligations is itself the solution to the following maximization problem:
V c (At, Dt, bt) = max
{Dt+1,bt+1}
{v̂ (At, Dt, Dt+1, bt, bt+1) + ,EtV o (At+1, Dt+1, bt+1)} . (1.2.15)
If the government chooses to default on its debt obligations expected discounted lifetime
social welfare is given by:
V d (At, bt) = max
bt+1
{v̂ (At (1! -) , 0, 0, bt, bt+1)
+,Et
1





with - parameterizing the output cost experienced during financial autarky. Upon default
the government loses access to credit markets, but regains access with state-independent
probability . each period; the government cannot save and must match its revenues and
expenditures period-by-period. Financial autarky has a cost to households via an increase
in the volatility of some combination of private consumption, public good provision, and the
tax rate.
Letting the probability of default next period be given by / (At, Dt+1, bt+1), perfectly com-
petitive risk-neutral lenders set a price for debt to earn an expected rate-of-return r per
period:8
q (At, Dt+1, bt+1) =
1! / (At, Dt+1, bt+1)
1 + r
. (1.2.17)
Lenders require a deeper discount on the face value of debt as the probability they will be
repaid falls. If the government enters period t with debt Dt and fiscal capacity bt, repayment
is optimal for the set of income realizations defined by:
R (Dt, bt) =
/
At : V




implying that default is optimal for the set of income realizations defined by the complement
set of income realizations: N (Dt, bt) = Rc (Dt, bt).
Letting "t = {At, Dt, bt}, a recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of (i)
policy functions for the tax rate & (At, Dt, Dt+1, bt, bt+1), public consumption Gt, and private
consumption ci,t for i " [0, 1], (ii) the government’s chosen debt level Dt+1 ("t), repayment
sets R (Dt, bt) and default sets N (Dt, bt); (iii) the policy function for next period’s level of
fiscal capacity bt+1 ("t); and (iv) the bond price function q (At, Dt+1, bt+1) such that:
1. The policy functions for the government and the representative household satisfy their
respective budget constraints each period;
8The Eaton-Gersovitz model has been extended to allow for risk-averse pricing (see Arellano, 2008).
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2. Taking the bond price schedule as given, the policy functions are optimal;
3. The bond price schedule reflects the government’s default probability for each history
of the state variables "t (i.e., in expectation competitive lenders make zero profit).
Because the value function V o is neither globally concave nor di"erentiable, being the maxi-
mum of two other value functions, the model, even without the incorporation of endogenous
fiscal capacity, yields few analytical insights (see Aguiar and Amador, forthcoming). How-
ever, the model can be solved numerically. But before doing so, in the next subsection I
analyze a simplified two-period version of the model that permits analytic expressions with
a rich set of implications.
1.2.6 Optimal Tax Base Breadth with Debt: Two-Period Model
This section considers a simple two-period version of the general model described above. The
income endowment in the second period is expected to be higher than in the first period,
creating a desire borrow in the first period. The government enters the first period with no
debt, and chooses the level of borrowing and the second period’s level of tax base breadth. The
model ends in the second period and debt incurred in the first period is due for repayment:
if the government defaults on its debt there is a proportional output cost -. Borrowing is
sustained only by the output cost experienced upon default, unlike in the general case where
threat of financial autarky also helps sustain borrowing. These simplifications imply the
following maximization problem for the planner in the first period:
max
{Dt+1,bt+1}









dF (At+1|At) , (1.2.19)
where v̂ct+1 # v̂ (At+1, Dt+1, 0, bt+1, bt+2) is utility under repayment, v̂dt+1 # v̂(At+1(1 !
-), 0, 0, bt+1, bt+2) is utility under default, and F (At+1|At) is the cumulative density function
for the income endowment in the second period, conditional on its level in the first period.
Because the model ends in the second period, it is assumed that there is no investment in
fiscal capacity made in the second period: bt+2 $ bt+1.
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The model is solved by backward induction, first considering the decision to repay or default
on debt obligations in the second period. Because there is no commitment technology binding
the government in the final period, the decision to repay or default on debt obligations
depends only on which choice gives higher second-period utility: default is optimal if v̂dt+1 >
v̂ct+1. With some algebra (see the appendix), it can be shown that default is optimal for the










bt+1 (1! (1! -)0 (bt+1))
(1.2.20)






That default occurs for low income realizations is a general feature of models with non-state-
contingent debt (see Aguiar and Amador, forthcoming). Because the cost of repayment rises
with indebtedness, but the output cost of default does not, the threshold Adt+1, and therefore
the likelihood of default, is increasing in the amount of debt due for repayment; this is also
a general feature of the Eaton-Gersovitz framework (see Arellano, 2008).
With a comprehensive tax base in the second period (bt+1 = 1), the default threshold given
by Equation (1.2.20) simplifies to Adt+1 = (Dt+1/-): default is optimal whenever debt due
for repayment is greater than the output cost of default. The smaller is the output cost of
default, the lower is the maximum amount of borrowing that can be sustained in equilibrium.
Because a broader tax base reduces the excess burden of raising revenue in both the repayment
and default states, it is not immediately clear how tax base breadth a"ects default incentives.
Critically, but demonstrated in the appendix, under a weak condition on initial tax base
breadth, the default threshold Adt+1 is decreasing in the level of fiscal capacity: (Adt+1/(bt+1 <




is shrinking in the level of second-period
tax base breadth. To understand this result intuitively, recall first that the reduction in the
excess burden of taxation from a marginal increase in tax base breadth is increasing in the
tax rate, and thus the revenue requirement (see Section 1.2.2.1). An increase in tax base
breadth reduces excess burden in the repayment state by more than in the default state (in
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the neighborhood of the default threshold) because—on account of the stock of debt due for
repayment—the revenue requirement, and so the tax rate, is greater in the repayment state.
In contrast, the change in administrative costs from a marginal increase in tax base breadth
reduces resources equally in the repayment and default states.









and as a consequence of the assumption of competitive risk neutral lenders, the discount bond
price in the first period is equal to q (At, Dt+1, bt+1) =
1!F(Adt+1|At)
1+r (see Equation 1.2.17).
Paying the fixed setup cost in the first period to increase second-period tax base breadth




, and thus the cost of borrowing, because the government
is less likely to renege on its debt obligations the higher is the level of fiscal capacity in the
second period.
With some manipulation, the first-order condition for optimal second-period tax base breadth







































, and dFt+1 = dF (At+1|At). The expression on the left-hand-side of Equa-
tion (1.2.21) is the expected benefit in the second period of having a marginally broader tax
base; at an optimum, it is balanced against the cost incurred in the first period to increase
tax base breadth, shown by the expression on the right-hand-side of Equation (1.2.21). The
term ()t/(bt+1 is the marginal administrative cost (in dollars) incurred in the first period to
marginally increase second-period tax base breadth; the term (qt/(bt+1 is the change in the
cost of debt (per dollar of repayment next period) with respect to a marginal increase in tax
base breadth, which, recalling the discussion above, is decreasing in second-period tax base
breadth. Hence, cost incurred in the first-period to expand tax base breadth is partly o"set
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by a reduction in the cost of borrowing. Equation (1.2.22), which expands the right-hand-
side of Equation (1.2.21), indicates that the cost of borrowing falls by more the larger is the
decrease in the default threshold with respect to a marginal increase in tax base breadth,





. Relative to a world in which borrowers can commit to repayment, the
presence of sovereign risk raises the marginal benefit of an increase in tax base breadth—via
reduced borrowing cost—and thus increases the optimal level of investment in fiscal capacity.
The reduction in total debt servicing cost due to a marginal increase in tax base breadth
is increasing in the level of indebtedness, for two reasons. First, there is a mechanical ef-
fect: the reduction in total borrowing costs is equal to the change in the cost of borrowing
multiplied by debt due for repayment, indicated by the Dt+1 term on the right-hand-side of
Equation (1.2.22). Second, the fall in the default threshold—and thus the cost of borrowing—
following a marginal increase in tax base breadth is larger the higher is the level of debt:
(2Adt+1/(bt+1(Dt+1 < 0 (see the appendix for a derivation).9 These facts together imply that
a marginal increase in tax base breadth reduces total borrowing costs by more the larger is
the amount borrowed in the first period.
In summary, from this simple two-period model we have gained these important insights
about the interaction of fiscal capacity and sovereign risk: i) for a given level of borrowing,
the default probability is decreasing in tax base breadth; ii) the reduction in the default
probability due to a marginal increase in tax base breadth is increasing in the level of indebt-
edness; and iii) the reduction in total debt servicing costs due to a marginal increase in tax
base breadth is increasing in the level of indebtedness.
The next section uses numerical techniques to solve the model outlined in Section 1.2.5,
allowing us to study the interaction between income shocks, fiscal capacity, and sovereign
borrowing in a more general infinite-horizon setting.




/#At+1 > 0, which is true if the probability density function f is
single-peaked and Adt+1 is at a level of income to the left of the peak in the density function.
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1.2.7 Optimal Tax Base Breadth With Debt: Numerical Solution
1.2.7.1 Calibration
Naturally, the model’s numerical solution depends on its calibration. The parameter values
outlined in this section have been chosen with the goal of describing the optimization prob-
lem faced by a typical U.S. state government in the 1930s—the time period and sample of
governments that the empirical analysis in Section 1.3 considers. The model is solved using
value function iteration, and the solution algorithm is described in the appendix.10 Matching
the typical government’s budget cycle, the model is solved at an annual frequency.
For computational simplicity, there are assumed to be only two possible levels of fiscal ca-
pacity: b " {blow, bhigh}; two levels of fiscal capacity is su!cient for understanding the circum-
stances in which a government finds it beneficial to undertake a tax base broadening reform.
The calibration of b (tax base breadth) is critical, because it controls the (compensated) tax
base elasticity; when it is low, the e!ciency cost of raising revenue is high and little debt
can be sustained in equilibrium. (Recall that the compensated commodity tax base elastic-
ity with respect to the net-of-tax rate in this model is equal to 1 ! b.) Even putting aside
the direct dependence in this model between tax base breadth and the tax base elasticity,
calibrating b based on an estimate of the 1930s commodity tax base breadth alone would be
misleading, because state governments had other non-commodity tax bases available (e.g.,
property). The relevant target for blow is a revenue-weighted average tax-base-elasticity for
a typical U.S. state government prior to the 1930s wave of tax base broadening reforms, and
bhigh its post-reform value.
In the absence of tax base elasticity estimates for the taxes administered by U.S. state
governments in the inter-war years, the appropriate calibration of b is inferred from other
work. In their review of the recent literature, Saez et al. (2012) suggest a federal income
tax base elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate of about 0.1-0.4; Romer and
10Thanks to Gita Gopinath and Mark Aguiar for making Matlab code available from their (2006) work on
sovereign default in emerging markets, which provided a starting point for the code written to solve this
model.
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Romer (2013) provide the only available estimate for the inter-war period, and estimate
the corresponding elasticity to be 0.2. Based on this evidence, the tax base elasticity is
conjectured to be a little above this range prior to the 1930s tax base reforms (blow = 0.5),
and just above the midpoint of this range post reform (blow = 0.7).
The per-period administrative cost function is assumed to be quadratic, )"f (bt) = fb2t , and the
parameter f is calibrated such that, at the mean income level, when b = blow (b = bhigh) the
reduction in excess burden from a marginal increase in tax base breadth is greater (slightly
less) than the increase in marginal per-period administrative cost. That is, with reference

















conditional on having incurred the fixed setup cost to increase tax base breadth, it is optimal
with this calibration, for most income realizations, to maintain that broad base; but it is not
optimal to incur that fixed setup cost absent a sharp fall in income and/or rise in indebtedness.
The assumption that fixed setup cost, rather than per-period marginal administrative cost, is
the main factor restricting optimal tax base breadth is consistent with the infrequency with
which new tax bases, once implemented, are repealed. Were the opposite true, the cost of
administering broad tax bases introduced when revenue needs are temporarily high (e.g., to
fund an external war) would be intolerable at normal revenue levels, and we would observe
frequent tax base repeal.
Administrative cost is about 1.9 (3.6 percent) of revenue raised when tax base breadth is at
a low (high) level. Taking into account that administrative costs do not vary with revenue
raised, and that government has growth substantially since World Word II, these assumed
per-period administrative cost levels (as a fraction of revenue raised) are broadly in line with
recent estimates for OECD countries (OECD, 2011, p. 126-127). In the preferred calibration,
the fixed setup cost to increase tax base breadth from blow = 0.5 to bhigh = 0.7 consumes
resources equal to 1.2 percent of mean income.
Empirically, public good provision varies less than proportionally with income over the busi-
ness cycle, and the model is calibrated accordingly. Demand for the public good is parame-
terized such that, were net borrowing infeasible, the government would optimally adjust the
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tax rate to o"set no less than half the mechanical change in revenue due to an income shock;




> *Amax. (This is the condition
derived in Section 1.2.4, under which a fall in income makes having a marginally broader tax
base desirable for a government with a balanced budget requirement.) Government spend-
ing is assumed be a little less than 8 percent of mean income, approximately equal to its
1932 level for the unweighted average of U.S. state governments.11 These two assumptions
together pin down the parameters that determine public good provision: * and +.
The probability each period that a government in financial autarky regains access to financial
markets is chosen to be in line with the experience of the U.S. state governments that repu-
diated their debts during the 1840s default episode. English (1996) documents that all of the
U.S. states that repaid their debts in full continued to borrow until the 1860s, but that none
of the repudiating states borrowed much before the 1861-1865 U.S. Civil War. Reflecting
this, . = 0.05 is chosen, which implies a mean period in financial autarky of 20 years.
Because increased consumption volatility under financial autarky has only a small welfare
cost, the parameterization of the output cost experienced during financial autarky is quantita-
tively more important than the choice of the per-period redemption probability. (Although
the redemption probability does govern the length of time that the output cost is experi-
enced.) The source of any output cost triggered by default is perhaps less clear for U.S. state
governments than nation states; for example, a trade embargo against a particular state
(often mentioned in the literature as a source of cost experienced upon default) is infeasible
because the U.S. Constitution guarantees free trade between the states. During the 1840s
wave of U.S. state government defaults, the federal government was unwilling to compensate
foreign lenders for debts accumulated by state governments, and the British government re-
fused to use diplomatic or military measures to intervene of behalf of British citizens who
held state government debt (English, 1996). Nonetheless, state governments have been able
to sustain high levels of indebtedness (measured relative to revenues) at various points in
11Because the model assumes a representative consumer, there are implicitly no transfers. Although relief
programs for the poor, administered or funded by state governments, were important during the Great
Depression, transfers to households represented a small share of state government spending in the 1930s.
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time. To give a plausible description of empirically observed levels of indebtedness, an out-
put cost of - = 0.02 (2 percent) in financial autarky is assumed, which is in line with the
calibration used by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Because the principal goal of solving the
model is to qualitatively understand the interaction between income shocks, sovereign risk,
and fiscal capacity—not to precisely match empirically observed debt levels—the particular
parameterization of the output cost is not crucial.
The rate-of-return required by risk-neutral lenders is chosen to be r = 0.06 (6 percent per
annum), and the government is assumed to have a subjective rate of time preference ,
equal to the reciprocal of the gross risk-free interest rate: , = 1/ (1 + r).12 Lastly, the
autocorrelation and shock size parameters of the income endowment process have been chosen
to approximately match detrended annual U.S. GDP data over the period 1900-2012: # = 0.9
and %$ = 0.05.
The numerical solution to the model, using these parameter values, is presented graphically
and described in the next section.
1.2.7.2 Discussion of Numerical Results
The shaded area in the lower panel of Figure 1.2 shows combinations of indebtedness (on the
x-axis) and income (on the y-axis) for which default is chosen. Consistent with the earlier
discussion, default is optimal when indebtedness is high and endowment income is low. The
default set is larger for a government with a narrow than a broad tax base, for two reasons:
i) debt repayment has a higher utility cost (the excess burden of taxation is higher) for a
government with a narrow than a broad tax base, and ii) for some combinations of debt and
income, the fixed cost to expand tax base breadth exceeds the punishment incurred by default.
12It is common in the sovereign debt literature to choose $ (1 + r) < 1 (often, substantially less than unity). A
low rate of subjective time preference counters a government’s incentive to save and outgrow its borrowing
constraint, generating high debt levels and frequent default; it also flattens the bond price schedule, increasing
the extent of counter-cyclical interest rate variation, helping in open-economy applications to match current
account dynamics (see Aguiar and Amador, forthcoming). However, when $ (1 + r) < 1, a government never
chooses to repay substantial amounts of debt, obscuring the full set of circumstances in which an increase
in fiscal capacity is desirable. The open-economy and debt level consequences of choosing a high rate of
subjective time preference are not critical in this setting.
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The default set is larger still for a hypothetical government permanently constrained to a
narrow tax base. The two-period model analyzed in Section 1.2.6 has the same property: for
any given level of indebtedness, default is less likely at a high level of fiscal capacity, because
there are fewer income realizations for which it is optimal.
The bond price schedules, shown in Figure 1.3, reflect the likelihood of default for each
combination of debt, income, and fiscal capacity. A shift in the bond schedule to the right
indicates tighter credit conditions, because less money can be borrowed at a given bond
price. Consistent with the default sets shown in the lower panel of Figure 1.2, the bond price
schedule for a government entering the current period with a low level of fiscal capacity, but
the opportunity to upgrade to a high level of fiscal capacity, lies to the right of the bond
price schedule for a government that already has a high level of fiscal capacity. A government
permanently constrained to a low level of fiscal capacity (shown by the grey dotted line in
Figure 1.3) faces less favorable borrowing conditions than a government that has the ability
to upgrade to a high level of fiscal capacity.
The shaded area in the upper panel of Figure 1.2 shows the combinations of debt and income
for which a government with a narrow tax base finds it desirable to undertake a tax base
broadening reform. This region borders the default set for a government with an initially
narrow tax base, indicating that, at each income level, a tax base broadening reform is most
desirable relative to its implementation cost when indebtedness is close to its maximum
level.13 Near the default boundary, sovereign risk makes lenders unwilling to permit net
borrowing; debt repayment occurs to guard against declines in income that would, at an
unchanged debt level, result in default. The larger is the magnitude of net debt repayment,
the greater is the benefit of a tax base broadening reform, because the tax rate, and thus the
excess burden of taxation, is increasing in the revenue requirement.
Recalling that an increase in tax base breadth comes into e"ect one period ahead, the govern-
13At su"ciently low levels of the fixed setup cost F , a tax base broadening reform is also be desirable inside
the default region, because a reduction in the excess burden of taxation is beneficial in both the repayment
and default states. But at this low level of F an increase in tax base breadth would also occur just outside
the default region, where the benefit is relatively greater. See the appendix for results with high and low
values for F .
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ment must guard against adverse income shocks: it chooses to undertake a base broadening
reform at levels of indebtedness even before substantial net debt repayments occur and the
tax rate must rise sharply; it is also less burdensome to fund the fixed setup cost before sub-
stantial net debt repayments are required, because of diminishing marginal utility of (private
and public) consumption.
Knowing the government’s maximization problem, competitive lenders anticipate the cir-
cumstances in which a government with a low level of fiscal capacity chooses to upgrade to
a high level of fiscal capacity and o"er lending terms that reflect its flexibility in tax base
breadth. Because default incentives are decreasing in tax base breadth, lenders recognition
of flexibility in fiscal capacity a"ords benefit even before a tax base broadening reform is
undertaken.
These numerical results indicate that the inverse relationship between tax base breadth and
borrowing costs derived using a two-period model in Section 1.2.6 carry over to an infinite-
horizon setting.
1.2.8 Summary of Model Predictions
This section has presented a formal model in which an optimizing government can vary tax
base breadth in response to fluctuations in revenue needs: an increase in tax base breadth
reduces the tax rate required to raise a given amount of revenue—and thus reduces the
excess burden of taxation—but an increase in tax base breadth incurs higher per-period
administrative cost and a fixed setup cost. The model assumes that households prefer less
business-cycle variation in public than private consumption, which is consistent with observed
variation in public spending; this implies that, with an unchanged tax rate and tax base, a
decline in households’ income endowment creates a budget deficit.
A government with a balanced budget requirement experiencing a revenue shortfall faces an
immediate trade-o" between increasing the tax rate on its existing tax base or broadening the
set of taxed goods. Raising the tax rate on the existing tax base increases the excess burden
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of taxation—which is convex in the tax rate—whereas broadening the tax base permits a
lower tax rate—and thus lower excess burden—but incurs higher administrative cost. For
su!ciently large negative income shocks, it is optimal to incur the fixed cost to undertake a
tax base broadening reform.
A government with the ability to borrow can run a budget deficit in response to a negative
income shock, and postpone the decision on how to fund its revenue shortfall—either a higher
tax rate or an increase in tax base breadth—until debt is due for repayment. Whenever net
debt repayment occurs, revenue needs are unusually high, and so is the tax rate; this makes
the benefit of a broad tax base high relative to the associated increase in administrative
cost. Because having a broad tax base reduces the excess burden of taxation due to debt
repayment, an increase in tax base breadth can reduce default incentives, and thus the cost
of debt; this interaction between the tax base breadth and borrowing costs reinforces the
benefit for a heavily indebted government of undertaking a tax base broadening reform when
income is low.
1.3 The U.S. States During the Great Depression: The
Role of Tax Base Expansion
1.3.1 Introduction
The model’s key predictions are tested by studying the behavior of U.S. state governments
during the Great Depression. This time period and group of governments provides an ex-
cellent setting to examine the impact of macroeconomic income shocks and indebtedness on
fiscal capacity upgrading: the income shocks were large, with the average state experiencing
a fall in real per capita personal income of 28.5 percent between 1929 and 1933; there was
significant heterogeneity in the size of income shocks experienced across states; and indebted-
ness at the onset of the Great Depression varied considerably across state governments. Like
nation states, U.S. state governments are sovereign with respect to their debts: the Eleventh
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution e"ectively grants state governments sovereign debt im-
munity. As English (1996) explains, bond holders may seek payment of debts by turning to
state courts, but their experience in Mississippi following the 1840s default suggests that this
is not a promising strategy: the Mississippi State Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
bondholders’ claims but the court could not enforce repayment (English, 1996).14 However,
as discussed in Section 1.2.7.1, the cost of default may be di"erent for a U.S. state govern-
ment than nation states, because the U.S. Constitution precludes some forms punishment
upon default, such as trade embargoes.
Although there is significant heterogeneity, compared to a panel of nation states, U.S. state
governments form a relatively homogenous grouping. But there were some di"erences in fiscal
institutions that may have a"ected upgrading in fiscal capacity during the Great Depression.
These di"erences are discussed next.
1.3.2 Fiscal Institutions
By 1929 20 U.S. state governments had adopted constitutional balanced budget requirements,
limiting their ability to use borrowing to smooth income shocks between good and bad times
(Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis, 2010).15 For a further 20 states, the e"ective power to issue
debt resided outside the legislature; some of these states had binding constitutional limits on
the amount of debt that could be issued, while others required a voter referendum to issue
debt.16 Most of the debt issue restrictions originated from the 1840s: six of the eight states
that defaulted in the 1840s adopted procedural restrictions on debt issue by 1851, as did
six other non-defaulting states (Wallis, 2005). Many states achieving statehood after this
14English (1996) discusses barriers to two other means around the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court’s
ruling in Hans v. Louisiana (1890) prevents federal courts ruling in disputes between a citizen and a resident
of that state, while the Supreme Court in Monaco v. Mississippi (1934) makes U.S. states immune from suits
by foreign countries. The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent suits being brought by other U.S. states,
or by the U.S. government, but most state government debt has been privately held.
15Thanks to Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Wallis for sharing their data.
16See Ratchford (1938) for a classification of states into three categories: i) those requiring a constitutional
amendment to issue debt, ii) those requiring voter approval, and iii) those able to borrow without quantitative
limit, subject only to legislative approval. Note the caveats to his classification discussed in the accompanying
text.
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episode adopted debt restrictions as part of their original constitutions. During the 1930s a
few states adopted more stringent fiscal institutions: Alabama introduced a constitutional
balanced budget requirement in 1933, as did New York in 1938. The only state to default on
its debt obligations during the Great Depression, Arkansas, removed the e"ective power to
issue debt from legislators in 1934 and put it in the hands over voters via referendum, and
North Carolina, which had entered the Great Depression with a high debt level, but did not
default, did the same in 1936 (Ratchford, 1938).17
The practical importance of these restrictions had been eroded over time in many states
by loose interpretation of the so-called Special Funds Doctrine (Ratchford, 1941): debt is-
sued with earmarked revenue streams does not, in principle, rely on general fund revenues,
sidestepping constitutional restrictions on long-term debt issue. Examples are highway rev-
enue obligations tied to gasoline tax revenues, toll bridge revenue bonds, revenue obligations
pledged to tax collections from a specific base, and obligations on behalf of state agencies
generating their own revenue streams. Even in states where the Special Funds Doctrine was
strictly applied, state courts had in some cases permitted significant latitude in the use of
short-term debt instruments, such as treasury notes and revenue anticipation warrants.
To the extent they carried some force, balanced budget requirements and debt issue restric-
tions had the potential to make revenue shortfalls during the Great Depression particularly
acute. However, as discussed next, even the group of states without these restrictions on
deficit spending did not meaningfully use debt to bu"er income shocks experienced during
the Great Depression.
17Despite the extreme level of fiscal stress faced by state governments in the 1930s, Arkansas was the only state
government to default on its debts. In 1932 Arkansas had a debt-to-revenue ratio of 6.3, about six times the
average debt-to-revenue ratio for state governments in 1932. The Arkansas debt was accumulated principally
for highway construction, much of it originally by local road districts. In August 1932 Arkansas defaulted on
some district bonds, and by March 1933 had defaulted on all its highway debt. By 1937 almost all highway
debt had been refunded into new bonds shifting the repayment burden out to a 40-year horizon, with no new
debt maturing before 1943-44. See Ratchford (1941) for a more detailed account.
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1.3.3 State Government Borrowing in the 1930s
With a few exceptions, state government indebtedness on the eve of the Great Depression
was moderate by historical standards: the median debt-to-revenue ratio in 1929 was 0.67,
which is similar to median ratios recorded in 1922, 1912 and 1902, and appreciably lower
than the ratio of 1.59 recorded in 1890 (see Table 1.2).18 As Table 1.2 shows, the distribution
of debt-to-revenue ratios across the U.S. states was either similar or more favorable in 1929
compared to earlier years.
Despite mostly modest levels of indebtedness in 1929, there was no general tendency for state
governments to run larger budget deficits in the early 1930s than they had prior to the Great
Depression. As shown by Figure 1.4, the absence of a sharp increase in state government
budget deficits in the early 1930s is evident across states with di"erent fiscal institutions.
The median state among those with a constitutional balanced budget requirement remained
in approximate budget balance, while those in which e"ective borrowing power resided in the
legislature ran deficits in 1931 and 1932, but of about the same size as they had in 1928 and
1929.19 As a group, state governments subject to a long-term debt issue restriction moved
from approximate budget balance to deficit in 1931 and 1932, but the average magnitude of
deficits was small relative to the cross-state average 28.5 percent decline per capita income
between 1929 and 1933.
In addition to institutional restrictions potentially a"ecting some states, a general tightening
of credit conditions appears to have been an important factor limiting state governments’
ability to run temporary deficits.20 In 1929 all but two U.S. states received a Aaa rating
on their general obligation bonds (North Dakota and South Dakota had the next highest
Aa rating), but by 1932 10 states had been downgraded to an Aa rating, and two to an A
rating. U.S. real per capita income grew strongly after its 1933 trough, to regain its 1929
18Debt-to-revenue ratios are reported rather than debt-to-income ratios because income estimates are only
available for a few select years before 1929.
19Government cost payment (spending) data for capital outlays are unavailable for 1930, and revenue and cost
payment data are unavailable from 1933-1936.
20Deflation in the early 1930s, which might contemporaneously have been expected to persist for some time,
may have made governments unwilling to take on nominal debt. However, the accumulation of debt by the
U.S. federal government is not consistent with this being an important deterrent to debt accumulation.
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level in 1937, but state government credit ratings continued to deteriorate: by 1937 all but
13 states had received a credit rating downgrade, despite generally declining debt-to-revenue
ratios (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3).21
Coincident with these credit rating downgrades, the most heavily indebted state governments
significantly reduced the real value of their debts between 1932 and 1937 (see Table 1.2 and
Figure 1.5), despite real incomes for most states being well below full-employment levels.
The model predicts that an optimizing government will only reduce its indebtedness in bad
times if there is an increase in the likelihood of default, and lenders are unwilling to permit
net lending; the decline in credit ratings for the most indebted state governments suggests
this may have been the case. Ratchford (1941) argues that the reduction in real state govern-
ment debts reflected, in part, the completion of infrastructure projects—principally highway
construction—for which most of the pre-Depression debt had been earmarked; but the fall
in indebtedness for high debt states, measured by real per capita debt, debt-to-income, or
debt-to-revenue ratios, was generally a reflection of rising prices that accompanied recovery
in real incomes after 1933 (which boosted nominal state government revenues), rather than
a reduction in nominal debt outstanding.
1.3.4 The Great Depression and Upgrading in State Fiscal Capacity
1.3.4.1 Summary of Tax Base Changes
Experiencing large income shocks, and being unwilling or unable to meaningfully increase
indebtedness, the Great Depression had a profound and immediate impact on U.S. state
government fiscal capacity. Prior to the Great Depression no state had a retail sales tax,
only 12 of the 48 U.S. states had an individual income tax, and 10 had a corporate net-
21Ideally, bond yield data would be used to measure borrowing costs for state governments, but for most states
debt on comparable issues was too infrequently traded to provide meaningful prices, if data are even available.
Ratings provided in Moody’s annual Municipal Government Bond Manual provide a consistent means with
which to measure default risk for the U.S. states. States with non-negligible levels of debt were rated in most
years, and rating categories remained unchanged over the period of interest. In 1937 Moody’s began tracking
bond yields for a portfolio of municipal bonds in each of their four highest rating categories. Although not
covering uniquely state government debt, the data show persistent di!erences in borrowing costs across rating
categories.
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income tax (see Table 1.4). By 1940 22 states had a retail sales tax, another 18 states had
adopted an individual income tax, and a further 15 had a corporate net-income tax; all but
three of these new tax bases became permanent. Most new tax bases were introduced before
real economic activity had returned to pre-Depression levels: Mississippi was the first state
the adopt a retail sales tax in 1932, and 19 of the 22 states that adopted a permanent retail
sales tax in the 1930s did so by 1935 (see Figure 1.6). No new sales or income tax bases were
introduced after 1938 and before 1946. Summing over these three types of tax base, 52 new
broad tax bases that ultimately became permanent were in place by 1940 across the 48 U.S.
states, compared to only 22 in 1929. In addition, six mostly Northeastern states had levied
a retail sales tax for one or two years each during the early to mid-1930s.
Retail sales tax adoption during the 1930s was a more important development in state gov-
ernment fiscal capacity than the adoption of new income tax bases. By 1942, the 22 states
that had adopted a retail sales tax during the 1930s raised on average 19 percent of their
total tax revenue from the sales tax, compared to an 11 percent income tax revenue share
for the 35 states collecting income tax revenue in 1942 (see Figure 1.7).22 The sales tax was
an important revenue source because of its broad base, not high tax rates: of the 22 states
with a retail sales tax in 1938, 16 had a 2 percent rate, and the remaining six states had a 3
percent rate (Due and Mikesell, 1995).
In addition to the introduction of retail sales and income tax bases during the 1930s, the
relative importance for state governments of existing revenue sources changed substantially,
and some other new tax bases were introduced (see Figure 1.7). Having accounted for just
over half of all tax revenue for U.S. state governments on average in 1922, the property
tax share of total state government tax revenues declined further during the 1930s, from
about one-quarter in 1932 to less than one-tenth in 1942. Reflecting in part an increase
in automobile use, motor vehicle fuel tax revenue grew to almost one-quarter of total tax
revenue by 1942, and increased unemployment compensation taxes accompanied the rise in
joblessness.23 Following the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, all states introduced alcoholic sales
22Income tax revenue-share data include inheritance taxes.
23Unemployment compensation taxes are payroll taxes remitted by employers, and in some states employees,
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taxes, but they raised only about 5 percent of total tax revenues in 1942.24
State governments continued to adopt retail sales and income tax bases after the 1930s, but
at a gradual pace until the 1960s (see Table 1.4). In that decade, 12 additional states adopted
a retail sales tax, 7 an individual income tax, and 6 a corporate net-income tax (one of which
was later repealed). The 25 new tax bases introduced in the 1960s is substantial, but less
than half the number of bases introduced in the 1930s. Due and Mikesell (1995) suggest that
the post-World War II adoption of retail sales taxes was due to increased demand for state
revenue, in large part to fund new education expenditures. After the 1960s, four more states
introduced an individual income tax, and one more a corporate net-income tax.
Because the introduction of the retail sales tax was the most important change in fiscal
capacity during the Great Depression, measured by revenue raised, the remainder of the
empirical analysis focuses primarily on understanding its adoption. Most of the analysis that
follows groups state governments according to whether or not they adopted a sales tax base
that ultimately became permanent: the six states that had temporary retail sales taxes in
the 1930s maintained these bases for only one or two years each.
1.3.4.2 The Relationship Among Tax Base Adoption, Income, and Indebtedness
States that did and did not adopt a retail sales tax during the 1930s had, on average, a
similar level of per capita real spending before and during the 1930s (see Figure 1.8). As a
share of income, spending was higher in 1932 and 1937 than before the Great Depression,
especially for the states that adopted a retail sales tax; that public spending rose as a share
of income during the Great Depression is consistent with the modeling assumption that
households prefer public spending to vary less than private consumption over the business
cycle. Because borrowing was not meaningfully used to bu"er income shocks, and spending
di"ered little between sales tax adopting and non-adopting states, average revenues for the
to exclusively fund unemployment compensation benefits.
24There was no strong tendency for states without a retail sales tax to rely more heavily on alcoholic beverage
taxes: the 22 states with a retail sales tax in 1942 collected on average 4 percent of total tax revenues from
alcohol taxes, compared to 6 percent for states without a retail sales tax.
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two groups of states were by necessity little di"erent (see Figure 1.9).
While spending and revenues shares were similar across states that did and did not adopt
a sales tax, the e!ciency cost of raising tax revenues di"ered markedly. States adopting a
retail sales tax in the 1930s experienced, on average, a 7.6 percent larger decline in real per
capita personal income between 1929 and 1933 (see Figure 1.10). Grouping states by their
magnitude of income decline between 1929 and 1933 reveals a strong relationship between the
size of income shocks experienced and a state government’s propensity to adopt a retail sales
tax during the 1930s (see Table 1.5). States su"ering above-average income declines were also
more likely to adopt income tax bases during the 1930s (see Table 1.5). The approximately
contemporaneous relationship between the magnitude of negative income shocks and retail
sales tax base adoption is consistent with the formal model, conditional on governments being
unable to accumulate meaningful amounts of debt; this is true whether debt accumulation
was restricted by a balanced budget requirement, or because indebtedness was high enough
to make lenders were unwilling to permit net borrowing.
Governments with high levels of indebtedness, and unable to accumulate more debt, had
a greater incentive to adopt a retail sales tax than governments with little debt, for two
reasons: i) they needed additional revenues to fund interest payments, and ii) an increase
in fiscal capacity may have reduced default incentives, and thus the cost of borrowing. For
the five state government with the highest debt-to-income ratios in 1929, on average 14
percent of revenue was spent servicing debt, compared to only 4 percent for the remaining
states. Reflecting their greater revenue needs, the most heavily indebted group of states
in 1929 were more likely than low-debt states to adopt a retail sales tax during the 1930s
(see Table 1.6). A relationship is also evident between the cost of debt, measured by credit
ratings, and the willingness of state governments to adopt a retail sales tax: of the 13 states
maintaining a Aaa rating during the 1930s, only three adopted a retail sales tax, while among
the five Baa rated states only one did not (see Table 1.7). However, formal regression analysis
reported in next sub-section shows that, after controlling for the size of income shocks and
debt levels, a relationship between credit ratings and tax base adoption is no longer evident.
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This is not surprising in the context of the model presented here, where the level of fiscal
capacity, indebtedness, and income fully summarize default probability, implying that there
is no additional information contained in credit ratings.
The theoretical model assumes that, given an unchanged tax base and tax rate, tax revenues
vary one-for-one with income; the discussion thus far has implicitly assumed such a direct
correspondence between changes in income and changes in taxable income. This relationship
is, in general, di!cult to test: while data on revenue collected by tax base is available,
data on taxable value is typically unavailable. The property tax base, which on average
accounted for 27 percent of total state government tax collections in 1932, is an important
exception. Figure 1.11 indicates an approximately one-for-one relationship between 1929-
1933 changes in state incomes (peak-to-trough) and changes in the taxable value of property
over the period 1929-1937. (The change in property values is measured over a longer time
period than changes in income because assessed property values typically adjust with a lag
to changes in the market value of property; the delay is likely to be less than four years, but
data unavailability prevent a more timely comparison.)
Reassuringly, given the earlier discussion, states experiencing declines in taxable property
values were the most likely to adopt a retail sales tax: of the 28 states experiencing a decline
in the real taxable value of property between 1929 and 1937, 18 adopted a retail sales tax
during the 1930s, whereas only 4 of the 20 states experiencing a rise in the real taxable value
of property adopted a sales tax (see Figure 1.12). Compounding the impact on revenues,
states su"ering a decline in taxable property values raised an above-average share of revenue
from the property tax base: property taxes accounted for 32 percent of total tax revenue in
1932 for states experiencing a fall in assessed property values, compared to 19 percent for
states experiencing a rise in assessed property values.
Delayed pass-through of changes in state income to state revenues—particularly for the prop-
erty tax base—helps explain the timing of tax base changes during the 1930s. Real U.S. per
capital GDP fell sharply from 1929-1933, but with the exception of Mississippi, each state
government introducing a sales tax during the Great Depression did so coincident with or
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after the trough in GDP; Eighteen states introduced a retail sales tax that ultimately became
permanent between 1933 and 1935, and five further states had a temporary sales tax base
for some of this period (see Figure 1.6).
1.3.4.3 Regression Analysis
Formal regression analysis confirms the findings evident in the bivariate relationships dis-
cussed above. In the preferred specification, regression number (1) in Table 1.8, each 10
percent decrease in real income between 1929 and 1933 is estimated to have increased the
probability that a state adopted a retail sales tax during the 1930s by 0.18. This relationship
is precisely estimated and, given that the average fall in income between 1929 and 1933 was
28.5 percent (0.34 log points), implies that the Great Depression raised the probability of the
average state adopting a retail sales tax by about 0.6. A high debt level on the eve of the
Great Depression is also estimated to have increased the likelihood of adopting a sales tax: a
1 percentage point increase in the 1929 debt-to-income ratio increased the probability of sales
tax base adoption by 0.06. But measuring indebtedness instead by the 1932 debt-to-income
ratio, instrumented by the 1929 debt-to-income ratio to sidestep any endogenous response of
debt to income shocks, more than halves the estimated e"ect of indebtedness on the likeli-
hood of sales tax base adoption (see regressions 6 and 7 in Table 1.8). Reflecting the fact
that there was limited use of debt to bu"er income shocks during the 1930s, cross-sectional
di"erences in income shocks is estimated to be an economically more significant predictor of
sales tax base adoption than is di"erences in indebtedness across state governments. Having
an income tax base prior to the Great Depression, and the type of fiscal institutions present
in 1929, is not estimated to have significantly a"ected the likelihood of adopting a sales tax
base. Using a Probit rather than OLS estimator for this regression specification changes the
magnitude of the estimated e"ects somewhat, but alters none of the qualitative conclusions
(compare regression specifications 1 and 2 in Table 1.8).
As foreshadowed in Section 1.3.4.2, having a less than Aaa credit rating in 1937 is not
estimated to have had an independent e"ect on the likelihood of adopting a sales tax base
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during the 1930s. The component of a binary indicator for a non-Aaa credit rating orthogonal
to changes in income and to the level of indebtedness during the 1930s (estimated by the
residual series for regression 4 in Table 1.8) is insignificant when included in the preferred
regression specification (see regression 5 in Table 1.8).
1.4 Conclusion
This paper has established, theoretically and empirically, that deep recessions can be an im-
portant stimulant to investment in fiscal capacity. Negative macroeconomic income shocks
reduce tax collections, but demand for public spending falls by less, stressing the revenue
raising capability of existing tax bases, particularly when the ability to accumulate debt is
limited. Raising the tax rate on existing tax bases increases the marginal excess burden
of taxation—the marginal welfare loss compared to revenue-equivalent lump-sum taxes—
because taxpayers increasingly distort their consumption choices toward untaxed commodi-
ties. For su!ciently steep falls in income, it is optimal to incur the fixed cost necessary to
upgrade fiscal capacity: this enables taxing a wider range of economic activity at a lower rate,
and thus reducing the distortionary cost of taxation. For highly indebted governments, an
increase in fiscal capacity can reduce default incentives, because the e!ciency cost of raising
revenue to repay debt is reduced, and thus can lower borrowing costs. Even though income
shocks are transitory, improvement in fiscal institutions can be long-lasting: the fixed cost to
upgrade fiscal capacity is sunk, making it optimal to maintain a high level of fiscal capacity
even after incomes have recovered.
Evidence from the behavior of U.S. state governments during the Great Depression supports
the model’s key predictions. At the onset of the Great Depression, none of the state govern-
ments levied a retail sales tax, but by 1938 22 state governments had adopted a retail sales
tax that ultimately became permanent. Moreover, governments in states experiencing larger
than average negative income shocks were significantly more likely to adopt a retail sales
tax (and income taxes) than were governments in states experiencing smaller than average
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income shocks. As the model predicts, state governments entering the Great Depression with
a high debt load were more likely to adopt new tax bases than were those with little debt.
Finally, it is interesting to ponder the impact the recent Great Recession might ultimately
have on fiscal institutions in light of the model developed in this paper. To this point, govern-
ments in most advanced economies have responded to falls in tax collections by accumulating
debt; at some point in the future, substantial net debt repayments will be required, at which
time the incentive to invest in increased fiscal capacity will be heightened. Because most
developed economies already maintain a broad set of tax instruments, any increase in tax
base breadth is likely to involve limiting exemptions and loopholes that provide opportunities
for taxpayers to easily substitute from taxed to untaxed commodities; increased enforcement
e"ort, to limit avoidance and evasion behavior, is a complementary way for governments to
tax a wider range of economic activity, and thus increase fiscal capacity. Greece—already
under substantial fiscal stress, and with a lower level of fiscal capacity than many of its Eu-
ropean Union peers—has taken some steps toward increasing fiscal capacity, by seeking to
improve tax compliance, under pressure from foreign lenders.
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Table 1.1: Quantitative Model: Parameter Values
World interest rate r = 0.06
Rate of time preference , = 11+r
Public good preference parameter * = 0.037
Public good curvature parameter + = 0.6
Per-period administrative cost function parameter f = 0.006
Fixed setup cost to upgrade fiscal capacity F = 0.012
Tax base breadth b " {0.5, 0.7}
AR(1) coe!cient on income process # = 0.9
Standard deviation of income shocks %! = 0.05
Output cost of default - = 0.02
Redemption probability . = 0.05
Table 1.2: Debt-to-Revenue Ratios: Number of U.S. States
1890 1902 1912 1922 1927 1929 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952
0.0-0.5 11 15 22 18 19 20 19 23 29 36 32
0.5-1.0 6 14 6 14 13 15 13 12 12 11 11
1.0-3.0 15 12 18 16 15 11 12 12 7 1 5
> 3.0 13 7 2 0 1 2 4 1 0 0 0
Average 2.62 1.47 0.91 0.80 0.87 0.93 1.09 0.66 0.52 0.27 0.44
Median 1.59 0.83 0.54 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.51 0.39 0.17 0.30
Federal Govt. 2.78 2.10 1.72 5.70 4.61 4.38 10.13 6.76 4.95 6.71 3.92
Notes: Debt is par value of gross debt less sinking fund assets. Revenue data for 1902 and 1912 are
unavailable, and data for 1903 and 1913 has been used instead. Data for three states are missing
for 1890. Average values are unweighted. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (Various Years).
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Table 1.3: Moody’s General Obligation Bond Ratings
Number of U.S. States by Rating Category
1922 1927 1929 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952
Aaa 48 44 45 35 13 15 24 22
Aa 0 2 2 10 15 18 16 13
A 0 0 0 2 11 12 7 9
Baa 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 0
Ba 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Unrated 0 2 1 1 3 1 1 4
Notes: Where a state is unrated for the year noted, the state is
assigned its rating for the subsequent year. If a rating is unavailable,
states with a debt-to-revenue ratio of no more than 0.1 were assigned
a Aaa rating. Unrated states noted in the table fall into neither of
these categories. The number of assigned ratings for the years shown
1922-1952, respectively, is 2, 0, 3, 3, 6, 7, 11, and 9. According to
Moody’s, the absence of a rating provides no indication of the credit
worthiness of an issuer. Source: Moody’s Municipal and Government
Manual (1920-1950) .
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Table 1.4: Number of U.S. States with Tax Base: By Decade
Retail Sales Individual Income Corporate Income
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Total
1900-09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1910-19 0 0 8 0 4 0 12
1920-29 0 0 12 0 10 0 22
1930-39 22 6 28 2 24 1 83
1940-49 27 0 28 2 25 1 83
1950-59 32 0 28 0 28 0 88
1960-69 44 0 35 0 33 1 113
1970-79 44 0 39 0 34 1 118
Notes: Alaska and Hawaii, which achieved statehood in 1959, are excluded. Narrow individual income
tax bases are also excluded: New Hampshire and Tennessee have bases taxing only interest and dividend
income, and Connecticut a base that taxes only capital gains and dividends. Temporary retail sales
taxes in the mid-1930s in Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania were
in place for only one or two years in each state. Louisiana is classified as permanently introducing the
retail sales tax in 1938 because its 1940 repeal lasted only one year. South Dakota and West Virginia
had an individual income tax from the 1930s until 1942, and South Dakota had a corporate net-income
tax from 1935-1943. Michigan had a corporate net-income tax from 1967-1975. Sources: State retail
sales tax data are from Due and Mikesell (1995) and income tax data are from Penniman (1980).
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Table 1.5: Income Shocks and Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity
Percent Fall in Sales Tax Average No.
Real Income: Number Share Broad Bases
1929-1933 of States 1940 1929 1940 #
< 20 8 0.1 0.8 1.1 0.4
20-30 21 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.0
30-40 15 0.7 0.5 1.9 1.5
40-50 3 1.0 0.7 2.3 1.7
> 50 1 1.0 0.0 3.0 3.0
Federal Govt. 2 2
Notes: Real Income is state per capita personal income de-
flated by the US real GDP deflator. Sales Tax Share is the
fraction of states in each category with a retail sales tax in
1940. Mississippi was the first state to introduce a retail sales
tax in 1932. A maximum of three broad tax bases is possible:
a retail sales tax, an individual income tax, and a corporate
net-income tax. Sources: BEA, Due and Mikesell (1995), Pen-
niman (1980), and U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table 1.6: Pre-Depression Debt Levels and Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity
Average Sales Tax Average No.
Debt-to-Income Number Debt-to-Revenue Share Broad Bases
Ratio: 1929 of States Ratio: 1929 1940 1929 1940 #
< 0.01 8 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.6
0.01-0.02 16 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.9
0.02-0.03 9 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.8 1.6
0.03-0.06 10 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.4
> 0.06 5 3.2 0.8 1.2 2.6 1.4
Federal Govt. 2 2
Notes: Debt-to-Income Ratio is gross debt less sinking fund assets as a share of
state per capita personal income. Sales Tax Share is the fraction of states in each
category with a retail sales tax in 1940. Mississippi was the first state to introduce
a retail sales tax in 1932. A maximum of three broad tax bases is possible: a retail
sales tax, an individual income tax, and a corporate net-income tax. Sources: BEA,
Due and Mikesell (1995), Penniman (1980), and U.S. Department of Commerce
(Various Years).
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Table 1.7: Cost of Debt and Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity
Sales Tax Average No.
Credit Rating: Number Share Broad Bases
1937 of States 1940 1929 1940 #
Aaa 13 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.7
Aa 15 0.5 0.1 1.3 1.1
A 11 0.6 0.7 2.1 1.4
Baa 5 0.8 0.8 2.8 2.0
Ba 1 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0
Unrated 3 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Federal Govt. 2 2
Notes: The sole Ba rated state, Arkansas, introduced individual
and corporate net-income taxes in 1929. Sales Tax Share is the
fraction of states in each category with a retail sales tax in 1940.
Mississippi was the first state to introduce a retail sales tax in
1932. A maximum of three broad tax bases is possible: a retail
sales tax, an individual income tax, and a corporate net-income
tax. Sources: BEA, Due and Mikesell (1995), Moody’s Munici-
pal and Government Manual (1920-1950), Penniman (1980), and
U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Table 1.8: Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity: Cross-State Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sales Tax Sales Tax Bases Down- Sales Tax Sales Tax Debt
1940 1940 1940 grade 1940 1940 1932
OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Inc. Tax 1929 0.065 0.089 0.547* -0.202 0.013 0.068 -0.002
(0.173) (0.218) (0.312) (0.249) (0.152) (0.163) (0.013)
Corp. Tax 1929 -0.087 -0.153 0.293 0.080 -0.068 -0.119 0.015
(0.165) (0.234) (0.288) (0.318) (0.145) (0.159) (0.013)
Debt: 1929 5.604*** 9.423*** 11.044*** 0.065 5.417*** 2.591***
(1.407) (2.855) (3.451) (4.218) (1.378) (0.428)




!Inc. 1929-33 -1.827*** -2.962*** -3.332*** -0.194 -1.731*** -1.692*** -0.062**
(0.382) (0.825) (0.850) (0.626) (0.439) (0.357) (0.030)
!Inc. 1932-37 0.273
(1.049)
Constitution 0.192 0.255 0.251 0.041 0.171 0.183 0.004
(0.154) (0.236) (0.357) (0.193) (0.151) (0.139) (0.009)
Referendum 0.269 0.299 0.511 0.164 0.341** 0.264* 0.002
(0.166) (0.249) (0.356) (0.213) (0.163) (0.149) (0.008)
BBR 0.009 0.019 0.201 -0.033 0.102 0.000 0.004
(0.151) (0.173) (0.314) (0.188) (0.165) (0.140) (0.010)
Orthog. 0.205
(0.150)
Constant -0.507*** -0.430 0.406 -0.479** -0.429*** -0.036*
(0.171) (0.484) (0.339) (0.183) (0.156) (0.019)
Observations 48 48 48 45 45 48 48
R-squared 0.332 0.369 0.185 0.392 0.316 0.892
Notes: Sales Tax 1940 is a dummy variable taking the value unity if the state had a retail sales tax in 1940. Bases
1940 is a count of the number of broad tax bases present in 1940, with a maximum of three: a retail sales tax, a
personal income tax, and a corporate net-income tax. Inc. Tax 1929 and Corp. Tax 1929 are indicators of the
presence of those tax bases in 1929. !Inc 1929-33 is the change in real state per capita personal income from
1929 to 1933, in log points, with a mean value of -0.34, and !Inc 1932-37 is the corresponding change in income
between 1932 and 1937, with a mean value of 0.32. Debt is the state debt-to-income ratio, with Debt 1929 having
a mean value of 0.03 and a maximum value of 0.18. Downgrade is an indicator variable taking the value unity for
states that did not have a Aaa credit rating in 1937, with the variable Orthog. the residual series from regression
specification (4). Constitution is a dummy variable equal to unity for states requiring a constitutional amendment
to incur debt, Referendum is a dummy variable equal to unity for states requiring a referendum to incur debt, and
BBR is a dummy variable taking the value unity for states with a constitutional balanced budget requirement.
Regression specification (7) is the first-stage estimation for 2SLS regression specification (6), with Debt: 1929 used
as an instrument for Debt: 1932 . Coe"cients for regression specification (2) are marginal e!ects at the mean for
each variable, and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for binary dependent variables. Statistical significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors have been used.
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Notes: !0,t is the reduction in the excess burden of taxation from having a
marginally broader tax base, and !1,t is the social cost of funding the associated
increase in per-period administrative costs. The figure is drawn assuming that
when income is at its mean level Ā tax base breadth is at an optimum (ignoring
the fixed setup cost component of administrative costs): !0,t = !1,t.
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Figure 1.2: Numerical Solution: Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity and Default Sets
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Default Regions:    
Broad Tax Base 
   Narrow Tax Base 
   Permanently Narrow Tax Base 
Notes: The shaded region in the upper panel shows combinations of debt (on the x-axis)
and income (on the y-axis) for which a government with a low level of fiscal capacity
chooses to upgrade to a high level of fiscal capacity. The shaded regions in the lower
panel show combinations of debt and income for which a government chooses to default:
the lightest grey shaded region shows the default set for a government with a high level of
fiscal capacity; the lightest two shaded regions show the default set for a government with
a low level of fiscal capacity, but the ability to upgrade to a high level of fiscal capacity;
and the combined shaded region shows the default set for a government permanently
constrained to a low level of fiscal capacity.
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Notes: The price of a discount bond depends on the amount of debt sold, the level
of income, and next period’s level of fiscal capacity: qt = q (At, Dt+1, bt+1). The
level of debt is shown on the x-axis (recall that mean income in the model is unity)
and the discount price of a one-period bond on the y-axis. For each pair of lines, the
left-hand line is for income at its maximum level, and the right-hand line for income
at its minimum level.
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Notes: BBR is the group of states that had a balanced budget requirement in 1929,
Debt Restriction is the group of states that had either a constitutional or procedural
(e.g., voter referendum) debt issue restriction, and Legislature is the group of states
for which the power to issue debt resided in the legislature. The three groups are
mutually exclusive: states with a balanced budget requirement are grouped into
the BBR category whether or not they had constitutional or procedural debt issue
restrictions. Budget Surplus is total government revenues less total government cost
payments. Data are unweighted averages across states. Government cost payment
data are not available for 1930. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (Various
Issues), Ratchford (1938) and Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis (2010).
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Notes: States with a retail sales tax in 1940 are colored red. Real Debt is gross
debt less sinking fund assets, deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator. Income is
state per capita personal income. Sources: BEA, Due and Mikesell (1995), U.S.
Department of Commerce (Various Issues).
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Note: Includes temporary sales tax bases. Sources: Due and Mikesell (1995)
and Penniman (1980).
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Figure 1.7: Tax Revenue Shares: By Presence of Sales Tax in 1940














Note: Yes indicates the group of states with a retail sales tax in 1940, and No in-
dicates the group of states without a retail sales tax in 1940. Data are unweighted
averages across states. Special taxes in 1922 includes income, inheritance, and other
special taxes, which are not reported separately at the state government level for all
states. License and Permit includes motor vehicle, non-business, and business license
taxes. Retail Sales taxes in 1942 excludes Arkansas, Michigan, and West Virginia be-
cause retail sales and gross receipts tax revenue was not reported separately. Other
in 1942 includes motor vehicle fuel taxes (44 percent of Other tax revenue in 1942 in
states with a retail sales tax, and 40 percent in states without a retail sales tax), alco-
holic beverage taxes (8/10 percent of Other), and unemployment compensation taxes
(28/33 percent of Other). Source: Due and Mikesell (1995), and U.S. Department of
Commerce (Various Issues).
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Note: States with a retail sales tax in 1940 are colored red. Income is state
per capita personal income. Nominal state government spending was converted
to real values using the U.S. GDP deflator. Spending data are total state gov-
ernment cost payments for 1922-1937, and total state government expenditures
for 1942-1952. Sources: BEA, Due and Mikesell (1995), U.S. Department of
Commerce (Various Issues).
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Note: States with a retail sales tax in 1940 are colored red. Income is state
per capita personal income. Nominal revenues were converted to real values
using the U.S. GDP deflator. Sources: BEA, Due and Mikesell (1995), U.S.
Department of Commerce (Various Issues).
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Note: States with a retail sales tax in 1940 are colored red. Nominal state personal
income was converted to real values using the U.S. GDP deflator. Sources: BEA,
U.S. Department of Commerce (Various Issues).
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Notes: The straight line gives the OLS estimated linear relationship. Income is state
per capita personal income deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator, and property value is
the assessed value of general property. Iowa, which experienced a 158 percent increase
in the real value of property between 1929 and 1937, is excluded from the figure.
Sources: BEA, and U.S. Department of Commerce (Various Issues).
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Note: Each column indicates the real percentage change from 1929-1937 in the assessed
valuation of property subject to general property tax. States that adopted a retail sales
tax by 1940 are shaded black. California, Delaware, Pennsylvania and North Carolina
did not levy property tax at the state government level in 1929. Two of those states,
California and North Carolina, had adopted a retail sales tax by 1940. Iowa, which
experienced a 158 percent increase in the real assessed value of property between 1929
and 1937, is excluded from the figure. Sources: Due and Mikesell (1995), and U.S.
Department of Commerce (Various Issues).
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Results Omitted From Main Text
1.5.1.1 Default Threshold
For the two-period model of sovereign borrowing outlined in Section 1.2.6, this appendix
shows the steps used to find the threshold level of income below which default occurs.
Default occurs if second-period utility is higher under default than repayment: v̂dt+1 #
v̂ (At+1 (1! -) , 0, 0, bt+1, bt+2) > v̂ (At+1, Dt+1, 0, bt+1, bt+2) # v̂ct+1. With some algebra, it
can be shown that











where & ct+1 = & (At+1, Dt+1, 0, bt+1, bt+2) is the optimal tax rate conditional on debt repayment,
and & dt+1 = & (At+1 (1! -) , 0, 0, bt+1, bt+2) is the optimal tax rate conditional on default.
Subtracting Equation (1.5.1) from Equation (1.5.2) gives the following expression for the
default condition:






















with the second line following from the condition for the optimal tax rate, given by Equation
(1.2.10). With some further re-arrangement it can be shown that default occurs for At+1 <
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Ādt+1, where Ādt+1 is given by Equation (1.2.20). For use in the next section, note that by
re-arrangement of Equation (1.5.3) if can be shown that when
(1! -)
1+!




the government is indi"erent between repayment and default.
1.5.1.2 Dependence of the Default Threshold on Tax-Base Breadth
For the two-period model of sovereign borrowing, this appendix section derives the condition
under which an increase in second-period fiscal capacity lowers the default threshold Ādt+1.
The utility gain from a marginal increase in second-period tax base breadth for the repayment





































where & ct+1 = & (At+1, Dt+1, 0, bt+1, bt+2) and & dt+1 = & (At+1 (1! -) , 0, 0, bt+1, bt+2) are the
optimal tax rates in the repayment and default states, respectively. The increase in utility




































which using the condition given by Equation (1.5.4) (that applies at the income level where























































where the approximate equality follows from taking a first-order Taylor series approximation
about - = 0 (the output cost experienced upon default). Hence, a marginal increase in tax
base breadth raises utility at the default threshold by more in the repayment than the default
state if & ct+1Adt+1 > )#f (bt+1). This is a weak condition that holds except when the tax base
breadth is well-above its optimal level; Equation (1.5.5) implies that, at an optimum for tax

















<< & ct+1, (1.5.11)
so that & ct+1Adt+1 >> )#f (bt+1). Under this condition, following a marginal increase in tax base
breadth, repayment gives higher utility than default at the original threshold level Adt+1. If
repayment is preferred to default at Adt+1 then it must also be preferred at all higher levels of
income At+1 > Adt+1 (see Section 1.5.1.1). Thus, the default set shrinks following a marginal
increase in tax base breadth—and the threshold income level at which the government is
indi"erent between repayment and default must fall.
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1.5.1.3 E!ect of Tax Base Breadth on Default Threshold: By Debt Level


































because & dt+1 (the tax rate in the default state) does not depends on the level of debt due for











because (& ct+1/(Dt+1 > 0 (see Equation 1.2.10 and recall that & ct+1 = & (At+1, Dt+1, 0, bt+1, bt+2)).
Hence, a marginal increase in tax base breadth makes repayment preferred to default at
At+1 = Adt+1—the more so the larger is the level of first period borrowing. Recalling that the








the larger is the fall in the threshold level of income. Thus, the higher the level of debt, the
greater is the reduction in the threshold level Adt+1 following a marginal increase in tax base
breadth: (2Adt+1/(bt+1(Dt+1 < 0.
1.5.1.4 E!ect of Tax Base Breadth on Total Borrowing Costs: By Debt Level
This section uses the results derived earlier to show that (2qt/(bt+1(Dt+1 > 0. Using the







































Next, note that (Adt+1/(bt+1 < 0 (see Section 1.5.1.2), and (2Adt+1/(bt+1(Dt+1 < 0 (see




/(Adt+1 > 0, a marginal increase




The following steps describe how to solve the quantitative model:
1. Discretize the state space, 50 points for the debt state space, and 25 points for the
income state space;
2. Set the initial guess for the bond price function to be the risk-free rate: q0 (At, Dt+1, bt!1) =
1
1+r ;
3. Taking the bond price function as given, solve the government’s maximization problem
by value function iteration, to get the government’s policy functions, value functions,
and repayment and default sets;
4. Update the bond price function given the government’s repayment and default sets,
to get q1 (At, Dt+1, bt!1). If |q0 (At, Dt+1, bt!1)! q1 (At, Dt+1, bt!1)| < /, where / is the
convergence tolerance for the bond price function, stop, otherwise iterate over steps 2-4
until convergence.
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1.5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Fixed Setup Cost to Increase Tax Base Breadth
Figure 1.13 shows the combinations of debt and income for which an increase in tax base
breadth is optimal, for di"erent values of the fixed setup cost parameter F . All other param-
eter values are the same as in the baseline specification (see Table 1.1).
Figure 1.13: Numerical Solution: Upgrading of Fiscal Capacity: Sensitivity
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Tax Base Broadening Region: Low 
Fixed Setup Cost 
Tax Base Broadening Region: High 
Fixed Setup Cost 
Notes: The shaded regions show combinations of debt (on the x-axis) and income (on the
y-axis) for which a government with a low level of fiscal capacity chooses to upgrade to
a high level of fiscal capacity: the upper panel shows results when the fixed setup cost is
low (F = 0.006), and the upper panel when the fixed cost is high (F = 0.017).
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Chapter 2
Consumption Commitments in General
Equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
This paper proposes a model of consumption commitments that derives inertial aggregate
consumption dynamics in an otherwise standard general equilibrium macroeconomic model.
Consumption commitments describe any purchase that triggers an ongoing sequence of con-
sumption and payments that is costly to alter. Housing services, which generates ongoing
rental or rental equivalence payments, is the most important source of commitments for most
households. Purchase of durable goods, such as autos and furniture, are another important
source of consumption commitments. In addition to a service flow that has costs to ad-
just, these goods and services in turn often trigger further commitments, such as financial
insurance and utility payments for housing. Chetty and Szeidl (2007) estimate that about
two-thirds of the typical household’s consumption basket is subject to commitments.
Because consumption is adjusted for only a subset of goods each period in the model, aggre-
gate consumption responds more slowly to economic news in the presence of commitments
than in the standard frictionless model. This allows the model to match the empirical findings
of excess smoothness and excess sensitivity in consumption data, generating humped-shaped
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dynamics in response to economic news.1 Aggregate consumption reflects, in part, informa-
tion available at the time commitments were made, and thus reflects dated information, as
in sticky information models.
Households are forward looking when making commitments, taking into account the likeli-
hood that choices made today will constrain utility and spending in future periods. As a
consequence, the consumption response to, for example, a transitory real interest rate cut
is attenuated relative to a frictionless world, because commitments increase the chance con-
sumption will be remain stuck at a high level long after the real interest rate has returned to
its normal level; a corollary is that only long-lasting changes in the expected real interest rate
can be used to reliably estimate the structural elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the
presence of consumption commitments. Because adjustment costs can delay and attenuate
households’ consumption response to equity price changes, commitments mask the extent of
consumption risk borne by households via their equity holdings, and help to explain some of
the apparent equity-premium puzzle.
An important feature of the model is endogenous adjustment of the share of goods over which
households maintain commitments. By incurring a monetary cost households can reduce
the share of goods for which commitments must be kept each period, with the marginal
adjustment cost assumed to be rising in the share of commitments adjusted. In response
to small shocks, households optimally choose to maintain a high share of commitments but,
faced with large shocks, households choose to pay an increased adjustment cost and reset
a large share of commitments. This adjustment mechanism allows aggregate consumption
to exhibit a high degree of inertia in the presence of small shocks, but can endogenously
generate bigger changes in consumption in response to large shocks.
On several dimensions, the model matches the behavior of the now widely used habit-
formation preference specification, but reference dependence arises via consumption adjust-
ment costs, not a behavioral assumption on consumer preferences. A special case of the model
is equivalent to consumer habit-formation, providing a microfoundation for habit-formation
1Consumption is said to be excessively smooth when it responds less than one-for-one to permanent income
news shocks, and to display excess sensitivity when it can be predicted by lagged information.
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preferences.
This paper shares many qualitative features with the consumption commitments model out-
lined by Chetty and Szeidl (2010). Households in their two-good economy (one of which is
subject to commitments, and the other which is not) are heterogeneous in income risk, leading
to variation in the timing of adjustment for the commitment good. This variation in timing
creates smooth aggregate consumption dynamics for the commitment good, but the accom-
panying heterogeneity in asset holdings limits the ability to incorporate their framework into
a general equilibrium model. In contrast, the model presented here has a representative agent
formulation, and thus can be easily incorporated into a general equilibrium model.
Several related literatures have investigated the implications of consumption commitments.
Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show that consumption commitments can raise risk aversion over
moderate-stakes gambles: large gambles trigger re-optimization of commitments, limiting
their e"ect on risk preferences; Postlewaite et al. (2008) show that such heightened risk-
aversion over moderate-stakes gambles means optimal employment contracts can feature
rigid wages, but the prospect of dismissal. In a finance application, Grossman and Laroque
(1990) find that in an economy with a single durable good even small transaction costs can
lead to infrequent adjustment of consumption, and consequently a low contemporaneous
correlation between consumption growth and stock returns; they argue that the apparent
equity-premium puzzle is an artifact of the short horizons over which stock returns and con-
sumption growth are typically compared. Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) extend the Grossman
and Laroque (1990) model to a two-good housing (which is subject to adjustment costs) and
non-housing consumption setting, and find that their model shares many features with the
habit-persistence model.
In related work, a range of other frictions have been proposed to explain empirically docu-
mented consumption anomalies. Reis (2006) studies the consumption behavior of an agent
who finds it costly acquire and process information: households in his model endogenously
choose to make consumption plans sporadically, generating delayed and gradual adjustment
of aggregate consumption to economic news. Sims (2003) and Moscarini (2004) present
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conceptually similar models featuring agents with limited information processing capacity.
In what follows, Section 2.2 lays out the model formally. Section 2.3 discusses the ability of
the model the explain the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity properties of aggregate
consumption, and discusses the model’s implications for the equity-premium puzzle. Section
2.4 solves the model quantitatively, and subjects it to a series of exogenous monetary pol-
icy shocks, in order to demonstrate some features of the commitments model in a general
equilibrium setting. Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks.
2.2 Household Problem with Consumption Commitments
2.2.1 Model Overview
The model assumes that households derive utility Ut =
´ 1
0 u (ct (j)) dj at time t from a
continuum of consumption goods ct (j), with j " [0, 1]. Utility is additively separable within
and across time periods for each good, and is concave in the level of consumption for each
good. Perfectly competitive final goods firms producing each consumer good face the same
costs, implying a relative price of unity for each pair of goods, in all time periods. (The firm
side of the model is described in Section 2.4.)
In the absence of frictions, utility is maximized for a given level of spending when consump-
tion in each time period is equated across goods. To see this, consider the expenditure
minimization problem for a household that faces no frictions in choosing its consumption





Ptct (j) dj s.t. Ut & U, (2.2.1)
where Pt is the nominal price for each good at time t. Letting + be the Lagrange multiplier
on the constraint, the first-order condition for this expenditure minimization problem is:
[(ct (j)] Pt = +u
# (ct (j)) , (2.2.2)
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from which it is clear that at an optimum ct (j) = ct (k) = ct for all j, k " [0, 1]. An optimum
requires equating spending across goods because each good has the same price Pt and there
is diminishing marginal utility in consumption of each good.
The key departure from this frictionless benchmark is an assumption that households face
consumption adjustment costs: consumption decisions made today create commitments that
are costly to adjust. Consumption commitments may arise for a variety of reasons, as dis-
cussed in the introduction. Regardless of their source, the model assumes that commitments
create adjustment costs that can be represented in monetary terms. Relative to the bench-
mark model without commitments, the only new parameters introduced are those related to
the adjustment cost function.
When economic news arrives, a household must pay a real cost D (1t) to adjust spending
for a (1! 1t)-share of its consumption basket. For tractability, when a household chooses to
abandon a (1! 1t)-share of its commitments, the set of commitments adjusted is assumed to
be random. This assumption dramatically simplifies the household’s problem by eliminating
the need to keep track of the history of consumption choices for each good. The function










= 0, and lim
%t$0
D# (1t) = !',
where 1̄ < 1 is the probability that consumption for a good can be adjusted at no cost:
maintaining last period’s consumption basket creates no adjustment cost, but the cost to
abandon all commitments and choose an entirely new consumption basket is infinite.
Crucially, marginal utility is no longer equated across goods in each time period. Commit-
ments made in good times may remain in place in bad times because they are too costly to
abandon, and vice versa. The greater the dispersion in marginal utility across goods, the
lower is total utility for a given level of spending. For those goods whose consumption is
reoptimized, the same level of consumption is chosen because this maximizes utility for a
given level of spending; there are no dynamic considerations that would lead a household to
reset consumption to a di"erent level across goods, because the probability a commitment is
abandoned is history independent.
The share of goods whose consumption is reset each period is chosen by the household to
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balance adjustment costs against the benefit of a more equal distribution of spending, and
therefore marginal utility, across goods. Households are forward looking in choosing the share
of commitments to adjust, and in making new commitments, taking into account that choices
made today are costly to alter in the future.
Total consumption is less responsive to economic news in the presence of commitments than
in the standard model: a 1t-share of the previous period’s consumption basket is unchanged,
and the concavity of the utility function makes a compensating change in consumption for
goods whose consumption is reset undesirable. The following example illustrates the e"ect
of commitments on the response of consumption to economic news. Suppose a household
receives a negative permanent income news shock which, in the absence of commitments, the
household would respond to by proportionately reducing spending on each of its consumption
goods by #. In the presence of commitments, it is prohibitively costly to adjust consumption
for all goods, so instead the household chooses to keep a 1t-share of commitments made before
the news shock arrived. With spending ‘stuck’ at a higher than desired level for the 1t-share
of goods subject to ongoing commitments, consumption for the (1! 1t)-share of goods whose





# to achieve the same decline in total
spending as in the absence of frictions. But such a large fall in consumption spread across
only a (1! 1t)-share of goods creates a sharp rise in marginal utility. The household tolerates
a distorted intertemporal pattern of consumption—incorporating the news about permanent
income into its spending over time, rather than immediately—to limit the unevenness in
spending across goods in each time period.
The remaining elements of the household’s problem are essentially standard. Households
supply labor in a perfectly competitive labor market, and own firms from which they receive
flow profits each period via a divided. Households rent capital to firms, and are assumed to
pay capital adjustment costs. It is important to include capital in the model because, in the
presence of consumption adjustment costs, households use saving to smooth abrupt changes
in income.
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2.2.2 Household Maximization Problem
Formally, the household’s optimization problem at time t can be expressed in terms of the
following Bellman equation:
Vt (bt, Kt, Ct!1, Ut!1) = max
{ct,Nt,%t,It}
{Ut ! v (Nt) + ,EtVt+1 (bt+1, Kt+1, Ct, Ut)} , (2.2.3)







tKt + wtNt + $t ! Ct ! It !D (1t)
2
, (2.2.4)






Ct = (1! 1t) ct + 1tCt!1, (2.2.6)
Ut = (1! 1t) u (ct) + 1tUt!1, (2.2.7)
where Ct is total consumption, ct is the level of consumption for goods whose consumption
is reset, bt is real bonds held, Rt!1 is the gross nominal rate-of-return on bonds, .t = PtPt!1
is the inflation rate on consumption goods, Nt is labor supply, Kt is capital held, Rkt is
the real marginal product of capital, % is the capital adjustment cost function, $t is profits
remitted to households, and D (1t) is the cost (measured in dollars) of maintaining a 1t-
share of consumption commitments. Each period a household resets consumption for a
random (1! 1t)-share of its basket of goods, with 1t endogenously chosen by the household.






Letting / represent the depreciation rate on capital, the function % is assumed to satisfy
% (/) = /, %# (/) = 1, and %## (/) < 0.
Last period’s total spending Ct!1 and level of utility Ut!1 are introduced as state variables
only for analytical convenience. Making use of the randomization assumption, Equation
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= (1! 1t) ct + 1t
ˆ
Ct!1 (j) dj
= (1! 1t) ct + 1tCt!1.
(2.2.8)
We only need to keep track of last period’s total spending and this period’s consumption
choice ct to compute today’s total spending; this is because the household buys a 1t-scale
replica of yesterday’s consumption basket, and spends ct on each of the (1! 1t)-share of




u (Ct (j)) dj
= (1! 1t) u (ct) + 1t
ˆ
u (Ct!1 (j)) dj
= (1! 1t) u (ct) + 1tUt!1.
(2.2.9)
Flow utility is a weighted average of utility from last period’s consumption basket, and the
utility derived from goods whose consumption is reset today. The dependence of flow utility
on lagged consumption choices is due to consumption adjustment costs; there is no reference
dependence built into the utility function, as assumed in habit formation models.
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:









































































































In what follows, these conditions are used to derive expressions for consumption, the share
of goods subject to commitments, labor supply, and investment, respectively.
2.2.3 Consumption: First-Order Condition
In the absence of commitments (i.e., when there is no cost to adjust consumption, and thus
1t = 0 in all time periods) households equate the marginal utility of consumption and the
marginal value of wealth:
u# (Ct) = !t, (2.2.18)
where ct = Ct because consumption is reset for all goods in each period, and !t is used to
denote the marginal value of wealth at time t. In the presence of consumption adjustment
costs, households take into account the probability that consumption choices made today
will remain in place in future periods, resulting in a more general expression than Equation
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(2.2.18). Making use of Equations (2.2.16) and (2.2.17), the household’s first-order condition
for spending on goods whose consumption is reset in the current period (Equation 2.2.10)






At = 1 + ,Et [1t+1At+1] , (2.2.20)
and
Bt = !t + ,Et [1t+1Bt+1] . (2.2.21)
Total consumption is a weighted sum of consumption for goods whose consumption is reset
in the current period, and consumption commitments that are unchanged from the previous
period (see Equation 2.2.8). Note that in the steady state, BtAt = !t and ct = Ct, in which
case Equation (2.2.19) reduces to the standard condition given by Equation (2.2.18). Next,
insight is developed by considering a special case of the model in which the share of goods
subject to commitments each period is exogenous and constant; the general form of the model
with an endogenous and time-varying share of goods subject to commitments is discussed
afterward.
2.2.4 Special Case: Exogenous Commitments
2.2.4.1 Euler Equation Representation
When the adjustment cost function D (1t) permits consumption to be reset for a (1! 1)-share
of goods each period at no cost, but requires an infinite cost to reset consumption for a larger
set of goods, the share of goods whose consumption can be reset is e"ectively exogenous
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and equal to 1 < 1 in each time period. Under this assumption, Equation (2.2.19) can be
re-expressed as follows:




Equation (2.2.22) indicates that households set the marginal utility of consumption (for
goods whose consumption is reset in the current period) equal to a discounted weighted
average of expected future marginal values of wealth. The weights reflect the probability
that goods whose consumption is reset today remain subject to commitments in each future
period: the higher is the probability that a commitment remains in place in future periods,
the larger is the weight placed on distant-in-time expected values of the marginal utility
of wealth. Because a pronounced consumption response to a transitory fluctuation in the
marginal value of wealth creates consumption commitments that remain in place long after
the fluctuation in !t has passed, households optimally respond little to transitory variation
in !t when 1 is large.
Further insight can be gained by representing consumption behavior in terms of an Euler
equation. Continuing to assume that the share of goods subject to commitments each period
is constant at 1 < 1, and assuming in addition that utility for each good has a constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution %, the following log-linearized consumption Euler
equation holds for aggregate consumption at time t:








where the term !Rt+k ! ".t+k+1 is the percentage deviation in the real interest rate from its
steady-state level. (See Appendix 2.6.1 for a step-by-step derivation of this condition.) The
standard frictionless consumption Euler equation is a special case: setting the share of goods
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subject to commitments equal to zero (1 = 0) yields





That is, when all consumption goods can be adjusted each period at no cost, expected con-
sumption growth is proportional to the expected percentage deviation in the real interest
from its steady-state level. But when a 1-share of goods are subject to ongoing commit-
ments each period, expected consumption growth is a weighted sum of a backward looking
component (lagged consumption growth) and a forward looking component (expected future
deviations in the real interest rate from its steady-state level). The larger is the weight on the
backward looking component—equal to the share goods subject to ongoing commitments—
the greater is the degree of inertia in aggregate consumption growth. The smaller is the share
of goods subject to commitments each period, the larger is the weight on near-term expected
deviations in the real interest rate from its steady-state level. As in Equation (2.2.22), the
weight placed on expected future realizations of the real interest rate reflect the probability
that spending on goods whose consumption is reset today remain unchanged in each future
time period. The parameter %, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, parameterizes
the curvature of the utility function for each good, controlling the willingness of households
to vary consumption in response to changes in its intertemporal price: ceteris paribus, the
larger is %, the greater is the response of consumption to an expected change in future real
interest rates.
An important insight apparent from the Equation (2.2.23) is the dependence of consumption
growth on the persistence of expected changes in future real interest rates: persistent changes
in the real interest rate meaningfully a"ect the forward-looking term on the right-hand-side of
Equation (2.2.23), but transitory changes do not. Households optimally respond elastically to
persistent changes in the real interest rate, and largely ignore transitory changes; mirroring
the earlier discussion, a pronounced increase in consumption in response to a short-lived
reduction in the real interest rate is undesirable because it is likely to result in spending
being ‘stuck’ at a sub-optimally high level long after the real interest rate has returned to
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its normal level, and vice versa. This aspect of consumption behavior suggests that a high
degree of inertia in central bank policy interest rate rules may be desirable: in the presence
of commitments, aggregate consumption is only meaningfully a"ected by real interest rate
changes that are expected to be long-lasting.
2.2.4.2 Relation to Habit-Formation Preferences
A widely used specification of consumer preferences assumes that utility derived from con-
sumption is reference dependent: the reference level may be either aggregate consumption
(external habit) or lagged own consumption (internal habit). Although there is only limited
microeconomic evidence that consumer preferences are reference dependent, habit formation
preferences are now widely used, especially in general equilibrium macroeconomic models, be-
cause they generate consumption behavior that matches several stylized features of aggregate
consumption data: excess smoothness and excess sensitivity in response to economic news,
and humped-shaped dynamics. Because reference dependence makes consumers unwilling
to tolerate abrupt changes in consumption, habit-formation preferences have also become
prominent in the asset pricing literature, to reconcile standard estimates of investor risk-
aversion and a high equity-premium with an empirically observed low covariance between
consumption growth and returns on financial assets.
Critically, the consumption Euler equation implied by the widely-used internal habit prefer-
ence specification is a special case of the consumption commitments model outlined in this
paper. The utility function for internal habit-formation preferences is given by
Ut = u (Ct ! bCt!1) , (2.2.25)
where b is the degree of degree of reference dependence on past own consumption. The
larger is b, the greater is the weight placed on past consumption, and the less willing is the
consumer to tolerate period-to-period changes in consumption. Utility maximization with
this preferences specification (setting 1 = 0 and replacing Equation 2.2.7 with Equation
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where Ĉt # Ct!bCt!1. Note that this condition closely resembles Equation (2.2.22), the first-
order condition with consumption commitments, for consumption on goods whose spending
is reset in the current period. As shown in Appendix 2.6.2, the first-order condition for
internal habit-formation preferences (Equation 2.2.26) implies a consumption Euler equation
identical (up to a first-order approximation) to that for the consumption commitments model,
when the share of goods subject to commitments is exogenously equal to 1 = b (see Equation
2.2.23). Accordingly, consumption commitments—with an exogenous and random subset of
goods subject to commitments each period—provides a microfoundation for internal habit-
formation preferences.
2.2.5 General Case: Endogenous Commitments
Having shown in the previous section that consumption behavior implied by internal habit-
formation preferences is matched by a special case of the commitments model, this section
returns to the general form of the model in which the share of goods subject to commitments is
endogenously chosen by the household each period. This is the key di"erence between the two
models: the degree of reference dependence with habit-formation preferences is a structural
(and time-invariant) parameter, whereas the share of goods subject to commitments each
period is constrained only by consumption adjustment costs. The ability to vary the share
of goods subject to commitments allows consumption to respond asymmetrically to large
and small shocks: in the presence of large shocks, it is optimal to incur adjustment costs to
reset spending for a high share of goods, and consumption behavior approaches that of the
frictionless model. This intuition is formalized in the next two subsections: the implications
for consumption dynamics of a household having the ability to vary adjustment of prior
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commitments is discussed first, and then the consumer’s optimal determination of the share
of goods subject to commitments.
2.2.5.1 Consumption Response with Endogenous Adjustment of Commitments
There are two channels via which endogenous adjustment of commitments can magnify the
responsiveness of consumption to near-term expected changes in the marginal value of wealth.
First, by incurring adjustment cost in the current period, the household can increase the set
of good whose spending can be reset; recall that the law-of-motion for total consumption is
Ct = 1tCt!1+(1! 1t) ct, and that the smaller is 1t the narrower is the set of goods subject to
commitments this period. Second, the ability in future periods to reset commitments incurred
by current spending choices can increase the responsiveness of current consumption to near-
term changes in !̃t. To illustrate this second channel, it is helpful to take a second-order
Taylor series approximation to the right-hand-side of Equation (2.2.19), about the steady-
state level for consumption and the steady-state share of goods subject to commitments:





























=Xt = Xt!XX is the percentage deviation of variable X from its steady-state level, and the
steady-state condition implies u# (c) = ! (see Appendix 2.6.3 for a derivation of this ap-





-share of goods at no cost; whenever adjustment cost is incurred,
consumption is reset for a larger share of goods, implying 1̃t+k $ 0, for all k: the larger is
the set of goods that the consumer expects to reset spending for in period t + k, the more
negative is 1̃t+k. If the household expects to reset consumption for a large share of goods in
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period t + k, then 1̃t+k < 0 and consumption responds elastically relative to the exogenous
commitments benchmark. This can be seen formally by inspection of Equations (2.2.27) and















. Intuitively, when the household
expects to reset commitments for a broad set of goods in period t+k, the constraint imposed
on future choices by current spending decisions is small, and it is optimal for consumption
to respond elastically to near-term changes in the marginal value of wealth.
Having shown that the consumption response to an economic shock is more elastic the smaller,
now and in future periods, is the share of goods subject to commitments, the following
discussion considers the household’s optimal determination of 1t.
2.2.5.2 Determination of the Share of Goods Subject to Commitments
The share of commitments maintained each period is chosen by households to balance ad-
justment costs against the benefit of a more equal distribution of spending, and therefore
marginal utility, across goods. Following essentially the same steps used in Section 2.2.3, the
household’s first-order condition for 1t (Equation 2.2.12) can be expressed as follows:
(
(Ct!1 ! ct)!









The left-hand-side of Equation (2.2.29) measures the reduction in the consumption distortion
across goods from a marginal decrease in the share of commitments held over from the
previous period. This term does not depend on 1t: the randomization assumption means that
the distribution of consumption among goods whose consumption is reset is independent of
1t. Balancing this benefit, !D# (1t) measures the marginal increase in adjustment costs from
a marginal decrease in the share of commitments maintained from the previous period. The
term D# (1t) is scaled by !tBt $ 1, reflecting the fact that incurring cost to adjust consumption
for an increased share of goods today may accrue benefit in future periods.
The utility loss arising from an uneven distribution in consumption across goods is second-
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order, because commitments a"ect the composition of a household’s consumption basket, but
not the lifetime level of consumption. However, the adjustment cost incurred to adjust con-
sumption commitments consumes resources, and has a first-order cost to households. This
means that even small adjustment costs can make households unwilling to adjust commit-
ments.2
To gain intuition, it is helpful to re-express the left-hand-side of Equation (2.2.29) as follows:
(
(Ct!1 ! ct)!

































Term y is the dollar cost of the consumption distortion carried over from the previous period.
The inequality follows from the fact that term y is positive: u (Ct!1) & Ut!1, because utility
for any given level of spending is maximized when consumption is spread evenly across all
goods. Term x measures the additional utility loss that arises whenever today’s chosen level
of consumption, ct, is unequal to last period’s total spending, Ct!1. Figure 2.1 graphs x
over a range of values for ct.3 For ct close to Ct!1 the distortion caused by consumption
commitments is negligible, but rises at an increasing rate in the gap between ct and Ct!1,
shown by the curvature of graph x. The more concave is the utility function for each good,
2On a technical level, the second-order nature of the utility cost arising from consumption commitments means
that a linear approximation to the model’s first-order-conditions around the steady-state level of consumption
is not su"cient to describe a household’s choice of %t. When solving the model quantitatively in Section 2.4,
a second-order approximation to the model’s first-order conditions is used. For the special case where the
share of commitments adjusted each period is exogenously fixed at some %t = % < 1, a linear-approximation
is su"cient.
3To see that term x is convex, note that "x"ct = !
u!!
u!2 [u (ct)! u (Ct!1)]. Hence,
"x
"ct
> 1 for ct > Ct!1, "x"ct < 1
for ct < Ct!1, and "x"ct = 0 when ct = Ct!1.
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the greater is the distortion caused for any ct (= Ct!1.
Further intuition can be gained by taking a second-order Taylor series approximation to the
left-hand-side of Equation (2.2.29), around the steady-state level of consumption ct = C̄.































where %Xt % Xt!XX is the percentage deviation in variable Xt from its steady-state level X, -j =
1t!11t!2 · · · 1t!j+1 (1! 1t!j) are the weights on prior commitments, and % is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, assuming isoelastic preferences. Term a is proportional to the
variance of consumption across goods, relative to a mean level of consumption equal to the
steady-state level ct = C. Distant-in-time consumption choices receive less weight than
recent choices because they are a smaller share of total consumption. In general, steady-
state consumption is not the relevant benchmark from which to measure the dispersion in
consumption; term b adjusts the cost measured by term a according to the deviation between
desired consumption today and the average level of spending carried over from the previous
period. Deviations in past consumption choices from the steady-state are less costly the
closer is their mean value to today’s desired frictionless level of consumption. For the special
case in which consumption today is reset to its steady-state level (c̃t = 0) term b is equal
to zero and the variance in past consumption choices, given by the summation in term a,
measures the full cost to households of the dispersion in consumption across goods. The
smaller is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution %, the greater is the cost of any given
dispersion in spending across goods, because the degree of curvature in the utility function
is higher, and the greater is the adjustment cost that the household is optimally willing to
pay to reset spending. Terms c and d, on the right-hand side of Equation (2.2.31), are the
same as in Equation (2.2.29), with the exception that term d is now scaled by steady-state
consumption.
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The following two sub-sections describe the remaining choice variables for the household:
labor supply and investment in physical capital. Because these two aspects of the model are
standard, these sections are brief.
2.2.6 Labor Supply: First-Order Condition
Frictions a"ecting household labor supply are undoubtedly important, but their incorporation
into a DSGE model is beyond the scope of this paper. Accordingly, the frictionless first-order




where !t is the marginal value of wealth. Equations (2.2.11) and (2.2.14) together imply a











2.2.7 Investment: First-Order Condition
Letting qt # ,Et #Vt+1#K denote the discounted shadow value of a unit of installed capital next













The market value of installed capital is increasing in the rate of return on capital, and the
degree of convexity in the capital adjustment cost function. It is decreasing in the rate of
depreciation, /. The first-order condition for investment (Equation 2.2.13) is standard:
qt%
#
t = !t. (2.2.35)
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2.3 Applications
2.3.1 Excess Smoothness and Excess Sensitivity
The commitments model generates aggregate consumption dynamics that are consistent with
two important deviations from the permanent income hypothesis: excess smoothness and
excess sensitivity. Consumption is said to be excessively smooth if it responds less than one-
for-one to the arrival of news about permanent income (Deaton, 1987), and to be excessively
sensitive if it responds to lagged information (Flavin, 1981). Switching costs make it optimal
for households to incorporate news about permanent income into their spending over time,
rather than immediately, resulting in excess smoothness, while such delayed response makes
spending responsive to dated information, and thus exhibit excess sensitivity.
The ability of the consumption commitments model to match these stylized features of ag-
gregate consumption data can be most easily shown analytically for the special case of the
model in which the share of goods subject to switching costs is exogenously equal to 1 in each
period. Suppose the representative household in an economy that has been in steady-state
receives favorable news about permanent income at time t, and no further news thereafter.







for k & 0;
! for k < 0,
(2.3.1)
where ! is the steady-state level of marginal utility before the shock, and !" < !. In each
time period k > 0, consumption is reset to an increased level for goods whose spending is not
subject to commitments. The first-order condition for consumption on goods whose spending





c# for k & 0;
c for k < 0,
(2.3.2)
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where c is the steady-state level of consumption before the shock and c# > c. Consumption
responds immediately for goods not subject to commitments but, in each period, consumption
for a 1-share of goods is not adjusted, and aggregate consumption incorporates the date t news
shock over time, rather than immediately; using the law of motion for aggregate consumption
(Equation 2.2.6), total spending in period k > 0 after the shock occurs is given by:
Ct+k = 1




Taking a log-linear approximation to this condition around the pre-shock steady-state level
of consumption, it can be shown that the change in aggregate consumption between any two
periods k2 > k1 > 0 is approximately equal to







(logc# ! logc) (2.3.4)
# , (k1, k2, 1) (logc# ! logc) . (2.3.5)
The term (logc# ! logc) is equal to the approximate percentage change in permanent income
discovered at time t. In the absence of commitments, 1 = 0 and , (0, k2, 1) = 1 in Equation
(2.3.4), in which case aggregate consumption responds one-for-one to the news shock at
time t. But, in the presence of commitments, , (0, k2, 1) < 1, generating delayed and partial
adjustment at time t. Equation (2.3.4) maps directly into a standard empirical test for excess
smoothness. Consumption is excessively smooth if the coe!cient ,0 < 1 for any k2 > 0 in
the following empirical regression:
logCt+k2 ! logCt = !0 + ,0 (logAt+k2 ! logAt) + $, (2.3.6)
where logAt+k2 ! logAt is the change in permanent income between time t and t+ k. For an
economy subject to the shock studied here (see Equation 2.3.1), logAt+k2 ! logAt = logc# !
logc. The regression coe!cients in Equation (2.3.6) correspond exactly to parameters of the
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commitments model: !0 = 0 and ,0 = , (0, k2, 1) < 1. The larger is 1 the smaller is the value
of , (0, k2, 1), and the greater is the degree of excess sensitivity. Because lim
k2$%
, (0, k2, 1) = 1
aggregate consumption does eventually fully incorporate the news received at time t.
Similarly, there is evidence of excess sensitivity if ,1 > 0 in the empirical regression:
logCt+k2 ! logCt+k1 = !1 + ,1 (logAs ! logAs!") + $, (2.3.7)
for any k2 > k1, s $ k1 and # > 0. For the shock studied here, logAs!logAs!" = logc#!logc,
for any s & t + #; hence, ,1 = , (k1, k2, 1) > 0 in the presence of commitments and there
is excess sensitivity. Aggregate consumption exhibits excess sensitivity because adjustment
costs limit the ability of households to immediately revise their spending upon receipt of news
about permanent income; they reset consumption in response to a news shock over a number
of periods, generating a correlation between consumption growth and lagged information.
2.3.2 Asset Pricing Implications
The equity-premium has been an enduring puzzle: reconciling the historical return on stocks
over bonds (of about 6 percent per annum) with the empirically observed low covariance
between consumption growth and stock returns (of about 0.2 percent per annum) requires
investors to have a degree of risk-aversion about an order of magnitude larger than standard
estimates in other settings (see Kocherlakota, 1996, for a survey of the literature). This sec-
tion shows that consumption commitments provide a potential reconciliation: commitments
prevent aggregate consumption adjusting fully and immediately in response to asset returns,
masking the extent of consumption risk borne by households via their equity holdings. The
remainder of this section formalizes this intuition.
First, note that the household’s first-order and envelope conditions can be combined to give









where Rst+1 is the return on holding stocks (realized at time t + 1), Rt is the return on
bonds (with the time t + 1 payo" known at time t), and !t the marginal value of wealth.
The term !t+1/!t is the stochastic discount factor used to price assets in this representative
agent economy. In the standard model, without consumption commitments, households set
the marginal utility of consumption equal to the shadow value of wealth in each period:
u# (Ct) = !t. Using this condition, and supposing households have isoelastic utility with
















Using the historical moments listed above, a coe!cient of relative risk aversion of about 30
is implied by Equation (2.3.10)—an order of magnitude larger than standard estimates.
The implications of consumption commitments for asset pricing can be most easily seen
for the special case in which the share of goods subject to commitments each period is
exogenous: 1t = 1. Spending on goods whose consumption is reset today is chosen such that
u# (ct) = (1! ,1)Et
I%
k=0 (,1)
k !t+k (see Equation 2.2.22), implying that variation in the
current period’s marginal value of wealth has a reduced e"ect on consumption compared to
the frictionless model in which u# (Ct) = !t. In addition, a 1-share of goods have unchanged
consumption in the commitments model each period, further dampening the movement of
aggregate consumption in response to changes in the marginal value of wealth. In the presence












See Appendix 2.6.4 for a derivation of this condition. Thus, the presence of consumption
commitments reduces the degree of investor risk-aversion required to reconcile the historical
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equity-premium with the observed covariance between stock returns and consumption growth
by a factor of (1! ,1) (1! 1) % (1! 1)2. With a value of 1 = 0.7, roughly the share of
consumption that Chetty and Szeidl (2007) estimate is unadjusted on an annual basis, there
is no apparent equity-premium puzzle. This reconciliation is similar to that proposed by
Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Gabaix and Laibson (2001): in each case, there is at least
some consumer good (or set of goods) that is not adjusted contemporaneously with news on
asset returns.
Because the restriction on consumption imposed by adjustment costs diminishes with time,
the commitments model implies that the magnitude of the apparent equity-premium puzzle
should decrease when the consumption response to stock market returns is measured over
longer time periods. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is the case: Parker (2003) finds
that risk borne by households in holding the market portfolio is substantially larger when
measured by changes in consumption at horizons of up to about two years, particularly for
stockholder households.
The commitments model provides an explanation for the observed high equity-premium with-
out implying a counterfactually high risk-free rate-of-return. Without consumption adjust-
ment costs, a high degree of curvature in consumer utility is required to generate a large
equity-premium, but this implies that consumers are also unwilling to experience variation in
consumption through time, requiring a high risk-free rate to explain observed mean growth
in per capita consumption. This conflict does not arise with the commitments model: utility
is assumed to have only a moderate degree of curvature and adjustment costs do not restrict
predictable growth in consumption over time.
Interestingly, the commitments model implies that large movements in financial asset returns
may be the most informative observations for measuring the extent of consumption risk borne
by households via their stock holdings. Large shocks make it optimal for households to adjust
spending for a large share of goods, concentrating the necessary adjustment in consumption
over a short period of time.
It should be noted that—as is the case with habit-formation preferences—incorporating con-
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sumption commitments into an otherwise standard DSGE model is not su!cient to generate
the empirically observed level of the equity-premium. The magnitude of consumption risk
borne by households from holding capital assets remains low because households have two
means through which they can limit variation in the marginal value wealth: i) they can vary
labor supply to o"set a change in the value of asset holdings; and ii) they can vary saving
without bearing large adverse capital gains or losses on holding capital. The marginal prod-
uct of capital varies little in standard DSGE models, so any adverse capital gains must come
from inelasticity in the supply of capital. Microfounding any inelasticity in labor supply and
investment supply that acts to raise the equilibrium return premium on stocks is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Boldrin et al., 2001, for a two-sector model with habit persistence
preferences that matches the empirically observed equity premium).
2.4 Quantitative Model
This section solves the model quantitatively, in order to illustrate the e"ect of commitments
on aggregate consumption dynamics in the presence of a series of monetary policy shocks.
This policy exercise demonstrates the ability of the commitments model to generate hump-
shaped aggregate consumption dynamics in response to economic news, and shows the poten-
tial of the model to reconcile a moderate structural elasticity of intertemporal substitution
with an empirically observed low correlation between consumption growth and changes in the
real interest rate. Before discussing the results of this simulation, the following sub-sections
sketch the remaining elements of the model, and discuss its calibration.
2.4.1 Description of Model
The consumption commitments model outlined in this paper can be easily incorporated into
an otherwise standard DSGE model: the assumption that a random set of goods are subject
to commitments each period eliminates history dependence that would otherwise complicate
solving a general equilibrium model. The model is standard, with one exception: to allow for
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nominal rigidity—as is now standard in business-cycle analysis—sticky prices are introduced
at the wholesale level, rather than at the retail level. If prices were instead assumed to be
sticky at the retail level, then the price paid by households for each good would be di"erent,
and consumption of each good would be a state variable for the household problem, not just
total consumption; the model would be substantially more complicated to solve, for little or
no gain in performance.
Each good consumed by households is assembled by a final goods firm (using no labor or
capital) from inputs made by intermediate goods firms. Final goods firms are perfectly
competitive, but intermediate goods firms are monopolistically competitive. Intermediate
goods firms produce inputs using a constant returns to scale production function, employing
labor and renting capital from households. These imperfectly competitive intermediate goods
firms choose their sale price to maximize profits, subject to a friction that prevents them
freely choosing their nominal sale price each period. As is standard in the New-Keynesian
DSGE literature, the pricing restriction is assumed to be governed by a Calvo device: each
intermediate goods firm can reset its price with state-independent probability (1! ') each
period. The nominal interest rate is determined by a Taylor (1993) monetary policy rule.
The technology used to assemble each final good is assumed to have the same substitutability
among inputs. All consumer goods represent the same collection of intermediate inputs that
have been costlessly di"erentiated by, for example, painting the good a di"erent color. This
assumption that final goods firms use a common technology implies a common price for each
consumer good in every period. Details of the model can be found in Appendix 2.7.
2.4.2 Functional Forms and Calibration




= 0.35, roughly equal to the expenditure share of consumer goods Chetty and Szeidl
(2007) estimate to have no or negligible switching costs. This parameter choice coincides with
the internal habit-formation reference weight estimated by Christiano et al. (2005) in their
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influential DSGE model of the macroeconomic e"ects of a monetary policy shock; because
the habit-formation model is equivalent to the commitments model when the share of goods
subject to switching costs is exogenously fixed, comparing consumption dynamics of the
commitments model to the benchmark habit-formation model simply requires examining the
special case in which 1t = 1̄ = b. The adjustment cost function for commitments is given








, which satisfies each of the desired properties listed in Section
2.2.1. The parameter 2 is calibrated so that there is su!cient variation in 1t to highlight the
endogenous response of commitments to shock magnitude; in this dimension, the simulation
results are exploratory.
The remaining model parameters and functional forms are essentially standard. Isoelas-
tic functional forms are assumed for labor supply and utility for each consumption good:








, where * parameterizes the disutility of labor
supply. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is chosen to be % = 0.5, and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is set to 3 = 1; these are typical parameter values used in business-
cycle analysis. The quadratic form % (x) = x! &2 (x! /)
2 is chosen for the capital adjustment
cost function, in which case ) % dlnqt
d( IK!')
is the semi-elasticity of the shadow value of cap-
ital with respect to deviations in the investment-capital ratio from its steady-state level.
Each period in the model corresponds to a quarter; the depreciation rate for capital is set
at / = 0.025, and households’ subjective rate of time preference is , = 0.99. The elastic-
ity of capital to output is ! = 13 , consistent with empirically observed capital and labor
income shares, and the price elasticity of demand for intermediate inputs " is chosen such
that intermediate goods firms set a steady-state mark-up over marginal cost of 20 percent.
Intermediate goods firms are able to reset their price each period with state-independent
probability (1! ') = 14 , resulting in a one year average price duration. The Taylor rule
coe!cient on inflation is 1.5, a value roughly in line with the coe!cient for estimated Taylor
rules. The model’s calibration is summarized in Table 2.1.
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2.4.3 Response to Monetary Policy
The e"ect of commitments on aggregate consumption dynamics is demonstrated by subjecting
the model to a series of exogenous monetary policy shocks. Specifically, the model’s Taylor
rule is subjected to a shock ut that decays according to a first-order autoregressive process
with autocorrelation coe!cient #R:
µt = #Rµt!1 + ut, (2.4.1)
with ut+k = 0 for k > 0. The cumulative size of the shock depends on the autoregressive






1!( . Three di"erent shock scenarios are presented
to illustrate the role of commitments:
1. A persistent shock with small magnitude: ut = 0.01 and #R = 0.75, for a cumulative
size 0.04;
2. A persistent shock with large magnitude: ut = 0.03 and #R = 0.75, for a cumulative
size of 0.12;
3. A transitory shock with large magnitude: ut = 0.03 and #R = 0.25, for a cumulative
size of 0.04.
Impulse response functions for the model’s endogenous variables are presented in response
to each of these shock scenarios in Figures 2.2 to 2.4, respectively. In each figure, the
model with endogenous consumption commitments corresponds to the set of impulse response
functions shown by a blue dotted line; the commitments model with an exogenous and
constant share of goods subject to switching costs each period, which is equivalent (to a
first-order approximation) to internal habit-formation preferences (with b = 1), is shown by
a green line; and the standard model, which is a special case of the commitments model with
1t = 0, corresponds to the set of impulse response functions shown by a red line.
Figure 2.2 illustrates behavior when the economy is subjected to a persistent, but small in
magnitude, expansionary monetary policy shock (simulation number one). Relative to the
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standard model (the red set of impulse responses), in the presence of commitments (the
blue and green set of impulse responses), households adjust consumption gradually, rather
than immediately, generating hump-shaped aggregate consumption dynamics; because the
shock magnitude is small, there is negligible di"erence in consumption behavior between the
model with an exogenous (and fixed) share of goods subject to commitments each period
(green line) and the model with endogenous (and time-varying) consumption commitments
(blue line). In contrast, the simulation shown in Figure 2.3 indicates that, when faced with
a large and persistent shock (simulation number two), households abandon a sizable share
of commitments: they do this because, in the presence of a large shock, the consumption
distortion caused by changing spending for only a small group of goods is large relative to
the marginal cost of adjusting commitments. Critically, the consumption response is more
elastic when households can reduce the share of goods subject to commitments (compare the
blue relative to the green impulse response functions for consumption in Figure 2.3). Thus,
the endogenous adjustment mechanism—that is by assumption absent from habit-formation
preferences—results in a non-linear response of consumption to shock size.
Because consumption commitments a"ect the marginal value of wealth, commitments af-
fect labor supply, even though consumption and labor supply are additively separable in
households’ utility function. Because there are no labor supply frictions in this model, but
commitments limit the responsiveness of consumption to economic shocks, saving is a poten-
tially important adjustment mechanism for households: saving is temporarily high whenever
earnings respond more elastically than consumption to a favorable economic shock.
For the set of simulated impulse response paths associated with the standard model and the
endogenous commitments model, shown in Figures 2.2 to 2.4, estimates of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution are reported in Table 2.2. The estimate for the standard model
(i.e., in the absence of consumption adjustment costs) is equal to the structural parameter,
% = 0.5, up to numerical approximation error. In the presence of commitments, consumption
responds gradually to the interest rate shock, continuing to increase after the real interest
rate has begun to decline (but is above its normal level), resulting in a low or slightly negative
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estimate for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The commitments model has the
same structural elasticity of intertemporal substitution as the standard frictionless model
(utility for each good has the same curvature), but commitments break the relationship
between changes in consumption and the real interest rate implied by the frictionless Euler
equation.
This is interesting in light of disagreement in the empirical literature about the magnitude
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The seminal work of Hall (1988) estimates
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of close to zero, based on time series data, but
cross-sectional evidence (e.g., Gruber 2006), and complementary estimates implied by survey-
based attitudes toward risk (e.g., Kimball et al. 2008), typically find much larger estimates.
Consumption adjustment costs provide a potential reconciliation: most time-series estimates
are based on transitory variation in real interest rates that households may optimally respond
little to, because doing so incurs consumption adjustment costs; consumption commitments
do not a"ect a household’s willingness to respond to long-lasting variation in real interest
rates, potentially explaining why Gruber (2006)—who uses variation in real interest rates
across households due to di"erences in marginal tax rates on interest income—estimates a
large value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model that microfounds inertial aggregate consumption dynamics,
based on the assumption that spending on some goods is subject to commitments that are
costly to abandon. Household level consumption data, documented elsewhere, indicates that
a sizable share of the typical household’s consumption basket is subject to such costs, with
spending on shelter and autos being the most important sources of commitments for many
households.
Commitments magnify the e"ect on utility of a given change in a household’s total spending,
because consumption can only be reset for the subset of goods not subject to commitments,
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each of which has diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Accordingly, news about
permanent income is incorporated into total household spending over time, rather than im-
mediately, making consumption excessively smooth, and responsive to lagged information
(excess sensitivity). In response to a temporary change in the real interest rate, consump-
tion displays hump-shaped dynamics; the observed elasticity of intertemporal substitution
appears low, despite the model incorporating a moderate structural elasticity, because con-
sumption adjustment costs alter the timing of changes in consumption growth relative to
the real interest rate. The model also has implications for the equity-premium puzzle: com-
mitments restrict the ability of households to adjust consumption immediately in response
to changes in asset values, masking the extent of consumption risk borne by households via
their equity holdings.
The model permits a highly tractable representative agent representation, and can be easily
incorporated into general equilibrium macroeconomic models. The widely used (internal)
habit-formation preference specification is a special case of the model, and thus the model
provides a foundation for reference dependent consumption behavior based on consumption
commitments. In contrast to habit-formation preferences, the reference point—due to con-
sumption adjustment costs, not a behavioral assumption—is endogenously determined in the
general form of the model. When households face large shocks, they optimally choose to
incur adjustment costs necessary to adjust spending for a large share of goods, but in re-
sponse to small shocks leave most commitments in place: consumption responds non-linearly
to the magnitude of economic shocks, approaching the frictionless model for su!ciently large
shocks. The model’s tractability makes it straightforward to embed in more sophisticated
DSGE models.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values: Quarterly
Rate of time preference , = 0.99
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution % = 0.5
Labor supply elasticity (hours worked) 3 = 1
Elasticity of Tobin’s-Q with respect to investment-capital ratio 1'
Capital share of output ! = 13
Commitments adjustment cost parameter 2 = 5* 10!3
Steady-state share of goods subject to commitments 1̄ = 0.65
Capital depreciation rate / = 0.025
Price reset probability (1! ') = 14
Taylor rule coe!cient on inflation *) = 1.5
Intermediate goods firms’ demand elasticity " = 6
Table 2.2: Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Shock Model %̂
ut = 0.01 and # = 0.75 Standard 0.46
Commitments -0.07
ut = 0.03 and # = 0.75 Standard 0.44
Commitments -0.01
ut = 0.03 and # = 0.25 Standard 0.49
Commitments 0.01
Notes: This table reports estimates of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, calculated using the simulated
impulse response functions for the policy exercises shown
in Figures 2.2 to 2.4, respectively.
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Notes: This figure shows the utility cost, beginning in the steady-state,
when spending for goods whose consumption is reset in the current period
(ct) is not equal to spending on goods whose consumption is unchanged
from the previous period, due to consumption commitments.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: Persistent Shock with Small Magnitude



































































































Notes: This figure shows impulse response functions when the model’s Taylor rule is subjected to a 100 basis point
expansionary interest rate shock, that decays according to an autoregressive process with an AR(1) parameter &R = 0.75.
The red set of impulse responses is for the frictionless benchmark model, the blue dotted set for the commitments model,
and the green set for the commitments model when the share of goods subject to commitments is exogenously held fixed.
99
Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: Persistent Shock with Large Magnitude









































































































Notes: This figure shows impulse response functions when the model’s Taylor rule is subjected to a 400 basis point
expansionary interest rate shock, that decays according to an autoregressive process with an AR(1) parameter &R = 0.75.
The red set of impulse responses is for the frictionless benchmark model, the blue dotted set for the commitments model,
and the green set for the commitments model when the share of goods subject to commitments is exogenously held fixed.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: Transitory Shock with Large Magnitude
















































































Notes: This figure shows impulse response functions when the model’s Taylor rule is subjected to a 400 basis point
expansionary interest rate shock, that decays according to an autoregressive process with an AR(1) parameter &R = 0.25.
The red set of impulse responses is for the frictionless benchmark model, the blue dotted set for the commitments model,
and the green set for the commitments model when the share of goods subject to commitments is exogenously held fixed.
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2.6 Appendix A: Proofs Omitted From the Main Text
2.6.1 Euler Equation With Consumption Commitments
This section shows the steps used to derive Equation (2.2.23). Supposing 1t = 1 < 1,
Equation (2.2.19) simplifies to:
u# (ct) = (1! ,1)Bt. (2.6.1)
Assuming u (ct) exhibits constant relative risk-aversion, with an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution % equal to the reciprocal of the coe!cient of relative risk-aversion, Equation
(2.6.1) in log-linearized form is:
! 1
%
%ct = =Bt, (2.6.2)
where =Xt = Xt!XX is the percentage deviation of variable X from its steady-state level. Sub-
tracting this condition from itself advanced one period gives a log-linearized Euler equation
for goods whose consumption is reset in the current period:





The next step uses the log-linearized condition for Bt, and the household’s envelope condition
for bond holdings (Equation 2.2.14), to re-express the term in square brackets on the right-
hand-side of Equation (2.6.3). Recalling that !t # 1Rt!1
#Vt
#b , the log-linearized versions of
these two conditions, respectively, are:
















Substituting Equations (2.6.4) and (2.6.5) into Equation (2.6.3) gives the following represen-
tation of the Euler equation for consumption commitments:








Log-linearizing the law of motion for aggregate consumption (Equation 2.2.6) yields:
%Ct = 1 >Ct!1 + (1! 1) %ct. (2.6.7)
With some re-arrangement, substitution of this expression into Equation (2.6.6) gives the
desired Euler equation for aggregate consumption:








where #logCt = logCt ! logCt!1 % %Ct ! %Ct!1.
2.6.2 Habit-Formation Preferences Euler Equation
This section shows that, when the habit parameter (b) is equal to the exogenous and constant
share of goods subject to commitments each period (1), internal habit-formation preferences
imply an identical log-linearized consumption Euler equation to the model with consumption
commitment. First, note that the log-linearized first-order condition for consumption with








where %Bt is given by Equation (2.6.4). Subtracting this condition from itself advanced one
period, making use of Equations (2.6.4) and (2.6.5), and following essentially the same steps
used in the previous section, gives a log-linearized Euler equation representation for con-





























which after substitution into Equation (2.6.10) gives the desired consumption Euler equation
representation (see Equation 2.2.23).
2.6.3 Consumption FOC: Approximate Representation
This section details the steps used to find a second-order approximation to Equation (2.2.19).
First, take a second-order Taylor series approximation of Equation (2.2.20) to get
dAt % ,Et [d1t+1A+ 1dAt+1 + d1t+1dAt+1] , (2.6.12)




1̃t+1 + Ãt+1 + 1̃t+1Ãt+1
?
, (2.6.13)
where =Xt = Xt!XX is the percentage deviation of variable X from its steady-state level.
Similarly, a second-order Taylor series approximation of Equation (2.2.21) gives
dBt % d!t + ,Et [d1t+1B + 1dBt+1 + d1t+1dBt+1] , (2.6.14)
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which with some manipulation, and using the stead-state condition B (1! ,1) = !, can be
re-expressed as
B̃t % (1! ,1) !̃t + (,1)Et
<
1̃t+1 + B̃t+1 + 1̃t+1B̃t+1
?
. (2.6.15)
Next, let f (At, Bt) = BtAt , and using this notation, take a second-order approximation to the
right-hand-side of Equation (2.2.19) to get


























which with some manipulation, and using the steady-state conditions A (1! ,1) = 1 and
B (1! ,1) = ! can be re-expressed as follows:
u# (ct) % !+!
<










Substitution of Equations (2.6.13) and (2.6.15) into Equation (2.6.19) gives the desired repre-
sentation for the consumer’s consumption first-order condition, for goods whose consumption
is reset in the current period:















where, given Equation (2.6.13),
Ãt % (,1)Et
<

















2.6.4 Asset Pricing Equations
This section present a more complete derivation of the equations presented in Section 2.3.2.
2.6.4.1 Pricing Kernel
The gross rate-of-return on holding stocks is given by:
Rst+1 =
Rkt+1 + (1! /)P kt+1
P kt
, (2.6.23)
where P kt is the price of a unit of capital at time t, and Rkt+1 is the rate-of-return from holding








Recalling that !t # 1Rt!1
#Vt
#b , the envelope condition for bond holdings (Equation 2.2.14) can








Subtracting Equation (2.6.25) from Equation (2.6.24) yields the asset pricing kernel given by

























with the second approximate equality valid for small values of #log!t+1.
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2.6.4.2 Consumption Commitments and Asset Pricing
Assuming utility for each consumption goods exhibits constant relative risk-aversion ', the








Using the approximation =Xt = Xt!XX % log
Xt
X , Equation (2.6.29) can be first-di"erenced to
get an expression for the change in consumption between adjacent time periods for goods
whose consumption is reset:







Aggregate consumption evolves according to the law of motion Ct = (1! 1) ct + 1Ct!1. Log-
linearizing this condition and first-di"erencing yields the following expression:
Et [)logCt+1] % (1! 1)Et [)logct+1] + 1)logCt. (2.6.31)







Rst+1, (1! 1)#logct+1 + 1#logCt
'
(2.6.32)






















































2.7 Appendix B: General Equilibrium Model: Details
This appendix provides details omitted from the main text for the general equilibrium model
discussed in Section 2.4.
2.7.1 Firms
2.7.1.1 Final Goods Firms
Each consumer good Cj, for j " [0, 1], is assembled (using no labor or capital) from a contin-












where " is the elasticity of substitution between inputs xt,j (i) in the production of final good






P̂t (i) xt,j (i) di, (2.7.2)
where P̂t (i) is the price faced by final goods firms of type j for input xt,j (i). Final goods






Ct (j) , (2.7.3)
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for each intermediate input by firms producing consumer good j. Because there is free-entry
into the production of consumer goods, final goods firms earn zero profits, and the price of










Symmetry of the production technology across final goods implies Pt (j) = Pt (k) = Pt for all
j, k " [0, 1].
2.7.1.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate goods firm rents capital from households and employs labor to produce
its input xt (i) according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology:
xt (i) = ZtKt (i)
* Nt (i)
1!* , (2.7.5)
where Zt is the level of total factor productivity, and ! is the elasticity of output with respect






tKt (i) s.t. xt (i) & x̄i, (2.7.6)














The first-order conditions for labor and capital demand, respectively, are:
[(Nt (i)] wt = (1! !)
xt (i)
Nt (i)







mct (i) . (2.7.9)
Substituting these expressions into the production function (Equation 2.7.5) gives an expres-
sion for real marginal cost:















from which it is clear that mc (xt (i)) = mc (xt) , + i " [0, 1].
Intermediate goods producing firms are monopolistically competitive, choosing P̂t (i) to max-
imize profits, subject to the demand curve
xt (i) =
´















where the second equality uses the fact that Ct =
´
Ct (j) dj because each consumer good
has the same price Pt. The input price charged by intermediate goods producers is assumed
to be sticky, with state-independent reset probability '. When free to set its input price, the
profit maximization problem faced by firm i is:
































where MCt = Ptmct is nominal marginal cost, and profits are discounted from the household’s
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point of view. The first-order condition for P̂ "t (i) is:


























Accordingly, the aggregate price level at any point in time is given by:




+ 'P 1!$t!1 . (2.7.15)
2.7.2 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate each period according to the following rule:
Rt = R̄ + *) (.t ! .̄) , (2.7.16)
where Rt is the nominal gross interest rate on bonds, R̄ = 1+ is the steady-state gross nominal
interest rate, and (.t ! .) is the deviation in inflation from its steady-state level of zero. This
interest rate rule is a special case of the Taylor (1993) rule with a zero weight on the output
gap. For any value of *) > 1 the nominal interest rate rises more than one-of-one with an
increase inflation, guaranteeing a unique solution to the model.
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2.7.3 Market Clearing









Kt (i) di, (2.7.18)




Yt (i) di, (2.7.20)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (2.7.21)
2.8 Appendix C: Model: First-Order Conditions
This appendix lists the full set of first-order conditions used to quantitatively solve the model.




! 1" At = Bt (2.8.1)
At = 1 + ,Et [1t+1At+1] (2.8.2)
Bt = !t + ,Et [1t+1Bt+1] (2.8.3)
Ct = (1! 1t) ct + 1tCt!1. (2.8.4)
Adjustment of commitments:














































































%#tqt = !t. (2.8.11)













Kt+1 = (1! /)Kt + %tKt. (2.8.13)
Aggregate price index:
1 = (1! ') (p̂"t )




























































Yt = Ct + It. (2.8.21)
Taylor rule:
Rt = R̄ + *) (.t ! .̄) + µt. (2.8.22)
Monetary policy shock process:





Zt = #ZZt!1 + (1! #Z) Z̄ + uZt . (2.8.24)
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Chapter 3
Evidence on Unclaimed Charitable
Contributions from the Introduction of
Third-Party Information Reporting in
Denmark1
3.1 Introduction
For the 2008 tax year, Denmark’s tax authority (SKAT) introduced third-party information
reporting for tax-deductible charitable contributions, where previously these deductions were
self-reported and subject to verification only upon an audit. Under the new system, charitable
organizations report contributions received from each taxpayer directly to the tax authority.
These information reports are used by SKAT to pre-fill charitable deductions on taxpayers’
annual declarations (referred to as pre-population). While information reporting is now
widely used for sources of income tax return line items in advanced countries, the use of
information reporting and pre-population for a tax return deduction line item is relatively
1This chapter is co-authored with Peer Skov, University of Copenhagen.
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new.2
The e"ect of the policy change on reported deductions was immediate, large, and in some
respects surprising; the number of taxpayers claiming a charitable deduction doubled. The
total value of contributions also rose, but by only by 15 percent, due to a fall in the mean
charitable tax deduction of 42 percent.
Using data from a recent large-scale audit experiment in Denmark, we document that pre-
reform overreporting of charitable contributions was negligible. This is somewhat unexpected,
because evasion rates for self-reported sources of income are often large (see Slemrod 2007).
The same audit experiment estimated an evasion rate of 42 percent for total self-reported net
income, but only 0.3 percent for third-party reported income (see Kleven et al. 2011). There
is good reason to trust the accuracy of these audits in identifying overclaiming of charitable
deductions: unlike self-reported sources of income, the burden of proof falls on the taxpayer,
who under the self-reporting regime was required upon audit to produce receipts to justify
all deductions claimed. For reasons discussed in detail in Section 3.3, audits did not appear
to identify unclaimed charitable deductions.
Administrative reports on total donations collected by charities enable us to separately iden-
tify the e"ect of the policy change on charitable giving and reporting behavior. We find
no evidence of a change in giving behavior coinciding with the introduction of information
reporting and pre-population of deductions. Accordingly, we argue that the rise in the value
of reported deductible contributions—and the near doubling in the number of reporting
contributors—is due to taxpayers with modest tax-deductible contributions who neglected
to report their deductions under the self-reporting regime in place before 2008.3
We estimate that the average unclaimed charitable tax deduction under the self-reporting
regime was worth about DKK786, which, given the one-third subsidy rate, translates to
DKK262 in forgone after-tax income.4 There was little change in the number of tax deduc-
2See OECD (2006) for a survey of pre-population in OECD countries.
3Examining a policy experiment in Finland in the 1990s, Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2013) argue that unclaimed
deductions may be particularly prevalent when many sources of income line items are pre-filled for taxpayers.
4DKK1 is approximately US$0.18.
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tions of more than DKK2,500—indicating that few taxpayers left large sums of money on
the table in any given year. But over a period of years, the cumulative amount of foregone
benefits appears to have been economically significant for many taxpayers; more than two-
thirds of the taxpayers who claimed a deduction in 2008 under the information reporting and
pre-population regime, but who did not claim a deduction in either 2006 or 2007 under the
self-reporting regime, claimed a deduction in each of the years 2009-2011.
Our finding of negligible charitable overreporting under the self-reporting regime is interesting
in light of work by Fack and Landais (2011), who find that reforms in the U.S. and France that
tightened enforcement of charitable tax deductions resulted in a fall in reported donations,
which they attribute to evasion. In France, a 1983 reform required taxpayers to attach
receipts to their tax return for all charitable deductions claimed, whereas previously the tax
authority only sought to inspect receipts during an audit. The rule change coincided with
a 75 percent fall in the value of charitable tax deductions claimed between 1982 and 1983.
In the U.S., a 1969 law change reduced opportunities for top-income earners to use private
charitable foundations as a tax sheltering or evasion scheme. Following the law change,
creation of private charitable foundations fell by 80 percent. They estimate that 30 percent
of charitable tax deductions claimed by the top 0.1 percent of income earners before the
policy change was due to tax avoidance or evasion behavior. The reform in France studied
by Fack and Landais (2011) is more relevant in our setting because we study behavior for
the population of donors, rather than just top-earner taxpayers.
Our findings are consistent with Rehavi (2010), who uses survey reports of U.S. taxpayers
to provide suggestive evidence of incomplete claiming of eligible charitable deductions. She
goes on to argue that as much as one-third of the response of charitable tax deductions
to the subsidy rate is due to changes in reporting rather than giving behavior.5 In con-
trast to the survey evidence used by Rehavi (2010), the administrative panel data available
to us provides arguably more credible evidence because it is less susceptible to systematic
misreporting (providing incorrect information to the tax authority has an expected penalty,
5Slemrod (1989) finds, based on analysis of audited U.S. income tax returns, that charitable giving overstate-
ment is less sensitive to the subsidy rate than is actual giving behavior.
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whereas misreporting on a household survey does not).
A related literature on incomplete enrollment in benefit programs has found evidence of
sizable unclaimed benefits. Bhargava and Manoli (2011) estimate that about one-quarter of
taxpayers apparently eligible for the U.S. earned-income tax credit (EITC) do not claim the
EITC. However, we recognize that the type of taxpayers who are eligible for the EITC and
those who make charitable gifts are likely to di"er in important ways that a"ect their claiming
behavior. Elsewhere in the literature, stigma is often cited as a reason for incomplete take-up
of welfare benefits (see, for example, Besley and Coate, 1992), but there should be no stigma
attached to claiming charitable deductions. Pre-population is akin to default enrollment—
taxpayers are automatically credited with their eligible charitable tax benefits—and the post-
reform surge in charitable tax deductions claimed attests to the power of defaults (see, for
example, Carroll et al., 2009 or Chetty et al., 2012).
Some taxpayers may have rationally decided not to claim charitable tax deductions because
the private compliance cost exceeds the forgone tax benefits. For 1982 U.S. taxpayers, Pitt
and Slemrod (1989) estimated the compliance costs of itemizing deductions by estimating
how much taxpayers claiming the standard deduction could have have saved from instead
itemizing their deductions. They estimated a compliance cost of $43, which is, after ad-
justing their estimate in 1982 dollars for inflation, about double our preferred estimate of
the average value of charitable deductions forgone under the self-reporting regime. But the
Pitt and Slemrod (1989) estimate of compliance costs should be larger because it measures
the compliance costs associated with all deductions for which a taxpayer is eligible, not just
charitable contributions; di"erences in tax-system design between Denmark and the U.S.
may also a"ect the comparability of these estimates.
More generally, this paper contributes to a growing literature that takes optimization frictions
seriously: Kleven and Waseem (2013) find that a majority of the income taxpaying population
in Pakistan face optimization frictions a"ecting their taxable income choice of at least 2.5
percent of gross income; Chetty (2012) shows that it is possible to reconcile high-quality
intensive-margin labor supply elasticity estimates from the labor and public finance literatures
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given an assumption of frictions equal to about one percent of income; and Saez (2010) finds
kinks in the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit insu!ciently powerful to create bunching, except
at the first kink, and only for self-employed taxpayers.6 The attenuated response of taxable
income to marginal tax rates reflects taxpayer frictions such as inattention, misperception,
and inertia, but also adjustment costs faced by taxpayers in finding employers o"ering desired
combinations of hours of work and compensation. Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of frictions
a"ecting claiming of charitable tax deductions appear to be much smaller than is required
in other recent work to reconcile observed behavior of taxable income with a frictionless
benchmark.
Theoretical work by Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) argues that di"erential response by type of
taxpayer to compliance costs can be exploited to discriminate between deserving and unde-
serving welfare program recipients. If hassle costs are more burdensome for undeserving than
for deserving applicants, the introduction of a hassle cost, such as a paperwork requirement,
may facilitate a higher benefit level, that in the absence of the hassle cost would induce sub-
stantial additional take-up by undeserving applicants. The reform we study is interesting in
light of this (mostly) theoretical literature because it provides empirical evidence on taxpayer
response to a change in a paperwork requirement (taxpayers had to maintain receipts and
process their own charitable deductions under the self-reporting regime). Although we find
the increase in the share of taxpayers claiming a deduction in the post-reform period to be
particularly large for some groups of taxpayers, this variation appears related to underlying
giving propensity, rather than a di"erential e"ect of hassle cost across taxpayer types.
Our findings suggest that the use of information reports to pre-populate tax-deduction line
items may result in a loss in revenue. The use of information reports alone need not though:
a tax authority could use third-party reports to flag for further investigation taxpayers who
overclaim on their charitable contributions, but not amend tax returns for underclaiming.
Unlike pre-population of sources of income line items, automatic crediting of deductions
increases tax expenditures on taxpayers who would otherwise neglect to claim deductions
6Saez (2010) attributes the bunching of self-employed taxpayers at the first kink in the EITC schedule to tax
evasion.
122
for which they are eligible. The introduction of information reporting and pre-population of
charitable deductions in Denmark coincided with an increase in the value of charitable tax
expenditures of DKK35.4 million. Absent a change in giving behavior, the reform is socially
desirable only if it lowers taxpayer compliance costs by more than an appropriately weighted
sum of the increase in administrative expense and tax benefits. We outline a simple modeling
framework that can be used to weight these costs and benefits.
In what follows, section 3.2 provides background information on relevant aspects of Den-
mark’s tax system, section 3.3 uses data from a pre-reform tax audit experiment to inves-
tigate reporting behavior before the policy change, and section 3.4 discusses the change in
reporting behavior when information reporting and pre-population of charitable deductions
was introduced in 2008. Section 3.5 presents evidence indicating that there was no change in
charitable giving—as opposed to reporting of charitable gifts—around the time of the policy
change, and section 3.6 uses a notch created by the pre-2012 charitable gift eligibility rules to
investigate taxpayer awareness of incentives for charitable giving. In section 3.7 we outline a
simple normative model of the optimal reporting regime for charitable tax deductions, using
our empirical findings to inform judgment on the social desirability of the policy change. We
o"er some concluding remarks in section 3.8.
3.2 Background
Denmark’s individual-income tax system features broad use of information reporting across
various sources of income. For most taxpayers, information reports made by third parties for
the tax year ending in December arrive at the tax authority for processing by late January.
Most information reports correspond to payments from which tax has been withheld, but
some do not. Making use of the information in these reports, and other known information
such as place of residence, SKAT prepares pre-populated (pre-filled) returns that are mailed
to taxpayers each year in mid-March.7 Taxpayers have until May 1 to amend their pre-
7Taxpayers can also access their pre-filled tax returns electronically.
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populated return to reflect sources of income not subject to information reports, any income
for which information reports were not received in a timely manner by the tax authority,
and any self-reported deductions for which the taxpayer is eligible.8 All income-tax-liable
people in Denmark are required to file a tax return, which is approximately 88 percent of the
population (Kleven et al., 2011).9
All taxpayers file as individuals, unlike in the U.S. where married couples generally elect
to pool their income and file a joint tax declaration. The subsidy rate for tax deductible
charitable contributions varies only (slightly) by region of residence—and so does not depend
on a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. Assuming married couples live in the same tax region,
this means that there is no tax advantage gained from shifting the claiming of charitable
deductions between husband and wife depending on who faces the higher marginal tax rate.
Because there is no di"erence in tax treatment of charitable deductions between singles and
couples, our unit of analysis is individual taxpayers. Even if taxpayers have no tax liability,
they are able to receive tax benefits for their charitable contributions.
According to government documents, the principal stated motivation for the introduction
of information reporting and pre-population for charitable deduction was a desire to limit
perceived abuse of charitable deductions and to lower taxpayer compliance costs. The tax
authority also appears to have been aware that pre-population would lead to some taxpayers
receiving tax benefits they previously neglected to claim. No net change in charitable tax
expenditures was expected prior to the reform. To ease their transition to the new policy
regime, charitable organizations received a subsidy for expenses associated with implementing
the new compliance procedures.
Charitable deductions fall into three tax-relevant categories, each with di"erent requirements
for tax favored treatment. The bulk of charitable contributions are regular gifts, for which
there was a somewhat complicated eligibility requirement before 2012. Only total annual gifts
to each eligible charity of DKK500 or more qualified for tax deductibility, and in calculating
8Taxpayers can amend their pre-populated return electronically, by phone, or by mail. Self-employed filers
have until July 1 to submit their final tax return.
9The bulk of those not required to file are children under the age of 16.
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the total tax deduction for each taxpayer the first DKK500 in gifts was excluded.10 We discuss
the incentives created by this policy design in detail in Section 3.6. Information reporting and
pre-population of deductions for regular gifts was introduced in 2008. With the introduction
of information reporting and pre-population for regular gifts, the tax authority also locked
this line item for most taxpayers. This means taxpayers are prevented from changing the
charitable deduction recorded on their pre-populated return. If the taxpayer finds an error
on their pre-populated return they must contact the relevant charity and request a revised
message be sent to the tax authority. Deductions are also capped, and thus so is the maximum
value of charitable tax benefits. The maximum value of regular deductions eligible for tax
deducibility has increased over time: from 1997-2004 the cap was DKK5,000, but the cap
was lifted to DKK6,400 in 2005, and to DKK6,600 in 2006; in 2007 the upper threshold more
than doubled to DKK13,600, and has increased modestly since, to DKK14,000 in 2008, and
to its current DKK14,500 level in 2011.
The second category of charitable donations corresponds to giving contracts with a minimum
10-year length, for which information reporting and pre-population of deductions was also
introduced in 2008. This category permits donors to deduct the larger of DKK15,000 or 15
percent of taxable income each year. A third category was introduced in 2008 for gifts to
cultural and research organizations, and for which information reporting was introduced in
2010. Because this type of gift was not tax deductible before 2008, we exclude this category
from our analysis entirely. For the two categories of gift we study (regular and long-term
charitable gifts), only cash contributions are eligible for a tax deduction.11
In 2011 the number of taxpayers claiming a deduction for regular, long-term, and cultural
and research gifts was 360,527, 44,399, and 23,477, respectively. Total gifts for each category
was DKK747m, DKK261m, and DKK20m, respectively. Before 2008 regular and long-term
10In 2012 the lower threshold was abolished, making gifts of less than DKK500 eligible for tax deductibility.
In addition, the 2012 reform no longer requires subtracting the first DKK500 in gifts from total eligible
deductions.
11Non-monetary gifts to cultural organizations have been eligible for a tax deduction since 2005. There was no
upper threshold for these gifts, but as for regular gifts only contributions with a value greater than DKK500
were eligible to receive tax-deductibility. In 2008, the first year in which we observe data specifically for
cultural and research organization gifts, there were only 11 such gifts made.
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gifts were self-reported together on one tax return line item, but from 2008 forward each
category corresponds to a separate line item. Because we do not observe each category of
donation separately before 2008, we group regular and long-term gifts together to form one
consistent series for charitable giving.
There was little change in the number of charities reporting charitable gifts in the years before
and after the 2008 policy change. In 2008 there were 796 organizations approved by SKAT
to receive tax-deductible contributions, only slightly higher than 790 in 2007 (see Table 3.1).
This represents the equal second smallest year-to-year increase for the years 1998-2011. In
both 2007 and 2008 the fraction of eligible organizations making an annual report to the tax
authority was 93 percent. This fraction has been stable, but had an upward trend over our
sample period.
Most donations were collected from the following groups of charitable organizations: inter-
national aid organizations (e.g., UNICEF, Red Cross); religious organizations (e.g., Catholic
Church); national social and humanitarian organizations (e.g., Blue Cross Denmark); nature,
environment, and animal welfare organizations (e.g., Danish Society for Nature Conserva-
tion); and disease fighting and disability organizations (e.g., Cancer Society).
In the next section we investigate reporting behavior prior to the introduction of information
reporting and pre-population of deductions.
3.3 Pre-Reform Misreporting of Charitable Gifts
Before investigating the e"ect of the policy change in the next section, we first draw on
data from the Kleven et al. (2011) audit experiment to ascertain the level of misreporting of
charitable gifts in Denmark prior to the reform. A random sample of about 20,000 taxpayers
was subjected in 2007 to an unannounced extensive and thorough audit of their 2006 tax
returns. The overall misreporting rate for charitable contributions was small: of the 872
taxpayers in the audit sample who reported any charitable contribution, only 7 percent
were found upon audit to have overclaimed charitable deductions, while 3 percent were
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found to have underclaimed, combining, with rounding, to give a gross misreporting rate
of 11 percent. For the 7 percent of taxpayers who overclaimed, the median value of excess
charitable deductions reported was DKK1,100, and for the 3 percent of taxpayers in the audit
sample found to have underclaimed, the median value of missing deductions was DKK1,975.
The value of underclaiming o"set about half the value of overclaiming, giving a net evasion
rate (net overclaiming as a share of deductions that should have been claimed) of 2.3 percent
conditional on having initially reported a non-zero charitable gift, and about 0.1 percent as
a share of all taxpayers in the audit sample. This evasion rate is trivial compared to the
37 percent evasion rate found by Kleven et al. (2011) for self-reported sources of income.
Evidently, those seeking to evade income taxes do not view overstatement of charitable
contributions as a high expected benefit-to-cost evasion opportunity.
In light of these audit results, our finding of a surge in reported tax-deductible charitable con-
tributions following the introduction of third-party information reporting and pre-population
may seem surprising. If so many taxpayers neglected to claim their tax deductible contribu-
tions under the self-reporting regime, why did the auditors in the Kleven et al. (2011) study
detect such little underclaiming? We have ascertained from discussions with SKAT o!cials
that auditors did not investigate line items for which no deductions were claimed.12 This is
most probably a sensible audit policy rule for the tax authority: the social value of finding
unclaimed deductions for taxpayers is arguably less than the social cost of auditors’ time.
But it means that the Kleven et al. (2011) audit sample results cannot be used to accurately
measure the fraction of taxpayers with unclaimed tax-deductible charitable gifts. The only
way in which the audit process could have resulted for a taxpayer in a higher post-audit than
pre-audit charitable deduction was if the audit process prompted the taxpayer to review
their records and discover charitable deductions they had not reported. However, we have
been told by SKAT that some audits in the Kleven et al. (2011) audit study involved only
computerized cross-checking of information reports, in which case the taxpayer was unaware
that their tax return had been audited; for example, a taxpayer with no self-reported income
12We would like to thank Søren Pedersen for sharing this detail of SKAT’s audit procedure with us.
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or deductions would have had their third-party reported information cross-checked electron-
ically, but would have only been contacted as part of the audit process if a discrepancy was
discovered.
Having established that there was negligible charitable evasion under the pre-reform self-
reporting regime, in the next section we describe the change in reporting behavior due to the
introduction of information reporting and pre-population of charitable deductions in 2008.
3.4 E!ect of the Reform on Reporting Behavior
3.4.1 Aggregate Data
Figure 3.1 reports the number and average size of charitable tax deductions reported over
the period 1997-2011.13 As foreshadowed in section 3.1, the introduction of information
reporting and pre-population for charitable deductions coincided with a near doubling in
the number of taxpayers claiming a charitable tax deduction: 150,311 taxpayers reported a
charitable tax deduction in 2007 under the self-reporting regime, and 300,122 taxpayers had
a charitable deduction in 2008 following the policy change (see Table 3.2). There was an
accompanying rise in the value of tax deductions claimed between 2007 and 2008, but the
rise was a relatively modest 15.3 percent. As discussed in detail below, we find that the bulk
of the new claims were small in value. Accordingly, the mean value of tax deductions claimed
fell sharply between 2007 and 2008, from DKK4,671 to DKK2,697 (see Table 3.2).
Interestingly, the mean value of contributions was higher in the year before the reform than
in earlier years. Between 1997 and 2006 the mean value of charitable tax deductions claimed
was between DKK3,859 and DKK4,029, lower than the DKK4,671 mean value recorded
in 2007. This change can be mostly explained by a relaxation in the upper threshold for
eligible regular gifts: in 2007 taxpayers were permitted to deduct up to DKK13,600 in regular
13Before 1997 charitable gifts were reported on the same tax return line item as a standard deduction available
to fishermen, and a special childcare deduction. Since 1997 these deductions have been reported separately
from charitable gifts.
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charitable tax deductions, compared to only DKK6,600 in 2006. As described in section 3.2,
this threshold has increased over time, but the 2007 increase was by far the largest over our
sample period. The number of taxpayers with total tax deductions greater than DKK10,000
rose by 6,344 between 2006 and 2007, and there was a corresponding 6,350 fall in the number
of taxpayers with total tax deductions in the range DKK5001-10,000. There was a further
modest rise in the upper eligibility threshold for regular tax deductions in 2008, but this
does not meaningfully a"ect our analysis. The bulk of the increase in tax deductions due to
the policy reform were small in value, so our focus is on the lower tail of the distribution of
claims, that is largely una"ected by changes to the upper eligibility threshold.
We have access to taxpayer level microdata beginning in 2006, and can compute the median
tax deduction reported in each year (see Table 3.2). Because most claims are small in value,
the median value of claims is only a little more than half the mean contribution for the years
2007-2011. The relaxation in the upper threshold for regular gifts in 2007 was relevant for
a relatively small number of taxpayers making large donations, explaining why the median
deduction rose by only DKK70 between 2006 and 2007, compared to the DKK638 rise in the
mean value of contributions.
To gain further insight on the e"ect of the reform, we investigate changes in tax deductions
reported by claim size. Table 3.3 reports these data for each year 2006-2011, and Figure
3.2 presents these data graphically. Note that claim size is the tax deductible amount on
individual tax returns, not the total value of contributions, which is larger because of the
exemption limits that existed before 2012. For example, a taxpayer who gave a total of
DKK600 to one charity would qualify for a tax deduction of DKK100 and be counted in
the category DKK0-500 in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2. As previewed earlier, the surge in the
number of charitable deductions claimed between 2007 and 2008 were primarily small in
value; there was an almost ten-fold increase in the number of claims less than DKK500, and
a more than doubling in the number of claims in the range DKK500-DKK1,500. In contrast,
there was little change in the number of claims larger than DKK3,000.
For the two years before and after the policy change, Figure 3.3 presents a finer picture
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for the distribution of claims less than DKK5,000. The surge in small claims in 2008 when
information reporting and pre-population of deductions was introduced is particularly evident
here. Abstracting from the policy change, the distribution of claims is very stable: Figure 3.3
shows that the pre-reform 2006 and 2007 distribution of tax deductions claimed are almost
identical, as are the post-reform 2008 and 2009 distributions. This makes us confident that
the pronounced change in the left tail of the claim distribution between 2007 and 2008 is not
in part accounted for by regular variation in the distribution of claims over time.
If we attribute all the change in charitable tax deductions between 2007 and 2008 to a decline
in unreported claims, the value of forgone charitable deductions in 2007 was DKK717. How-
ever, this is an imprecise estimate of the value of deductions forgone under the self-reporting
regime. Any change in the number of large tax deductions between 2007 and 2008 is proba-
bly unrelated to the policy change: those with large deductions forgo a substantial amount
of money from not reporting their eligible deductions and so are unlikely to have not done
so under the self-reporting regime. Informed by the distribution of claims data presented
in Figure 3.3, we estimate the value of forgone deductions under the self-reporting regime
by restricting our attention only to the increase in claims less than DKK2,500. Between
2007 and 2008 the total number of tax deductions claimed amounting to less than DKK2,500
increased from 77,046 to 226,855, and the total value of these deductions increased from
DKK116 million to DKK234 million. This implies an average value of DKK786 for forgone
deductions, which corresponds to DKK262 in after-tax income. This calculation is not par-
ticularly sensitive to the upper threshold of DKK2,500 used in this calculation (see Figure
3.11 in the appendix, and the notes therein for details on this calculation). Had the reform
not occurred, our estimated value of previously unreported deductions implies that we would
have observed a mean value of tax deductions equal to DKK4,601 in 2008, rather than the
actual value of DKK2,697.
These estimates implicitly assume that there would have been no change in average giving
behavior had the reform not occurred, which absent a control group (the reform a"ected all
taxpayers at the same time) we cannot formally test. Although this assumption is almost
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certainly violated, the magnitude of the change in reporting behavior pre- and post-reform is
several orders of magnitude larger than the usual year-to-year variation in reporting behavior
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.3); hence, any error in our estimate due to trend changes in average
giving behavior is likely to have only a minor e"ect on our estimate of the change in reporting
behavior due to the reform.
Interestingly, the bulk of the increase in charitable deductions claimed after 2008 appear to
be associated with regular, rather than occasional, donors who did not claim their eligible
tax benefits under the prior self-reporting regime. Of the 152,857 taxpayers who claimed a
charitable tax deduction in 2008 (under the information reporting and pre-population regime)
but not in 2006 or 2007 (under the self-reporting regime), 68 percent claimed a deduction in
each subsequent year 2009-2011. The share claiming zero, one, and two further tax deductions
between 2009 and 2011 was 13, 9, and 10 percent, respectively (see Table 3.8). This suggests
that foregone tax benefits under the self-reporting regime were concentrated among regular
donors who systematically did not claim eligible charitable deductions, rather than a larger
group of donors who occasionally did not claim their eligible deductions. Although the
typical amount of forgone tax benefits appears to have been modest in any given year, our
finding that many taxpayers repeatedly failed to claim eligible tax benefits indicates that the
cumulative amount of forgone deductions and tax savings may have been substantial for a
sizable fraction of charitable donors.
3.4.2 E!ect of the Reform by Type of Taxpayer
In this section we look for evidence of di"erential response to the policy change by type
of taxpayer. We present estimates for the following OLS panel data regression using the




,jXijt + 'jposttXijt + $ijt, (3.4.1)
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where Dit = {0, 1} is an indicator for person i claiming a charitable deduction in year t, Xijt
is characteristic j for taxpayer i in year t, and post is an indicator variable taking the value
unity in the post-reform period 2008-2011.14 The vector of characteristics Xijt includes the
following variables: age, personal income (the sum of labor income, transfers, pensions, and
other adjustments), gender, marital status, self-employment status, a Copenhagen location
dummy variable, and a linear time trend. We do not include a taxpayer fixed e"ect because
many of the covariates of interest are constant or vary little at the taxpayer level over our
data sample. We report robust standard errors and, because we have access to the universe
of tax returns, all but a few point estimates are highly statistically significant. The full set
of regression results is reported in Table 3.7 in the appendix.
The coe!cient on the post variable, shown in Figure 3.4, indicates the estimated pre- to post-
reform change in probability of claiming a charitable tax deduction, for a taxpayer with the
baseline set of characteristics (the baseline set of characteristics represents a male taxpayer
aged 46-65, in 50-75th income percentile, single, residing outside Copenhagen, and not self-
employed); the coe!cients on the post * income interaction terms, also shown in Figure 3.4,
indicate estimated variation in post-reform claiming behavior by income percentile. There
is a clear positive income gradient evident for the post * income interaction terms shown
in Figure 3.4, indicating that the increase in the share of high-income taxpayers claiming
a charitable deduction in the post-reform period was large relative to low income groups.
But, because high income earners were also more likely to claim a charitable deduction in
the pre-reform period (shown by the main e"ect coe!cients in Figure 3.4), the proportional
increase in likelihood of claiming a deduction following the reform is similar for high income
groups; the regression estimates are consistent with a roughly constant fraction of taxpayers
in high-income groups neglecting to claim eligible deductions in the pre-reform period. For
below-median income earners, the regression results indicate a small fall in the probabil-
ity of claiming a deduction post-reform; this most likely reflects their underlying very low
14We restrict our analysis to the sample of taxpayers who filed a tax return in each year 2006-2011 (only two
percent of taxpayers who claimed a charitable tax deduction in 2008 did not file a tax return in each year
2006-2011).
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propensity to claim a charitable deduction, and variation unrelated to the reform.
Figure 3.5 displays the analogous coe!cient estimates by age category. The likelihood of
claiming a charitable deduction post-reform increased for each age category: the increase is
estimated to have been largest for young taxpayers (under 25), and smallest for taxpayers
aged 26-45. The change in likelihood of claiming a deduction post-reform for selected other
taxpayer characteristics is reported in Figure 3.6. The increase in post-reform claiming
probability was particularly large for female taxpayers, and those residing in Copenhagen—
both groups with a high propensity relative to other taxpayers of claiming a deduction in the
pre-reform period (indicated by the main e"ect coe!cients shown in Figure 3.6). Post-reform
claiming behavior appears unrelated to employment status, and married taxpayers were a
little less likely to claim a charitable deduction in the post- than pre-reform period.
In summary, the increase in the share of taxpayers claiming a charitable deduction in the
post-reform period was particularly large for high income groups, female taxpayers, and
those residing in Copenhagen. But because these groups of taxpayers had an above-average
likelihood of claiming a deduction in the pre-reform period, the share of unclaimed deductions
under the self-reporting regime is unlikely to have been particularly large for these groups of
taxpayers.
3.5 Charitable Giving Propensity
To this point, we have not addressed the possibility that the policy change coincided with—
or caused—a change in actual giving behavior, rather than the reporting propensity. One
possibility is that the introduction of information reporting and pre-population of charitable
deductions reduced the compliance cost for taxpayers, and so the e"ective cost of charitable
giving, by enough to induce an increase in actual donations. To investigate whether there
was a change in giving propensity coinciding with the policy change in 2008, we make use of
annual administrative reports received by SKAT from charities eligible to collect tax-favored
contributions. These filings are required in order for charities to maintain their tax-favored
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status, and contain, among other information, reports on the total value of contributions
received and the number of contributing members (donations) for each charity. These data
correspond to donations that, provided they were of at least DKK500, qualify for a charitable
tax deduction.
Given our main finding—that there was a surge in the number, but less so in the value, of
charitable tax deductions following the policy reform—we first investigate whether there was
any change in the number of contributing members reported by charities following the policy
change. We restrict our attention here to the ten largest charities, measured by the number of
information reports received by SKAT over the period 2008-2011. These ten charities together
represent about 60 percent of the information reports received from all charities. We exclude
small charities to avoid our findings being influenced by potentially misleading reporting
behavior of some small charities: a few small organizations did not file reports in each year,
and, in some circumstances, reported implausible year-to-year changes in their number of
donors. The line labeled “Tax Return Data” in Figure 3.7 shows the number of information
reports received (aggregated by charity for each taxpayer) from the top-ten charities for the
period 2008-2011 (the information reporting period), and the line labeled “Charity Data” in
Figure 3.7 reports the number of charitable donors reported by these top-ten charities for the
period 2001-2011.15 The number of donors reported by these charities exceeds the number
of information reports received by SKAT from these organizations, most probably because
some charitable donors do not provide their tax identification together with their gift; for gifts
less than DKK500 this is not surprising: they do not result in a tax deduction. A few other
factors are likely to contribute to the divergence between these series: transfer of funds via cell
phone SMS (short message service) has become widespread in Denmark for popular giving
campaigns, for which donations appear in charity records, but not tax records; “tin rattling”
and church day donations are collected without tax identification; and some taxpayers may
prefer to give anonymously. Between 2007 and 2008, when information reporting and pre-
population was introduced, the number of charitable tax deductions claimed doubled, but, as
15All results that follow are qualitatively the same if we consider instead the 25 largest charities, measured by
the number of information reports received from each charity (per taxpayer) over the period 2008-2011.
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Figure 3.7 shows, the number of donations received by large charities was almost unchanged.
This is consistent with the notion that the surge in the number of tax deductions claimed in
2008 was due to a change in reporting behavior, not actual giving behavior.
We are further persuaded that the policy change a"ected reporting but not giving behavior by
the fact that there was no apparent change in the trend value of donations collected before
and after the policy change. Mirroring Figure 3.7, the line labeled “Tax Return Data” in
Figure 3.8 shows the total value of charitable contributions reported on information reports
sent to SKAT by the top-ten charities (with charity size measured by the number of donors,
as above), and the line labeled “Charity Data” shows the total value of donations collected
by the top-ten charities for each year 2001-2011. Apart from the spike in donations in 2005
(see Figure 3.8), most likely due to giving campaigns following the Indian Ocean tsunami
in December 2004, growth in the total value of donations has been stable. The fraction
of total donations reported to SKAT via information reports has also been stable over the
information reporting period 2008-2011. Given that was almost no change in the number
of donations made pre- and post- reform, the data in Figure 3.8 indicate that there was no
intensive margin giving response coinciding with the policy change either.
Supporting our claim that the reform did not a"ect giving behavior, there was little di"erence
in the growth rate of mean charitable deductions in the post-reform period between taxpayers
who claimed a deduction in the pre-reform period and those who claimed for the first time
in 2008. For the group of taxpayers who claimed a charitable tax deduction in 2008 (the first
year of the reform), but not in either of 2006 or 2007 (the pre-reform period), growth in mean
contributions over the period 2008-2011 averaged 2.2 percent, only slightly more than the 0.8
percent average growth rate for the group of taxpayers who claimed a charitable deduction
in 2008 and in at least one of the two pre-reform years 2006 or 2007.16
Having established that there was no meaningful change in giving propensity around the time
of the policy change, we attribute the surge in charitable tax deductions claimed between
2007 and 2008 to a change in reporting behavior. Before 2008, many taxpayers appear to have
16The calculation includes those who did not claim a charitable deduction in some years 2009-2011, for both
groups. We also restrict the sample to those taxpayers who filed a return in each year 2006-2011.
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neglected to report their tax deductible charitable contributions, but since 2008 information
reports have been used to automatically credit charitable deductions on taxpayers’ behalf.
Recall that the randomized audit experiment found only negligible amounts of charitable
overclaiming.
3.6 Awareness of Giving Incentives
Our finding of substantial underclaiming of eligible charitable tax benefits points to the
existence of pervasive frictions a"ecting reporting behavior. One potential friction is a lack
of awareness of the tax incentives created by charitable giving. We investigate this further
by examining an aspect of Denmark’s charitable giving rules, in existence before 2012, that
created a region of strictly dominated giving choices.
We begin by formally describing the incentives created by the pre-2012 regime, under which
only total annual gifts per charity of DKK500 or more were eligible to tax deductibility, and
in calculating the total amount of eligible tax deductions, the first DKK500 in contributions
was excluded. Supposing taxpayer i can donate to N charities eligible for regular charitable











where gi,n is taxpayer i’s total annual gifts to charity n, and 1 (·) is an indicator function
taking the value one for gifts of DKK500 or more. The amount of tax benefits received is the
tax deductible amount multiplied by the one-third subsidy rate.17 The examples provided
in Table 3.5 are provided in order to help clarify this formula. For simplicity, we assume
there are N = 3 charities in this example. Taxpayer A’s gift is less than DKK500, so she
receives no tax deductions for her charitable contributions. Taxpayer B makes one gift of
17In the text we refer to a one-third subsidy rate for simplicity, but there is slight variation based on the
taxpayer’s place of residence.
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DKK700, exceeding the DKK500 threshold, and so is eligible to receive tax preferences for
this gift, but because the first DKK500 in gifts receives no tax benefit she has only DKK200
in charitable tax deductions. Taxpayer C is eligible to receive tax preferences on both her
gifts of DKK500, and receives a total tax deduction of DKK500, after taking the exemption
limit into account. Even though taxpayer D gave an additional DKK400 to charity number
three compared to taxpayer C, and has given more than DKK500 in total, she receives no
more tax deductions than taxpayer C because her gift to charity number three is less than
DKK500.
For a taxpayer contemplating a gift to a single charity, the Si function reduces to a kinked
subsidy scheme with a DKK500 threshold. But once a taxpayer has made at least one
charitable gift of DKK500 or more they face a notched subsidy for gifts to all other charities.
The first gift meets the DKK500 exemption threshold, so all subsequent gifts to other charities
are eligible for full tax deductibility if each gift is DKK500 or more. Suppose that a taxpayer’s
largest gift is g1 & 500, Figure 3.9 shows the budget set facing the taxpayer for all subsequent





dominated because a gift of g = 500 a"ords a higher level of charitable contributions at no,
or less, cost to the taxpayer. With the tax subsidy rate & = 13 and g = 500 then the lower
limit on the strictly dominated region is g = g (1! &) = DKK333.
To illustrate the incentives created by this notched subsidy scheme with an example, consider
taxpayer D in Table 3.5, whose gift of DKK400 to charity number three is a dominated choice:
either of her first two gifts meets the DKK500 exemption threshold, so each subsequent gift
is eligible for tax deductibility provided it is to the value DKK500 or more. If she raised
her donation to charity number three by DKK100 to DKK500, this gift would be eligible
for tax deductibility, giving her a tax saving of DKK166 (given the one-third subsidy rate),
leaving her with DKK66 more in after-tax income (plus any utility gain from higher charitable
contributions).
Fortunately, under the information reporting regime charities report to the tax authority
all gifts above and below the DKK500 eligibility threshold for each taxpayer, allowing us to
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investigate taxpayer awareness of the incentives created by the kinked-and-notched subsidy
scheme. Figure 3.10 plots the number of charitable gifts made in 2011 by claim size for
taxpayers with a maximum gift of DKK500 or more. The distribution for the years 2008-
2010 is similar to the distribution shown in Figure 3.10 for 2011. All of these taxpayers face
the budget set shown by Figure 3.9: each second or subsequent gift qualifies for full tax
deductibility if it is DKK500 or more. The black bars in Figure 3.10 indicate the number
of gifts made in the strictly dominated region. Only a few taxpayers made more than one
dominated giving choice, so almost all these observations represent unique taxpayers; in
total, 11,624 taxpayers made a gift in the strictly dominated region in 2011. There is a clear
mass point at DKK500, at the upper limit of the notch, suggesting that many taxpayers
understood the budget set created by the subsidy scheme, and were induced to raise their
donations to DKK500. As a share of all taxpayers claiming a charitable deduction, only
about 2 to 3 percent of taxpayers made strictly dominated giving choices in each year 2008-
2011. However, the number of gifts in the dominated region DKK333-500 in 2011 was about
one-quarter the number in the range DKK500-666, and a little less in earlier years.
A clustering of donations in DKK100 multiples is evident, with the mass point at DKK600
even larger than that at DKK500. Because many taxpayers make gifts via automatic deduc-
tion on a monthly basis, we conjecture that the DKK600 mass point corresponds to taxpayers
choosing an integer DKK50 per month charitable deduction: DKK50 is the smallest multiple
of 10 that results in annual contributions qualifying for a subsidy, suggesting that the location
of this mass point is influenced by the notch.
The economic significance of these dominated giving choices depends on the frequency with
which individual taxpayers make such errors. Making a dominated choice in any one year
results in a relatively small loss, and a taxpayer may make a mistake in any given year for
idiosyncratic reasons. But for taxpayers making repeated mistakes, the cost may cumulate to
a substantial amount, providing perhaps more persuasive evidence of ignorance of tax incen-
tives for giving. To examine the frequency of dominated giving choices, Table 3.6 reports, for
the data sample available 2008-2011, the number of taxpayers who made dominated choices
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in each given and subsequent year. For example, in 2008 5,927 taxpayers made a dominated
choice, and of those 2,050 also made a dominated choice in 2009; 1,878 made a dominated
choice in each year 2008-2010, and so on. For each year on the diagonal, about one-third
of the taxpayers making a dominated choice do so again the following year. And of those
taxpayers making a dominated choice in 2008, about 25 percent made a dominated choice in
each of the next three years.
Taken together, these results provide evidence that a sizable minority of taxpayers did not
understand the complex giving incentives created by the notched subsidy scheme in place
before 2012. A non-trivial fraction of those making dominated choices did so repeatedly.
However, a majority many taxpayers made giving choices just above the dominated region,
indicating a high degree of awareness of the complex giving incentives in place before 2012.
3.7 Optimal Reporting Regime
Was the rise in the value of charitable tax deductions claimed as a result of the reform—
given no increase in actual charitable giving— socially desirable or undesirable? On the one
hand, between 2007 and 2008 (before and after the policy change), there was an increase
in charitable tax expenditures of about DKK35m. However, the reduction in net revenue
collected alone, even conditional on no change in giving behavior, tells us nothing about
the welfare implications of the reform. The reduction in net revenue represents a transfer
among citizens, not lost resources. Given an unchanged government revenue requirement,
there is a social cost if the revenue shortfall must be raised by reliance on a distortionary tax
instrument. On the other hand, the introduction of information reporting and pre-population
is likely to have reduced compliance costs borne by taxpayers.
To examine these arguments more closely, we next outline a simple normative model, drawing
on Mayshar (1991), that can be used to evaluate the social welfare implications of moving from
a self-reporting regime for charitable gifts to an information reporting and pre-population
regime. The model is written with reference to charitable deductions but, with some minor
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relabeling, it could be used to inform the choice of reporting regime for a variety of other tax
deduction line items.
We consider a social planner choosing tax-system parameters a"ecting charitable giving and
reporting behavior to maximize social welfare. The chosen tax system parameters are sum-
marized by the policy vector 1 " {R, &}, where R is the reporting regime, and & is the subsidy
rate on eligible charitable contributions. We let Ri,p denote an information reporting and
pre-population of deductions regime for charitable gifts, and Rs a self-reporting regime.
Taxpayer i is assumed to derive warm-glow utility from their own charitable gifts gi (1) that
depend on the tax-system policy 1, the total amount of public goods funded by charitable gifts
G (1) =
´
gi (1) di, and consumption of all other goods. For simplicity we assume quasi-linear
utility, with consumption of all other goods the numeraire. This assumption is not limiting
because most taxpayers make only small charitable contributions, in which case income e"ects
due to changes in charitable giving are not important. There is an exogenous government
revenue requirement una"ected by variation in charitable giving tax system parameters, and
all charitable tax-expenditures and administrative costs must be funded using a distortionary
tax instrument.18 These assumptions allow us to specify the following simple money-metric
utilitarian social welfare function given tax policy 1:
W (1) = ! + bG (1)!m (1)! (MECF ! 1)TE (1)! (MECF )A (1) , (3.7.1)
where ! is the component of social welfare unrelated to charitable giving and una"ected by
the charitable giving policy vector 1, b is the constant marginal social value of all charitable
contributions made, m (1) is the dollar cost borne by taxpayers in complying with tax-system
1, TE (1) are tax expenditures on charitable tax deductions claimed, A (1) are administrative
costs, and MECF is the marginal e!ciency cost of funds for the tax instrument used to raise
revenue to fund charitable tax expenditures and administrative costs. The marginal social
18We exclude the possibility of levying lump-sum taxes by assumption as in, for example, the Ramsey optimal
commodity tax literature. More generally, administrative and compliance cost considerations can endogenize
the absence of lump-sum tax instruments, even where there are no distributional concerns (see, for example,
Yitzhaki 1979).
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value of charitable contributions, b, captures both private (warm-glow) and public utility
gained from charitable giving. Tax expenditures represent a transfer between households, so
the social cost of raising revenue to fund charitable deductions comprises only the e!ciency
cost of raising that revenue: (MECF ! 1)TE (1). In contrast, administrative expenses have
a resource cost, and reduce our money-metric social welfare function by (MECF )A (1). The
term m (1) comprises compliance costs borne by individual taxpayers directly and by charities
on behalf of taxpayers; this is important for the policy change we study because part of the
reduction in compliance costs from the introduction of information reporting may have been
shifted onto charities.
Some taxpayer may engage in evasion by overclaiming charitable tax deductions. Total
charitable tax expenditures are equal to:
TE (1) # &Gr (1) , (3.7.2)
where Gr (1) is the value of all reported deductions, and & the subsidy rate.
Letting #X (11, 10) # X (11) ! X (10) represent the change in variable X due to a discrete
change in the tax-system policy vector 1, the welfare e"ect of moving from a self-reporting
regime to an information reporting and pre-population regime for charitable deductions is
equal to:
#W (1i,p, 1s) = b#G (1i,p, 1s)!#m (1i,p, 1s)! (MECF ! 1)#TE (1i,p, 1s) (3.7.3)
! (MECF )#A (1i,p, 1s) ,
where 1i,p = {Ri,p, &} and 1s = {Rs, &}. Introducing an information reporting and pre-
population regime increases social welfare if #W (1i,p, 1s) > 0. By rearrangement of Equation
(3.7.3), it can be seen that welfare rises if:
b#G (1i,p, 1s)!#m (1i,p, 1s) & (MECF ! 1)#TE (1i,p, 1s) + (MECF )#A (1i,p, 1s) . (3.7.4)
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The first term on the left-hand-side of Equation (3.7.4) is the social benefit from any increase
in charitable giving, and the second term is the social benefit from any reduction in compliance
costs. On the right-hand-side, the first term measures the increase in the social cost of
transferring income among taxpayers via charitable tax expenditures, and the second term
measures the social cost of an increase in administrative expenses. Administrative costs
receive a higher social weight than compliance costs because they are funded from after-tax
revenue raised using distortionary taxes.
We find no evidence of an increase in charitable giving accompanying the introduction of
information reporting and pre-population of deductions in 2008, in which case #G (1i,p, 1s) %
0. Hence, the introduction of information reporting and pre-population of deductions is
socially desirable only if the reduction in compliance costs for taxpayers is greater than the
appropriately weighted sum of any additional administration cost and the net social cost of
funding increased transfers among taxpayers via charitable tax deductions.
Denmark’s tax system has long featured widespread information reporting, so the marginal
increase in administrative costs from extending its use to charitable giving is likely to be
very small. Similarly, any reduction in audit costs from the use of information reporting for
charitable tax deductions is likely to be negligible, relative to the other terms in Equation
(3.7.4). Less than one percent of tax returns are routinely examined by an auditor, and
the fraction of all taxpayers reporting any charitable tax deductions under the self-reporting
regime was only about 3.5 percent. Compared to some sources of income line items, auditing
charitable tax deductions is not particularly costly for the tax authority, requiring only
cross-checking of taxpayer provided receipts against reported deductions. Together, these
considerations imply that any change in administrative costs due to the policy change is an
order of magnitude smaller than the social benefit of reduced compliance costs and the social
cost of increased charitable tax expenditures. Hence, our framework indicates that the policy
change increased social welfare i" ! "m"TE ! (MECF ! 1).
The MECF has been estimated in numerous empirical studies (see, for example, Ballard
et al., 1985, Gruber and Saez, 2002) and we have estimated the change in charitable tax
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expenditures due to the reform, but we must estimate the change in compliance costs. One
measure of the reduction in compliance costs borne by taxpayers due to the policy change is
the average value of forgone tax deductions under the self-reporting regime. This approach,
used by Pitt and Slemrod (1989) to estimate the magnitude of compliance costs for the
U.S. income tax system, provides a valid estimate under the assumptions that i) taxpayers
correctly estimate their cost of reporting charitable tax deductions; ii) the magnitude of
compliance costs is unrelated to the size of a taxpayer’s eligible charitable deduction, and
iii) taxpayers only fail to report their deductions when it is privately optimal to do so (when
compliance costs exceed tax benefits forgone). Under these assumptions, the average value
of forgone tax deductions provides an estimate of the average compliance cost borne by
those who did claim their charitable tax benefits under the self-reporting regime: in section
3.4, we estimated the average value of forgone tax deductions to be DKK262 per taxpayer.
Were there no increase in compliance costs borne by charities, then the aggregate reduction in
compliance costs is estimated to be !#m = DKK262*150, 311 % DKK39.4m (the average
value of compliance costs multiplied by the number of taxpayers claiming a deduction under
the self-reporting regime in 2007). The estimated increase in the value of tax expenditures
due to the reform is the increase in the after-tax value of tax deductions claimed between
2007 and 2008: #TE % DKK35m. Hence, ! "m"TE % 1.1 and the optimality condition
! "m"TE ! (MECF !1) is easily satisfied for standard estimates of the MECF, indicating that
the policy change was desirable under these assumptions.
Some of the reduction in compliance costs directly borne by taxpayers was undoubtedly
shifted to charities. Nevertheless, the shift in compliance cost from taxpayers to charities is
likely to have resulted in a reduction in overall compliance costs because of charities’ expertise
compared to taxpayers, and any economies of scale, in record keeping. Any marginal increase
in compliance costs imposed on charities by the information reporting requirement is likely
to be small because charities routinely record the names of donors and the size of their gifts
to aid their own fundraising e"orts and, in any case, charities eligible to receive tax-favored
contributions had to maintain similar records prior to the policy change in order to comply
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with SKAT’s annual reporting requirements. Perhaps more problematically, the value of
forgone deductions may overstate the magnitude of compliance costs borne by taxpayers
under the self-reporting regime: taxpayers may fail to claim eligible deductions for reasons
other than a rational cost-benefit calculation, such as inattention, which do not provide
evidence on the magnitude of compliance costs for those who did claim charitable deductions
under the self-reporting regime.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of substantial underclaiming of charitable tax deductions under
the self-reporting regime that existed in Denmark before 2008; the introduction of informa-
tion reporting and pre-population of charitable deductions coincided with a doubling in the
number of deductions claimed. We estimate the after-tax value of unclaimed charitable tax
deductions to have been about DKK262 per taxpayer per-year, but that the total value of
forgone benefits to be larger because many taxpayers systematically did not claim their el-
igible deductions under the self-reporting regime. We document that there was negligible
evasion under the self-reporting regime, and that there was no change in giving behavior
at the time of the reform. Most taxpayers making multiple charitable gifts appear to have
understood the giving incentives created by the notched subsidy scheme in place before 2012,
but a still sizable minority made dominated giving choices, in some cases repeatedly. Our
results caution researchers using tax return data to measure real behavioral response to be
aware of simultaneous (and possibly endogenous to the behavioral response) changes in re-
porting behavior; we have demonstrated that this is an important concern for low-value tax
deductions.
For tax administrators, perhaps the most surprising finding is that the introduction of infor-
mation reporting for a tax deduction line item can result in a loss in revenue—unlike sources
of income line items, for which information reporting has proven to be very successful at
limiting evasion opportunities and thus raising revenue collections (see Kleven et al., 2011,
144
and Slemrod, 2007). Nevertheless, even if it generates a revenue loss, such a reform may
be socially desirable, even if it has no e"ect on charitable giving; we have laid out a simple
modeling framework that shows how to appropriately weight the social cost of changes in
compliance and administrative cost due to such tax reporting reform.
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Notes: Approved Organizations refers to the
number of organizations SKAT recognizes as
eligible to receive tax deductible charitable
gifts. Reporting Organizations refers to the
subset that made an annual declaration to
SKAT in each year.
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Table 3.2: Taxpayers Reporting a Charitable Deduction: Summary Statistics
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of Deductions 162,983 150,311 300,122 325,525 365,167 388,976
Regular gifts 270,826 294,912 336,571 360,527
Long-Term Contracts 44,381 46,069 44,676 44,399
Mean Value (DKK) 4,033 4,671 2,697 2,689 2,650 2,593
Regular gifts 2,026 2,071 2,098 2,074
Long-Term Contracts 6,009 5,740 5,850 5,879
Median Value (DKK) 2,400 2,470 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,375
Regular gifts 1,350 1,375 1,300 1,280
Long-Term Contracts 2,526 2,400 2,500 2,500
Total Value (DKK, ’000) 657,310 702,103 809,429 875,337 967,693 1,008,615
Regular gifts 548,693 610,763 706,126 747,733
Long-Term Contracts 260,676 264,436 261,355 261,010
Notes: Number of Deductions is the number of taxpayers reporting a charitable deduction in each year
shown. For 2008 and after, charitable gifts were reported in two categories. Information reporting
and pre-population of deductions was introduced in 2008 for both regular and long-term gifts. The
total number of taxpayers claiming a charitable tax deduction in each year is less than the sum of
the two groups because some taxpayers claimed deductions in both categories.
Table 3.3: Number of Tax Deductible Claims: By Claim Size
Claim Size (DKK) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0-500 8,931 7,356 80,170 88,181 103,558 110,701
501-1,500 34,468 30,276 71,103 75,896 83,344 93,948
1,501-3,000 60,536 56,085 89,407 96,082 103,297 105,273
3,001-5,000 24,379 21,931 25,260 27,547 32,122 34,467
5,001-10,000 25,434 19,084 18,027 20,482 23,838 25,123
> 10,000 9,235 15,579 16,155 17,337 19,008 19,464
Mean 4,033 4,671 2,697 2,689 2,650 2,593
Median 2,400 2,470 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,375
Notes: Claim size is the amount of tax deductions received. Information reporting and
pre-population was introduced in 2008.
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Table 3.4: Charitable Tax Deductions Claimed: 2008
Number
Total deductions claimed in 2008 300,122
Filed a return 2006-2011 293,134
No deduction 2006-2007 152,857
3 deductions 2009-2011 104,197
2 deductions 2009-2011 15,571
1 deductions 2009-2011 13,961
0 deductions 2009-2011 19,128
Notes: Filed a return is the number of taxpayers who
claimed a charitable tax deduction in 2008 and filed a tax
return in each year 2006-2011. No deduction 2006-2007
is the subset who did not claim a charitable tax deduction
in 2006 or 2007. The No deduction 2006-2007 group is
split into four mutually exclusive groups according to the
number of charitable tax deductions claimed in the years
2009-2011.
Table 3.5: Tax Value of Regular Gifts
Taxpayer Charity Tax Deductible
1 2 3 Amount
A 400 0 0 0
B 0 700 0 200
C 500 500 0 500
D 500 500 400 500
Notes: This table shows the amount of regular tax de-
ductions received by four hypothetical taxpayers. Only
annual gifts of DKK500 or more per charity qualified
for a tax deduction before 2012, and the first DKK500
in total gifts is excluded in calculating the total value
of regular tax deductions. The value of charitable de-
ductions is equal to the deductible amount multiplied
by the one-third subsidy rate.
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Table 3.6: Dominated Giving Choices
2008 2009 2010 2011
2008 5,927 2,050 1,878 1,480
2009 7,350 2,421 1,925
2010 9,743 3,168
2011 11,624
Total 270,826 294,912 336,571 360,527
Notes: The diagonal elements report the number of
taxpayers making a dominated giving choice in that
year; the o!-diagonal elements report the number
of those taxpayers who made a dominated giving
choice in each subsequent year. For example, 5,927
taxpayers made a dominated choice in 2008, and of
those 1,878 also made a dominated choice in 2009
and 2010. Total is the number of taxpayers claiming
a regular charitable tax deduction in each year.
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Notes: The columns in this figure show the number of taxpayers reporting a charitable
deduction for the years 1997-2011, on the left-hand scale. The line shows the mean
value of tax deductions claimed, on the right-hand scale. The shaded columns are for
years in which there was information reporting and pre-population of deductions for
regular and long-term gifts.
150
















































Notes: This figure shows the number of taxpayers reporting a charitable deduction for
the years 2006-2011, by size of reported tax deduction. The claim size on the x-axis
is the amount of tax deduction claimed, not the total value of charitable gifts made.
Years for which there was information reporting and pre-population of deductions for
regular and long-term gifts correspond to the shaded bars.
151








































































Notes: This figure shows the distribution of tax
deductions claimed for the years 2006-2009. In-
formation reporting and pre-population for regu-
lar and long-term charitable gifts was introduced
in 2008.
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Notes: This figure reports OLS parameter estimates for the regression specification shown
by Equation (3.4.1). The error bars show a 95 percent confidence interval for each parameter
estimate. The intercept term indicates the probability that a taxpayer with the baseline set
of characteristics claimed a charitable tax deduction in the pre-reform period: the baseline
set of characteristics is a male taxpayer aged 46-65, in 50-75th income percentile, single,
residing outside Copenhagen, and not self-employed.
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Notes: This figure reports OLS parameter estimates for the regression specification shown
by Equation (3.4.1). The error bars show a 95 percent confidence interval for each parameter
estimate. The intercept term indicates the probability that a taxpayer with the baseline set
of characteristics claimed a charitable tax deduction in the pre-reform period: the baseline
set of characteristics is a male taxpayer aged 46-65, in 50-75th income percentile, single,
residing outside Copenhagen, and not self-employed.
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Notes: This figure reports OLS parameter estimates for the regression specification shown
by Equation (3.4.1). The error bars show a 95 percent confidence interval for each parameter
estimate. The intercept term indicates the probability that a taxpayer with the baseline set
of characteristics claimed a charitable tax deduction in the pre-reform period: the baseline
set of characteristics is a male taxpayer aged 46-65, in 50-75th income percentile, single,
residing outside Copenhagen, and not self-employed.
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Notes: The Tax Return Data line indicates the total number of information reports received
by SKAT from the 10 largest charities (aggregated by charity for each taxpayer), where
charity size is measured by the total number of information reports received by SKAT over
the period 2008-2011 (information reporting and pre-population for regular and long-term
charitable gifts was introduced in 2008). The Charity Data line indicates the number of
contributing members reported by those 10 charities. The dip in 2004 is due to a sharp drop
in the number of donors reported by one large charity. Because there was no accompanying
drop in the value of donations reported, we suspect this to be a reporting error.
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Notes: The Tax Return Data line indicates the total value of charitable donations contained
in information reports received by SKAT from the 10 largest charities, where charity size
is measured by the total number of information reports received by SKAT over the period
2008-2011 (information reporting and pre-population for regular and long-term charitable
gifts was introduced in 2008). The Charity Data line indicates the total value of donations
collected by those 10 charities.
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Notes: This figure shows the budget set for regular gifts, for a taxpayer
with total annual gifts of DKK500 or more to a particular charity.
All subsequent gifts to other charities qualify for tax deductibility





is a strictly dominated choice for a taxpayer because a
gift of g results in a higher level of charitable contributions and either
the same or a higher level of consumption of all other goods. At the
one-third subsidy rate, g = 500 and g = 333. The y-axis measures
consumption on all non-charitable items, less the largest charitable
donation in excess of the DKK500 threshold (g1).
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Notes: For the group of taxpayers with a maximum regular gift greater than or equal to
DKK500, this figure shows the number of other regular gifts made in 2011 (on the y-axis)
by gift amount (on the x-axis). Gift amounts are in bins of DKK33.3, with tick mark labels
corresponding to the lower limit of each bin. The solid bars show the number of strictly
dominated charitable gift choices made in 2011. A taxpayer makes a strictly dominated
choice if they make total annual gifts to at least one charity of DKK500 or more, and any
further total annual gifts to other charities of more than DKK333 but less than DKK500.
Raising any gift strictly inside the range DKK333-500 to DKK500 a!ords a higher level
of charitable contributions at either no or less cost to the taxpayer. A few taxpayers
made more than one strictly dominated choice, each of which is shown in the figure. The
distribution is similar for the years 2008-2010 in which data are available.
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3.9 Appendix































































Notes: The black line shows the average value of the change in charitable deductions
claimed between 2007 and 2008 for claims having a value no more than the upper limit
shown on the x-axis. That is, the mean value (m) of net new contributions between
2007 and 2008 conditional on claimed gifts (g) being no more than x is (m|g < x) =
[(V2008|g < x)! (V2007|g < x)] / [(N2008|g < x)! (N2007|g < x)], where (Vt|g < x) is the
total value of tax deductions less than x in value claimed in year t, and (Nt|g < x) is the
number of tax deductions with a value no more than x claimed in year t. The solid dot
sets x to its maximum observed value: x = xmax.
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Table 3.7: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Claimed a Tax Deduction
Coe!cient Std. Error t-Statistic
Intercept 0.02764 0.00027068 102.11
Female 0.01331 0.00016898 78.77
Married 0.01041 0.00018638 55.86
Copenhagen 0.01260 0.00024514 51.39
Self-Employed 0.02300 0.00028487 80.74
Time -0.00398 0.00016266 -24.45
Age: <25 -0.01014 0.00029713 -34.14
Age: 26-45 -0.01120 0.00020158 -55.55
Age: >65 0.01092 0.00027426 39.81
Income: 0-25th Percentile -0.02050 0.00026347 -77.82
Income: 25-50th Percentile -0.01263 0.00023914 -52.83
Income: 75-90th Percentile 0.01367 0.00026402 51.78
Income: 90-95th Percentile 0.02658 0.00039014 68.13
Income: 95-99th Percentile 0.03699 0.00042990 86.05
Income: Top Percentile 0.04671 0.00079829 58.51
Post 0.00293 0.00037333 7.86
Post * Female 0.02514 0.00020635 121.84
Post * Married -0.00744 0.00022603 -32.93
Post * Copenhagen 0.03868 0.00029907 129.35
Post * Self-Employed 0.00328 0.00034702 9.46
Post * Time 0.00961 0.00017064 56.30
Post * Age: <25 -0.00019246 0.00036645 -0.53
Post * Age: 26-45 0.00015791 0.00024668 0.64
Post * Age: >65 0.00474 0.00032730 14.48
Post * Income: 0-25th Percentile -0.01666 0.00032806 -50.78
Post * Income: 25-50th Percentile -0.00906 0.00029509 -30.71
Post * Income: 75-90th Percentile 0.00868 0.00032131 27.03
Post * Income: 90-95th Percentile 0.01531 0.00045837 33.39
Post * Income: 95-99th Percentile 0.02029 0.00050629 40.07
Post * Income: Top Percentile 0.02868 0.00092872 30.88
Notes: This table reports OLS regression output for Equation (3.4.1). The data
consists of the universe of taxpayers (4.37 million) observed over the years 2006-
2011. Time is a linear time trend, and the R-squared statistic for the regression is
0.0265. The omitted category represents a male taxpayer aged 46-65, in 50-75th
income percentile, single, residing outside Copenhagen, and not self-employed.
Robust standard errors have been used.
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